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This thesis contains three studies focusing on different dimensions of human capital:
investment decisions, resilience, and spillovers.
Chapter 1 investigates the importance of subjective expectations of returns to and
effort costs of maternal investments in newborns. We find heterogeneity across moth-
ers in expected effort costs and expected returns for outcomes in the cognitive, socio-
emotional, and health domains. While this contributes to explaining heterogeneity in
investments, we find no significant differences in preferences for child developmental
outcomes. The findings from simulating the impact of various policies on investments
highlight the relevance of interventions designed to reduce perinatal fatigue alongside
interventions that increase perceived returns to investments in children.
Chapter 2 exploits the expansion of a large-scale health insurance program in Mex-
ico and variation in local rainfall levels to estimate whether the increase in healthcare
coverage protected the educational attainment of primary school children in the event
of adverse climatic shocks. Results show that the universalization of healthcare mit-
igated the negative effect of atypical rainfall on test scores, particularly in more
marginalized and rural areas. An analysis of the mechanisms shows a reduced inci-
dence of sickness among children, lower demand for their time, and higher stability in
household consumption among program-eligible families exposed to rainfall shocks.
Chapter 3 explores whether parents benefit from bringing up and investing in
children. I instrument sibship size by exploiting gender preferences among Chinese
ix
households and address the endogeneity of parental investments by leveraging an
extension to the minimum compulsory schooling. In a context of low state welfare
provision I find that while the quantity of children has a null direct effect on the
physical, mental, or cognitive health of parents in later life, the reform-induced in-
crease in daughters’ education improved the physical and cognitive health of mothers,
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In recent decades, the world has seen a remarkable increase in the education level of its
population. Nevertheless, the positive evolution in educational attainment contrast
with recent evidence showing that more than one-half of children and adolescents
worldwide perform poorly in cognitive assessments, 68% of whom are attending school
(UIS, 2017). Studies have shown that gaps in children’s intellectual, physical, and
emotional development emerge early in life and widen over time (Cunha et al., 2006;
Ermisch et al., 2012; World Bank, 2015). Hamadani et al. (2014) show that significant
cognitive delays between children of different socio-economic backgrounds emerge as
early as 7 months old, well before reaching school-age. Parents thus play a crucial
role in the human capital acquired by their children, and understanding differences
in parental behavior are key to explain what is being considered a global learning
crisis.
In the model of parental investments developed by Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986),
heterogeneity in parental investments arises either from difference in resource con-
straints or from differences in parental preferences over child development. The model
therefore assumes that parents have perfect information as to how their investments
influence child outcomes. In Chapter 1 we relax this assumption (as in Cunha et al.,
2013), allowing that parents with similar resource constraints and preferences may
choose different levels of investment in their children due to differences in subjective
expectations (or beliefs) of the returns. In an important contribution to the literature,
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we also model the effort cost of investments directly, addressing a second limitation
of traditional models of parental investments which interpret resource constraints as
credit constraints, neglecting the relevance of mental and physical capacity.
To investigate the role of information frictions and perceived effort in parental
investment behavior we collect data on expected returns and effort costs from more
than 1,100 pregnant women in Pakistan. We focus on the perceived effect of exclusive
breastfeeding and stimulation through play (essential aspects of parenting in the first
months of life) on the cognitive, socio-emotional, and health outcomes. Although in
general mothers report positive expected returns to maternal investments, there is
substantial variation in their answers. Heterogeneity in effort cost is also present.
Using a discrete choice model in which mothers decide whether to breastfeed and
play, together with the expected returns and costs of the investments, we estimate
the preference parameters for child developmental outcomes. The main finding is
that differences in expected returns and effort costs across mothers contribute to
explain differences in maternal investments in infants, but that differences in prefer-
ences for child developmental outcomes play a limited role. Policy simulations using
the estimated structural parameters show that information campaigns targeting an
increase in maternal expected returns would raise investments in children. More-
over, increasing expected returns while simultaneously lifting effort cost shows the
strongest potential to foster maternal investments. The results evidence the potential
role of information policies as well as interventions to reduce the mental and physical
load on mothers to foster developmental outcomes in children.
While parents decide on the optimal investments in children based on resources,
preferences, and expectations, shocks experienced during childhood can endanger
children’s developmental outcomes. The extent to which shocks affect children’s
human capital, however, depends on the ability and coping mechanisms families have
access to.
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In Chapter 2 I inspect how the experience of negative shocks impact children’s per-
formance in school when the capacity of households to endure them is increased. I
define shocks as atypical rainfall levels and use the expansion of a large-scale pro-poor
health insurance program in Mexico that sought to establish universal healthcare in
the country (Seguro Popular). Combining information from a yearly national stan-
dardized test in primary education, the expansion in health coverage induced by the
reform of the health system, and rainfall precipitation, Chapter 2 shows the ability
of universal healthcare in protecting the cognitive development of children in the
event of adverse environmental shocks. The main results show that while adverse
rainfall shocks reduce mathematics and verbal attainment by 0.022 and 0.020 stan-
dard deviations respectively, a one standard deviation increase in healthcare coverage
mitigates 55% and 52% of the negative effect. The estimated results are driven by
schools located in more marginalized and rural areas. The finding adds on recent
studies examining the extent to which different programs or interventions can miti-
gate the negative effect of climatic and other environmental shocks on human capital
(Adhvaryu et al., 2019; Adhvaryu et al., 2018; Duque et al., 2019; Garg et al., 2017;
Gunnsteinsson et al., 2019).
An inspection of the mechanisms at play shows that health insurance reduces the
incidence of sickness among children from eligible families, decreases the demand for
children’s time, and protects households’ consumption levels in the event of negative
shocks. Chapter 2 highlights the potential role of universal healthcare in fostering
human capital resilience, by protecting cognitive attainment from climatic shocks
experienced during childhood. This is especially relevant given the large incidence of
environmental shocks among the poor, and the push by the WHO for the expansion
of universal healthcare as a major goal for health reform.
While most of the research in economics focuses on the returns to children from
parental investments, little is known on whether parents benefit from the human
4
capital of their children.
Becker’s seminal 1960 paper argues that parents obtain utility from both the quan-
tity and the quality of their children. The trade-off in fertility choice (Becker and
Lewis, 1973), by which parents must choose between how many children to have
and how much to invest on them, inspired models of parental utility maximization
to examine the relationship between returns to human capital and fertility decisions
(Becker et al., 1990; Galor, 2012; Galor and Weil, 2000; Hazan and Berdugo, 2002,
among others). Assessing whether parents benefit from the quantity and quality of
their children could be useful to better understand the evolution of fertility choices
and parental investments in children. For instance, previous empirical work has shown
a positive relationship between the value of child labor and fertility levels (Ager and
Herz, 2019; Caldwell, 1976) and between the returns to education and investments
in children (Attanasio et al., 2019a; Boneva and Rauh, 2018; Chiswick, 1988). Dif-
ferent from previous work on parental utility maximization, In Chapter 3 I inspect
returns to parents from the quantity and the quality of their children in the form of
measurable health outcomes in later life.
I exploit son preference among Chinese households and the quasi-random assign-
ment of the firstborn’s gender to instrument for fertility levels, and an extension to
the minimum compulsory schooling to instrument for children’s education. I focus
on the effect of fertility choices on indices of parental physical, mental, and cognitive
health among a representative sample of Chinese residents aged 45 and older. The
findings show that while fertility does not have any statistically significant direct
long-term effect on parental health, the reform-induced increase in daughters’ educa-
tion improved mothers’ physical health by 0.14 standard deviations (two-thirds of the
gender gap in physical health), and increased parental cognitive achievement by 0.16
standard deviations (29% of the cognitive premium from primary school completion)
- an effect driven by the sample of mothers.
5
The findings in Chapter 3 suggest an underestimation in previous studies of the
effect of policies promoting higher education among girls as a means to reduce gen-
der inequality, as they typically fail to account for the positive externalities accruing
to their mothers. Assessing the return to offspring quantity and quality is not only
critical to understanding fertility behavior and parental investments in children, but
also to evaluate potential externalities accruing to parents from policies promoting
reduced fertility levels, banning child labor, or expanding compulsory schooling as a
means to increase children’s human capital. The results show that both children and
parents’ human capital can improve from reduced fertility levels and higher invest-
ments in children, and add to the literature on the intergenerational transmission of
poverty by showing how low levels of human capital among children in large families
could also negatively affect their parents in the long-run. To the best of my knowl-
edge, this is the first study that attempts to disentangle the relative return from




Maternal Investments in Children:
The Role of Expected Effort and
Returns
1.1 Introduction
Gaps in children’s intellectual, physical, and emotional development by family-level
deprivation emerge early in childhood and tend to widen over time (Cunha et al.,
2006; Ermisch et al., 2012; World Bank, 2015). It is estimated that at least half
of the variation across individuals in lifetime earnings arises from attributes deter-
mined by age 18 (Cunha et al., 2005; Huggett et al., 2011; Keane and Wolpin, 1997).
Early childhood developmental outcomes are shaped by a combination of neurolog-
ical, physiological, and environmental factors, including nutrition, stress, and the
responsivity and stimulation offered by parents and other caregivers. Parents thus
play a crucial role, and differences in parental behaviours must be an important facet
of the emergence of unequal capabilities in children.
In the model of parental investments pioneered by Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986),
8 Chapter 1. Maternal Investments in Children
heterogeneity in parental investments arises either from differences in resource con-
straints or from differences in parental preferences over child development. As it can
be difficult to modify preferences, this has led to a tradition of seeking to ameliorate
childhood inequalities through cash transfers. However, the evidence that untargeted
income transfers to poor families boost child outcomes is ambiguous (Caucutt and
Lochner, 2020; Heckman and Mosso, 2014).
We contribute to recent research highlighting the potential relevance of two ad-
ditional constraints on parental investments – information frictions and effort costs.
The Beckerian model assumes that parents have perfect information on how their
investments influence child outcomes (henceforth, expected returns). As in Cunha
et al. (2013), we relax this assumption, allowing that parents with similar preferences
and resource constraints may choose different levels of investment in their children
because they have different subjective expectations (or beliefs) of the returns. If
this is the case, interventions that offer information to mothers may redress early
gaps in development. However, even if mothers update their beliefs about returns
to their investments in children, effort costs may constrain investment. Effort costs
may arise, for instance, from postnatal fatigue, depression, or the cognitive load as-
sociated with poverty (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013; Putnam, 2016), and failing
to address these constraints may limit the effectiveness of a range of early childhood
interventions. In an important contribution to the literature, we model effort cost
directly, addressing a second limitation of traditional models of parental investments
which interpret resource constraints as credit constraints, neglecting the relevance of
mental and physical capacity.
To investigate the role of information and effort costs, we elicit baseline data on
expected returns and effort costs from a sample of more than 1,100 pregnant women
in rural and peri-urban Pakistan and measure investments when their children are
three months old. In particular, we elicit probabilistic beliefs about investment re-
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turns in terms of child development in various domains: cognitive (language and
learning well at school), socio-emotional (playing with other children), and health
(diarrhea, the leading cause of death among infants and children in Pakistan). We
use visual aids following the approach developed by Delavande and Kohler (2009)
and reviewed in Delavande (2014). We elicit expected effort costs by asking mothers
how tiring they anticipate the activities of breastfeeding and play to be. We focus
on exclusive breastfeeding and guided play as these are essential aspects of parenting
and attachment-creation in the first months of life. Moreover, parenting and attach-
ment have been argued to be among the most critical family-level factors influencing
human capital and social mobility (Heckman and Mosso, 2014).1
The expectations and cost data we elicit are well-behaved. For example, the vast
majority of respondents respect the basic properties of probabilities when answer-
ing the questions. In general, mothers report positive expected returns to maternal
investments. They expect exclusive breastfeeding to have its highest impact on chil-
dren’s health (with, on average, a 39 pp expected reduction in the likelihood that
the child will experience diarrhea), while they expect guided play to have its highest
impact on cognition (with, on average, an increase of 35 pp in the expectation that
the child will learn well at school). There is, however, substantial variation in ex-
pected returns. Expected costs also vary across mothers, with around 39% of them
reporting that they expect to find breastfeeding to be tiring, and 35% saying they
expect that playing with the child will be tiring. Heterogeneity in both expected
returns and effort costs exhibits a gradient in socio-economic status (measured by
education and wealth). We also find that expected effort costs for both investments
are higher among women who are depressed in pregnancy, but we find no significant
association of depression with expected returns.
1Fitzsimons and Vera-Hernández (2013) identify a positive causal impact of breastfeeding on
cognitive development, and several other studies have associated breastfeeding with attachment
(e.g., Britton et al., 2006). Attanasio et al. (2020) identify impacts of structured play on cognitive
development among toddlers.
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We use the data on investments as well as the expected returns and costs measured
before any investment is made, to estimate preference parameters for child develop-
mental outcomes and effort costs using a discrete choice model in which mothers
decide whether to breastfeed and play. Our main finding is that differences across
mothers in expected returns and expected effort costs contribute to differences in
maternal investments, but that differences in preferences for child developmental
outcomes play a limited role. Learning well at school appears to be the most impor-
tant development outcome determining early childhood investment.2 The estimated
elasticities with respect to returns are about 4 to 5 times larger than in studies in-
vestigating the elasticities of education choices with respect to expected earnings
(Arcidiacono, 2004; Delavande and Zafar, 2019; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). There
are no previous estimates of the elasticity of maternal investment with respect to
perceived costs.
We use the structural parameters to simulate the impact of alternative policies that
raise expected returns or lift effort costs. In line with previous research, we find that
an information policy that increases mothers’ expected returns raises both invest-
ments. Information interventions are inexpensive relative to resource interventions
(like cash transfers or school construction), and issues of parental responses such as
crowd-out do not arise. In a departure from previous research, we also demonstrate,
for the case of guided play, that eliminating effort costs leads to a significant increase
in stimulation. Investment in play increases by 12% (3.8 pp from a baseline of 31%)
in a simulation in which effort costs are set to zero – a magnitude that happens to
be the same as that which results from raising expected returns by the interquartile
range of the returns distribution. Increasing expected returns while at the same time
lifting effort cost shows the strongest potential to foster maternal investments, with
2At baseline we also elicit preferences by asking women how much they care about each devel-
opment outcome that we analyze. A larger fraction of women say they care about the child learning
well at school than for the other developmental outcomes. When we estimate our model with all
developmental outcomes together, then learning wins the horse race.
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a large increase in play of 25% under the scenarios specified above.3 In an alternative
simulation, we investigate the effect of treating depression by setting an indicator for
whether the mother is depressed to zero and replacing the expected returns and costs
reported by depressed mothers with the averages from the non-depressed sample.
This results in an increase in investment in play of 8%, consistent with our finding
that depression exacerbates effort costs.4 Our results indicate a potential role for in-
formation policies as well as interventions that act to lighten the mental and physical
load on new mothers, such as mothers groups or depression treatments, as a way to
foster child development.
Following recognition of the identification problem that arises because many com-
binations of preferences and expectations yield the same choice (Delavande, 2008;
Manski, 2004; Savage, 1954), a number of recent studies combine expectations data
with choice data to better understand forward-looking decisions (Arcidiacono et al.,
2012; Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2014; Delavande, 2008; Delavande and Kohler, 2016;
Delavande and Zafar, 2019; Giustinelli, 2016; R. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner,
2012, 2014a, 2014b; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018).5 With some recent exceptions dis-
cussed next, this research has not studied the role of parental expectations in deter-
mining parental investment in children. Dizon-Ross (2019) differs from us in eliciting
parental beliefs about the child’s academic performance and providing information
on actual school grades rather than on expected returns to investing in children. At-
tanasio et al. (2019a), Attanasio et al. (2019b), Boneva and Rauh (2018) and Cunha
3This combined intervention is also effective at reducing differences in investment across mothers
with high vs low ends education and wealth and the difference between mothers who were and were
not depressed in pregnancy.
4The data show that mothers who are depressed in pregnancy are 9.7 and 8 percentage points
more likely to say that they expect breastfeeding and playing with their child will be tiring. In line
with this, the data also show that women who are depressed in pregnancy are less likely to make
both investments at 3 months.
5An alternative approach to the direct use of expectations data is to rely on stated choices for
multiple hypothetical scenarios as in Adams-Prassl and Andrew (2019). This approach delivers the
population average of beliefs vs preferences by comparing parent responses to certain vs uncertain
choices. It is therefore not appropriate when one wants individual-specific expectations to associate
them with choices.
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et al. (2013, 2019) are similar to us in eliciting beliefs about returns to parental in-
vestments but, in contrast to us, they do not elicit effort costs. Our approach also
differs from these studies in eliciting perceived returns in the health, cognitive and
socio-emotional domains. With the exception of Biroli et al. (2018) who investigate
parental beliefs about the returns to diet and exercise among children age 5-18 in the
UK, related studies have focused on cognitive, education, or earnings returns.
Although to our knowledge the effort costs of mothers in making early postnatal
investments have not been directly measured or incorporated before in models of
maternal investments, a number of recent papers show that non-pecuniary factors or
psychic costs influence (own) education decisions (Boneva and Rauh, 2019; Cunha
et al., 2005; Delavande and Zafar, 2019; Eisenhauer et al., 2015; Navarro and Zhou,
2016). From a methodological perspective, if expected returns and effort costs are
correlated, then omitting costs in the choice model will tend to bias estimates of the
importance of preferences (see also the discussion in Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). From a
substantive perspective, non-pecuniary costs for maternal investments, which include
physical and mental constraints, may render simple tasks such as breastfeeding or
interacting with a child burdensome. Physically, it can take a mother a year or
more to recuperate from pregnancy and replenish stocks of vital nutrients (DaVanzo
and Pebley, 1993). Mental constraints may arise from perinatal depression, which is
estimated to affect 10 percent of women in high-income countries and 20 percent in
low and middle-income countries. The condition often goes undiagnosed and hence
untreated (Gelaye et al., 2016), and is associated with stress and fatigue (Cohen et
al., 1982; Den Hartog et al., 2003). Effort costs may similarly be elevated on account
of the burdens of poverty. Recent work shows that the stress of poverty can enhance
cognitive load and trigger tunnelling in decision-making (Mani et al., 2013; Schilbach
et al., 2016).
Our study is one of the few to analyze the role of maternal subjective expectations
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of returns and costs in the context of child development in a developing country.6
There is an ongoing global learning crisis affecting the developing world as well as poor
families in developed countries, with an estimated 39 percent of the world’s children
under age five failing to attain their cognitive potential (e.g., Grantham-McGregor
et al., 2007; UNESCO, 2014). In line with the finding that parental beliefs about
the returns to investment are downward biased among parents of low socio-economic
status (Cunha et al., 2013), it seems plausible that returns are underestimated in
many developing countries (Attanasio et al., 2019b). Similarly, perceived costs are
likely to be higher in low-income settings, where constraints on time and energy are
tighter. For these reasons, the returns to interventions that lead people to update
beliefs on returns, or that reduce effort costs, are likely to be higher in developing
countries.
Our finding that maternal depression elevates the perceived costs of play with
the infant child contributes to an emerging literature on depression and economic
decision-making. In the US and Pakistani context, respectively, Ronda (2016) and
Baranov et al. (2020) find that depression hinders maternal investments. Both studies
suggest that effort cost may be important but cannot test for this directly due to lack
of data on this cost. De Quidt and Haushofer (2016) formulate a theoretical model
in which depression leads to an individual having downward biased beliefs about
returns to their effort (i.e., their productivity), as a result of which they supply less
effort. As far as we know, their hypothesis has not been tested – we provide the first
empirical test of an association of expected returns with depression. Our findings tie
in with their overall conclusion that depression can lead to lower investments but,
for the case of maternal investments in children, our evidence is not consistent with
depression biasing beliefs downward but, rather, with depression elevating perceived
effort costs.
6Attanasio et al. (2019b) elicit subjective expectations in Colombia.
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The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces our model of
early-life investments. Section 1.3 describes our data collection framework and our
measures of maternal beliefs, costs, and investments. Section 1.4 provides descrip-
tive evidence on the different variables feeding the model, and Section 1.5 specifies
the empirical model and reviews the estimates. Section 1.6 carries out a series of
robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of the assumptions and specifications. Sec-
tion 1.7 provides results from policy simulations targeting an increase in maternal
investments in early-life. Finally, section 1.8 offers some concluding remarks.
1.2 A simple static model of early-life maternal in-
vestments
Here we set out a simple model of maternal investments that motivates the data
collection and empirical analysis. Consider a mother i who has recently given birth
to a child. For simplicity, we assume here that the newborn is the only (first) child
in the household, but we relax this assumption in the estimation. The mother’s
utility depends on household consumption ci, and on three dimensions of her child’s
human capital in early (preschool) childhood (health hi, cognitive ability ai, and
socio-emotional development si) as well as one dimension of development during
later childhood (learning well at school li). The mother can engage in two different
binary investments in the preschool period, breastfeeding ei1 and stimulating her
child through play ei2. These investments may impose an effort or psychic cost on
the mother and produce a return in terms of the child’s development. Since we
measure investments at a very young age (3 months) in a low-income setting with
virtually no female labor force participation, we abstract from monetary investments.
For tractability, we assume that the utility function is additively separable, and
logarithmic in consumption.
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The mother’s utility is given by:
Ui(ci, hi, ai, si, li, ei1, ei2) =
αln(ci) + uhi(hi) + uai(ai) + usi(si) + uli(li)− C(ei1, ei2) + εei (1.1)
where α is the utility value of log consumption, uji(j) is the utility associated with
the child’s human capital outcome j (j ∈ hi, ai, si, li), C(ei1, ei2) is the effort cost of
engaging in the different investments (ei1, ei2), which we will simply call cost from
now on, and εei is a random term which is individual and investment-specific, and
unobservable to the econometrician. To reflect the scarcity of well-functioning credit
markets in rural Pakistan, we assume there is no borrowing or lending so that mothers
will consume their household earnings yi.
A key feature of the model is that mothers face uncertainty about the child’s fu-
ture human capital outcomes at the time of choosing the investment levels as well
as about the actual cost they will incur.7 Although each combination of investment
levels (ei1, ei2) is associated with an objective probability for the realization of the
developmental outcomes (i.e. there is a technology of skills production), the individ-
ual mother possesses subjective beliefs Pi(j|ei1, ei2) about the realization of a child’s
human capital outcome j (j ∈ hi, ai, si, li) when engaging in (ei1, ei2) and, similarly,
expectations about the cost she will incur Ei[C(ei1, ei2)]. The mother’s problem is,
therefore, to choose investment levels (ei1, ei2) that maximize her subjective expected
utility:
7For instance, breastfeeding or guided play may take a longer or shorter time than anticipated,
they may be demanded by the child at unexpected times (that elevate the cost of providing them),
and they may cause more or less fatigue or stress depending on the day.
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EUi(yi, Pi, Ei(C), ei1, ei2) = αln(yi) + Pi(hi|ei1, ei2)uhi(hi) +
Pi(ai|ei1, ei2)uai(ai) + Pi(si|ei1, ei2)usi(si) +
Pi(li|ei1, ei2)uli(li)− Ei[C(ei1, ei2)] + εei (1.2)
Using data on maternal investments, and data on expected returns and costs mea-
sured prior to the investment decision, our empirical analysis seeks to make inference
(up to scale) on the parameters of the mother’s utility function. This will illuminate
whether variation in investments observed across children originates from variation
in expectations about returns, expectations about costs, or preferences.
We acknowledge that this simple model abstracts from potentially important con-
siderations. First, the maximisation problem (1.2) is assumed to be made without
any constraints. The investments we focus on when the child is age 3 months do not
carry a direct monetary cost, and foregone earnings are not relevant in our sample
as female labour force participation is essentially inexistent.8 As such, credit con-
straints will not directly restrict investments in our set-up but we will nevertheless
allow effort cost to depend on household wealth or income. We also allow invest-
ments to be influenced by time constraints. We already account for this, in part, by
introducing expected effort costs. However, in specification checks, we will produce
separate estimates for households in which the mother is more vs less likely to be
time-constrained to assess if the results are different. Second, assuming separability
in the utility function implies that the utility a mother receives from any one develop-
mental outcome is independent from the utility she receives from others. This makes
elicitation of subjective expectations more tractable and allows us to capture “first-
8Only 6% of mothers responded they normally work. Although women’s labour force participa-
tion is in general low in this region, recall that the women in our sample are pregnant and baseline
and three months post-partum at follow-up.
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order” effects in a context where we still know very little. Third, the model abstracts
from endowment effects. This is a realistic assumption in our rural setting, as birth
weight is typically not measured, and healthcare workers do not monitor child health
with any known metric or provide scaled feedback.9 Despite these caveats, the model
captures the main trade-offs that a mother faces in her decision-making process and
can be estimated with the expected return and cost data we collected without making
restrictive assumptions on the mother’s knowledge about the production function for
skills and on the effort cost that the investments entail.
1.3 Study design
1.3.1 Sample
The data were collected as part of a longitudinal cohort study called Bachpan (which
means childhood in Urdu) in rural and peri-urban Pakistan in 2016-2017. The data
were collected electronically using tablets, uploaded daily to the main server, and
checked weekly for inconsistencies. Although not used in our analysis, the study
incorporated a cluster-randomized control trial addressing perinatal depression with
a cognitive behavioural therapy approach. As a result, the study over-sampled de-
pressed women. A description of the data is available in Sikander et al. (2015) and
Turner et al. (2016). In total, 1154 pregnant women were recruited in 40 clusters,
570 of whom were screened positive for a depressive disorder, and enrolled in the
depression trial, with around half in each of the intervention and control arms. The
remaining 584 women were not depressed in pregnancy. Baseline data were collected
when mothers were in their third trimester of pregnancy, the time of recruitment
into the study. At that time, women had not yet received any form of treatment for
9Note also that to account for endowments, one would need to elicit expectations conditional
on various endowments level, which implies that the number of questions increases n-fold for n
endowment levels as, for instance, in Cunha et al. (2013) and Boneva and Rauh (2018), and increases
survey time as well as respondents’ burden.
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depression. Depression was assessed using the patient health questionnaire (PHQ-9),
which queries a series of symptoms of depression (see Data Appendix B for a detailed
list of all items evaluated). The intervention was a positive thinking therapy focusing
on the mother’s personal health, her interactions with the child, and with others (Atif
et al., 2017). We do not use the trial-induced variation because the expected returns
and effort cost data were collected at baseline.10
We use two different samples for our analyses. We elicited expected returns and
costs of early-life investments for all women in the baseline data (depressed and not
depressed and irrespective of their treatment arm allocation), and these are the data
used to describe expected returns and costs. This first sample includes 1,090 women
given an item non-response rate of 5.6% on the questions pertaining to expected re-
turns and cost. Maternal investments were measured in a follow-up survey carried out
when the children were 3 months old. For the main analysis modelling investments
(section 1.5), we exclude mothers in the intervention arm. This is to be conservative
and address the possibility that the depression intervention had a direct effect on
parenting behaviour, but we investigate the sensitivity of our results to this restric-
tion.11 This second sample consists of 626 women. The smaller sample size at the
3-month survey reflects a 23% attrition rate between waves (including 8% of miscar-
riage/stillbirth, 1% of women not surveyed due to child’s illness, and 14% of women
not surveyed for other reason which we know is primarily because many mothers in
these communities go to live with their own mother soon after giving birth).
Given that the trial oversampled women with depression, we use two different sets
of weights to account for the regional prevalence of maternal depression, which was
30%. We first weight observations at baseline to account for the difference between
10(Sikander et al., 2019) found no treatment effect on symptom severity or remission from peri-
natal depression at 6 months after childbirth, but they found that the intervention was beneficial
on some other metrics of severity and disability.
11We nonetheless do not find any significant association of the depression intervention on actual
maternal investments at month 3.
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the real prevalence of maternal depression and the share of depressed mothers in
our sample, and we construct a second weight variable to account for the exclusion
of mothers receiving the intervention when examining the link between maternal
beliefs and investments at 3 months.12 Nevertheless, we confirm that our results are
insensitive to the inclusion of treated mothers in the model estimation and to using
weights.
Tables 1.1a and 1.1b provide descriptive statistics for (1) the original unweighted
sample; (2) the baseline weighted sample which we will be using to describe elicited
expectations over returns and costs; and (3) the 3-month weighted follow-up sample
which we use to measure maternal investments. Mothers in our sample are 26 years
old on average, with a mean parity of 2.5 children including the current pregnancy,
and about 30% of them are pregnant with their first child. They have, on average,
about 8 years of completed education, around 33% of them have 5 or fewer years of
education, and their labour force participation rate is very low, at 6%. The difference
between the weighted and unweighted samples is primarily in depression levels (since
the weights are designed to map the 30% depression prevalence of the study area) and
in variables known to be associated with the incidence of maternal depression- namely
education, wealth and parity.13 There are no statistically significant differences in
variable means between the weighted samples at baseline and 3 months. Appendix
Table A.1 presents descriptive characteristics by attrition status. Column (1) presents
characteristics for women who are included in the 3-month sample and column 2 for
women who are not. Reassuringly, demographic characteristics and expected returns
and effort costs are similar across the two groups, so it does not seem that at 3 months
we have a selected sample of the women at baseline.
12The weights are constructed by post-stratification. In our sample, the two strata considered
are depressed and non-depressed. Each weight is constructed by adjusting the observations in each
stratum such that with independence of the sample used, the weighted prevalence of depression in
the sample matches the overall depression rate in the study region.
13The Data Appendix B details the construction of the wealth measure.
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1.3.2 Expected returns, effort costs and maternal investments
Measuring expectations. We elicit maternal beliefs on the productivity of early-
life investments using visual aids, as is commonly done in developing countries (Dela-
vande, 2014; Delavande and Kohler, 2009). In particular, we used a card with bars
numbered from 0 to 10. Each bar is made up of equal-sized blocks (e.g., 1 block
for 1, 3 blocks for 3) and we explain that one block means one chance out of ten.
Data Appendix B details the survey design. We started with a preamble intended to
explain the notion of a probability, followed by a question designed to test whether
women had understood the concept.
We then directly elicited probabilities for whether a child will reach specified de-
velopmental milestones conditional on high vs low levels of maternal investment.14
These questions were framed with reference to a mother and child in the community
rather than with reference to the respondent and her child. As such, we expect the re-
sponses to capture beliefs about each woman’s expectations of the technology of skills
formation in her community. The questions focus on two key investments (exclusive
breastfeeding and guided play) and four child developmental outcomes: experiencing
frequent diarrhea (health), putting 2-3 words together in speaking by age 2 (cognitive
ability); playing happily with other children by age 3 (socio-emotional development)
and learning well at school. The high and low levels of maternal investment were
specified as exclusive breastfeeding for 6 months versus not doing this, and playing
14Cunha et al. (2019) discusses two ways to measure maternal subjective expectations. The first
relies on asking mothers the likelihood that a milestone will be reached like we do. The second
asks mothers to report what they think the youngest and oldest age is at which a child will reach a
milestone, which requires additional steps to transform answers into probabilities. This is also the
method adopted in Attanasio et al. (2019b) in Colombia. In Cunha et al. (2019), the probabilities
elicited using the first method appear uncorrelated with the difficulty of the milestone considered
but both methods yield measures of beliefs that behave sensibly, for instance, being correlated with
investments as measured by the HOME score. We used probabilistic beliefs as they have worked
well in many different low-income settings (see Delavande (2014) for a review). Moreover, even in
developed countries, individuals tend to have difficulties with providing a minimum and a maximum,
as shown by the low response rate in Dominitz and Manski (2011). Finally, beliefs elicited with
the format we use can be analysed without making any assumptions on maternal beliefs about the
shape of the production function for skills.
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frequently with the child to help her learn new things versus playing rarely. For
example, the questions were phrased as:
In your view, what is the likelihood that a child will put 2-3 words together in speaking
by the age of 2 years:
(i) If the mother plays with the child frequently to help them learn new things?
(ii) If the mother rarely plays with the child to help them learn new things?
Importantly, the questions were asked in pregnancy before any investments were made
to avoid any feedback from investments to beliefs.
Effort cost. We elicited expected effort costs associated with making the invest-
ments by asking mothers at baseline (before birth) to report on a Likert scale how
tiring they expected it would be to breastfeed or to play with a baby (see Data
Appendix B).
Measuring maternal investments. During the 3-month follow-up interviews, we
measured the two maternal early-life investments for which we had gathered data on
beliefs regarding returns and costs. To measure exclusive breastfeeding, mothers
were asked about all the nutrients given to their child in the last 24 hours (see Data
Appendix B for a complete list of all the nutrients evaluated and Appendix Table
A.2 for a detailed summary of feeding practices in our study area). Mothers are
considered as exclusively breastfeeding if they are giving only breast milk. While
93% of mothers are breastfeeding their 3-month old baby, only 49% are exclusively
breastfeeding (Table 1.1c). Guided play is a question collected within the Infant-
Toddler Home Observation Measurement of the Environment (HOME) inventory
questionnaire designed for children aged 0-3 (Cox et al., 2002) asking the mother
whether she guides the child during play. See Data Appendix B for details. We
focused on this particular question as it matches very closely the investment portrayed
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in the expectation questions. Using this variable, 33% of mothers were guiding during
play with their 3-month old baby. We conduct robustness checks replacing the chosen
play question with multiple alternative items from the HOME inventory in Section
1.6.
Why early infancy. As our focus on very early infancy is an important feature,
we briefly elaborate its rationale here. The velocity of physical and cognitive growth
is higher in infancy than at any later period in life and there is considerable develop-
mental plasticity, making the newborn child particularly sensitive to environmental
influences including nutrition and stimulation, the two investments that we analyze
(Almond et al., 2018; D. J. Barker, 1990, 1995; Bateson et al., 2004). In a context
similar to ours (Bangladesh), Hamadani et al. (2014) show that significant cognitive
delays between children of different socio-economic backgrounds are apparent as early
as 7 months old, motivating the need to investigate differences in parental investments
in the very first months of a child’s life. Once differences in initial conditions develop,
they tend to be “self-productive” and to exhibit dynamic complementarity with sub-
sequent investments, as a result of which inequalities widen with age (Cunha and
Heckman, 2007). As a result, infancy is a critical period for investment (Heckman
and Kautz, 2014). Our focus on early infancy also facilitates a cleaner analysis by
limiting the agency of the child (the relevance of which is discussed, for instance, in
Heckman and Mosso, 2014), allowing us to isolate determinants of maternal invest-
ment from data on mother’s expectations and effort cost.
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1.4 Description of investments, expected returns and
effort costs
1.4.1 Heterogeneity in investments
We estimate conditional associations of maternal investments with baseline values of
the mother’s education, wealth, and depression status using linear regression (Ap-
pendix Table A.3). Exclusive breastfeeding does not vary with any of these char-
acteristics, but play does. Mothers who are asset poor or depressed in pregnancy
are significantly less likely to guide their 3-month old baby during play, possibly
indicating that time and energy constraints are more likely to bind in these cases.
Our analysis focuses on joint investments, allowing that women either make both
investments, neither or one and not the other. In our sample, 36% of mothers make
neither investment, 32% breastfeed but do not guide play, 15% do not breastfeed but
guide play, and only 18% make both investments when the child is age 3 months
(Table 1.1c). We observe a wealth and depression gradient in indicators of joint
investments (Table 1.2). We find that 20% of mothers with wealth above the sample
median, in contrast to 15% with wealth below the median make both investments,
while 33% of wealthier mothers compared with 39% of less wealthy mothers make
neither investment. Similarly, 20% of non-depressed mothers in contrast to 11% of
depressed mothers make both investments, while 34% of non-depressed mothers and
41% of depressed mothers make neither investment (Appendix Figure A.1).
1.4.2 Expected returns to maternal investments and effort
cost
Subjective expectations data. We describe the expectations in more detail be-
fore discussing data quality considerations. The individual subjective probabilities
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for the two maternal investment scenarios and the four developmental outcomes are
displayed in Figures 1.1a and 1.1b. The figures reveal considerable heterogeneity in
expectations, with probabilities taking all values between 0 and 1. The modal answer
is 1 in the high-investment scenario and 0.5 in the low-investment scenario (with the
exception of the case of returns to breastfeeding in terms of lower diarrhea). Figures
1.2a and 1.2b transform the data into expected returns (i.e., difference in expected
outcomes between the high and low investment cases). Three behavioural tendencies
emerge from these figures: (i) On average, women perceive positive returns to both
investments: 74 to 82% of women report higher chances of positive child developmen-
tal outcomes with the investment than without15 – and the expected returns are large,
varying between 16 pp (for playing-diarrhea) and 39 pp (for breastfeeding-diarrhea).
(ii) Breastfeeding is expected to have the largest impact on child health (an average
39 pp expected reduction in the likelihood that the child will experience diarrhea),
relative to no breastfeeding. On the other hand, playing is expected to be most effec-
tive in influencing learning (with an average increase of 35 pp that the child will learn
well at school) and cognitive outcomes (with an average increase of 33 pp that the
child will put 2-3 in speaking words by age 2). These differences are all statistically
significant at conventional levels.16 Playing is expected to have only a limited impact
on health – notice the large heaping in Figure 1.2b, indicating that 22% expect a zero
return. (iii) There is substantial heterogeneity in expected returns. For instance, the
expected return from breastfeeding on diarrhea is 20 pp in the bottom quartile and
60 pp in the upper quartile. Similarly, the expected return from playing on learning
is 10 pp in the bottom quartile and 60 pp in the upper quartile.
15An exception is that only 55% of mothers estimate a positive return to playing in terms of
reduced incidence of diarrhea. We may have expected most mothers to report zero returns from
playing on diarrhea but we see in Figure 1.2b that only 22% did. However, debriefing during the
pilot revealed that several respondents reported that playing with the child would, by increasing
their time together, enable the mother to spot early signs of diarrhea and act on them quickly.
16The difference between the expected return on learning and the expected return on speaking
from playing frequently with the child is not statistically significant if calculated as an unpaired
sample mean difference, but it is at the 5% level using a paired t-test.
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We investigated if the heterogeneity in expected returns is correlated with demo-
graphic and socio-economic characteristics of the mother. Simple regressions are in
Tables 1.3a and 1.3b, and the corresponding distributions in Appendix Figure A.2.
There is an education gradient for most investment-outcome pairs and a wealth gra-
dient for some, in line with the finding of Cunha et al. (2013, 2019) that women of
low socio-economic status tend to have downward biased beliefs.17
There is no evidence in our sample that depression modifies beliefs, in contrast to
the priors set out in De Quidt and Haushofer (2016).18 We might expect higher parity
mothers to have different beliefs than those expecting their first child as they may
have had the opportunity to learn from previous children, although this will matter
less if they also learn from their peers. However, we find that beliefs of first-time
mothers are in general not systematically different from those of more experienced
mothers.
We observe that 19% of women report a zero return for at least one investment-
outcome pair, which is a plausible answer. More educated mothers are less likely to
report four or more zero returns (column 3, Table A.5). A lot of the heterogeneity in
expectations is left unexplained by mother characteristics (R-square in Tables 1.3a
and 1.3b is always below 0.05). This is typically the case with expectations data,
even in other domains.
Data quality considerations. We conduct several validity checks to assess the
quality of the expectations data. We started our expectations module with a test
17The education gradient is essentially a difference between mothers with no education (15%
of the sample) vs some education. For example, mothers with any education at all expect that
exclusively breastfeeding for 6 months reduces the probability that a child experiences diarrhea by
8.5pp more than women with no education (column 4, Table 1.3a). Wealth is measured as an index
of asset ownership.
18We use a binary measure of maternal depression based on each of the SCID and the PHQ-9
following the psychometric literature. There is no gradient even if we use different cut-off of the
depression score (Appendix Tables A.4a and A.4b). This may be due to the fact that women answer
questions about the technology of skills in their community. But we find similar results when using
beliefs about own child and own investment elicited when the child is 36 months in questions related
to school readiness and ability to share.
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question asking about the likelihood of a woman in their community going to the
market (a) in the next 2 days and (b) in the next 2 weeks. The distribution of
respondent answers to these questions is displayed in Appendix Figure A.3. The figure
shows a clear shift of the distribution to the right when the time horizon increases,
highlighting that women recognize that the probability of going to the market is
higher the longer the time span. Only 3.3% of respondents violated the monotonicity
property of probabilities by reporting a strictly larger likelihood for the shorter time
horizon, which is similar to what has been found in other developing country contexts,
and at the lower end compared to other surveys in developed countries (Delavande
and Kohler, 2009; Delavande et al., 2017).
In addition, item non-response is overall low, at 5.6%. We also investigate the
extent to which an individual woman provides the same answer to the series of prob-
abilistic questions, as this might indicate that she is paying limited attention to the
questions. Figure A.4 shows the distribution of repeated values of beliefs for the
high and low investment levels for the same woman. Only about 10% of women pro-
vided four or more repeat combinations of answers in the probabilistic questions out
of the eight outcome-investment combinations, and about 20% did not repeat any
combinations, which is reassuring.
We would not expect women to report negative returns, as this would suggest that
breastfeeding or playing with the child are detrimental to child development indica-
tors, but 22% report more than one negative return. Investigating the characteristics
of women who reported negative expected returns, we find they are more likely to
have no education and wealth below the median.19 We will investigate how the model
estimates change if we exclude women who report negative returns (see section 1.6).
There are no reliable estimates of the parameters of the actual production function
19Among women with no education and wealth below the median, 31% and 28% respectively
report more than one negative return, compared to 21% and 16% of women with more than 10
years of education and SES above the median respectively, see Column 4 of Appendix table A.5 for
a more detailed picture.
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for skills in this context. However, the beliefs data are consistent with the benchmark
provided by the Pakistan 2012-2013 Demographic Health Survey (DHS) and data
presented in Cunha et al. (2020) for a US sample. The DHS shows that the proportion
of children that experienced diarrhea in the two weeks prior to the interview was 25-
33% (depending on the child’s age), which is similar to the average expected likelihood
of frequent diarrhea in our sample when the mother exclusively breastfeeds (25%),
or guides play (35%) (Table 1.1b and Appendix Table A.6). Cunha et al. (2020)
documents that 72% of children in a US sample spoke partial sentences by the age
of 2, comparing well with 70-74% in our sample for the high investment scenario.
Women in the US sample expect an 82% chance of a 2-year old speaking a 3-word
sentence with high investment and high endowment, which is comparable to our
sample. Expectations in the low investment and low endowment scenario in the US
sample are also very similar to the expectations under low investments in our sample,
at 46%. Although crude, these comparisons suggest that the subjective expectations
of sample women are broadly in line with outcome realizations.
Overall, women appear comfortable reporting probabilistic beliefs using the 10 bar
scorecard; the vast majority respects basic probabilities properties; we find a socio-
economic gradient in expected returns to early-life investments as has been found
in other settings (e.g., Boneva and Rauh, 2018; Cunha et al., 2013); and average
probabilities of reaching specific milestones are consistent with the available evidence.
Moreover, very few women repeat their answers. This gives us confidence in using
the expected return data in our empirical analysis.
Expected effort costs of maternal investments. Using a binary indicator of
whether the mother reports that the investment is either sometimes or most of the
time tiring, we observe that 39% report that breastfeeding is tiring, and 35% report
that playing with the child is tiring, see Figure 1.3 and Table 1.1b. Investigating
heterogeneity in expected effort costs in Table 1.4 and Appendix Table A.7, we find
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that more educated mothers are less likely to expect breastfeeding and playing to
be tiring. For example, mothers with 6-10 years of education are 13 pp less likely
to expect to feel tired from breastfeeding compared to mothers with no education
and 21 pp less likely to expect to be tired from playing. The education gradient in
breastfeeding is attenuated when controlling for wealth, but the education gradient
in playing persists. There is a significant wealth gradient in the expected costs of
investment, steeper than for expected returns. Importantly, there is a significant
gradient in costs by maternal depression. Depressed mothers are 9.7 pp and 8 pp
more likely to expect that breastfeeding and playing, respectively, will be tiring. Also,
consistent with intuition, older mothers are more likely to expect playing to be tiring.
We find a tendency for a positive association between expected returns and costs,
even after controlling for mothers’ characteristics (see Appendix Table A.8). This
finding goes against the idea that mothers who anticipate higher returns for an in-
vestment internalize the cost of the investment and do not view it as costly. This
underlines the importance of collecting effort costs data alongside expected returns
data because omitting costs might lead us to over-estimate the role played by expected
returns.
1.5 Empirical results
1.5.1 Identification and empirical specification
We seek to estimate the parameters of the utility function described in Section 1.2
using the data described in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. Recall that the mother’s problem is
to choose the investment levels (ei1, ei2) that maximize her subjective expected utility
given in equation (1.2). Therefore, the probability that mother i chooses investment
levels (ei1 = j1, ei2 = j2) conditional on household income yi, expected returns Pi and
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cost Ei(C) is given by:
Pr(ei1 = j1, ei2 = j2|yi, Pi, Ei(C)) =
Pr
[
EUi(yi, Pi, Ei(C), j1, j2) > EUi(yi, Pi, Ei(C), t1, t2),
∀ (t1, t2) 6= (j1, j2)
]
(1.3)
Because of survey time and complexity limitations, we were forced to ask a limited
set of questions. We therefore need to make some additional assumptions in order
to be able to estimate equation (1.3). We first assume that the mother gets util-
ity level ωj if the child reaches the milestone for outcome j, and zero otherwise.
I.e., uaj(aj) = ωjI[aj > āj], where āj is a certain level of the outcomes considered
(Assumption 1). Developmental thresholds are set at the level defined by our belief
elicitation questions.20 Second, although we are making inference using the expected
probability distribution of joint investments Pi(ai|ei1, ei2), women were asked their ex-
pected returns from individual investments, i.e., Pi(ai|ei1) and Pi(ai|ei2). We assume
the mother sets the other investment at the modal value of the investments in the
community (i.e., no playing and no exclusive breastfeeding). This assumption is mo-
tivated by the fact that the vast majority of respondents report the mode of their dis-
tribution of beliefs when asked for a point estimate (Delavande and Rohwedder, 2011)
(Assumption 2). Our baseline specification assumes that there is no subjective com-
plementarity between the investments, i.e. Pi(ai|ei1, ei2) = max(Pi(ai|ei1), Pi(ai|ei2))
(Assumption 3), but we test the sensitivity of our results to this assumption in
Section 1.6.
We also make some parametric assumptions for the specification of costs as follows
20Recall that the milestones are: not experiencing diarrhea frequently, the ability of putting 2-3
words together in speaking by age 2, the chances of playing happily with other children by age 3,
and the ability to learn well at school.
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(Assumption 4):
EiC(ei1, ei2) = δ1I(ei1 = 1) · Ii(e1 is costly) +
δ2I(ei2 = 1) · Ii(e2 is costly) + βe1,e2Xi
Where I(e = 1) is a binary indicator function equal to 1 if mother i engages in in-
vestment e and Ii(e is costly) is a binary indicator function equal to 1 if mother i
expects investment e to be costly. This means, for example, that mother i expects to
incur the cost δ1 of breastfeeding if she breastfeeds and expects breastfeeding to be
tiring. Similarly for the cost δ2 of playing. Mothers who report that breastfeeding or
playing is not tiring have a cost of zero. To capture systematic differences in invest-
ments by mothers’ characteristics, we also show results that include characteristics
Xi in the cost function: the mother’s age, education, parity, husband’s education, a
household-assets wealth index, the gender of the newborn, and baseline depression
status.
Assuming the random terms εei to be independent for every individual i and invest-
ment level e = (ei1, ei2) and with a Type I extreme value distribution (Assumption
5), we estimate equation (1.3) using a multinomial logit model where the four choices
are: (1 ) neither breastfeed nor play with the child, (2 ) breastfeed but not play, (3 )
play but not breastfeed, and (4 ) both breastfeed and play. Using the elicited expected
returns and costs data, we make inference on the structural parameters ωj, δj, βe1,e2.
The preference parameters ωj are identified (up to scale) using the variation in ex-
pected returns across choices and mothers, while the cost parameters δj are identified
using the variation in expected effort costs across choices and mothers. While the
multinomial logit model has been widely used for the modeling of multiple choices,
its assumptions could prove demanding for our specification of joint investments.
We address this concern by also estimating a mixed logit model that relaxes the
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Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption.
1.5.2 Baseline estimates
The estimates of the multinomial logit model are displayed in Table 1.5, and they
are consistent with mothers valuing child developmental outcomes. We first show
results assuming that mothers only value one of the four developmental outcomes
(one at a time), and then we present estimates allowing all developmental outcomes
to enter the mother’s utility function. First, consider results for the ability to speak
(columns 1 without controls in the cost function and column 2 with controls). The
preference parameter ωs is the coefficient associated with beliefs concerning the re-
turns to breastfeeding and playing in terms of the ability to speak. It is positive and
statistically significant, suggesting that maternal investment choices are determined
by mothers’ subjective beliefs about returns to investments and that they care about
this developmental dimension. The estimated cost of playing, δ2, is negative and
significant, suggesting that mothers who find playing costly are less likely to play.
The estimated cost of breastfeeding, δ1, is not statistically different from zero, sug-
gesting that the cost of breastfeeding is not a deterrent to exclusively breastfeeding
a newborn at the age of 3 months in our sample.
Columns (3) to (8) of table 1.5 show the estimates when we consider each of
the other child developmental outcomes individually. The preference parameter for
health (defined as diarrhea incidence, columns 3-4) is positive but about a third
smaller in magnitude than the preference parameter for speaking, and is not precisely
estimated. The preference parameters for socio-emotional development (defined as
the child playing happily with other children by age 3, columns 5 and 6), is also
positive, only slightly smaller in magnitude than the one associated with speaking,
and borderline significant (p-value=0.074 without controls and 0.111 with controls).
On the other hand, the preference parameter for learning (defined as the ability of a
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child to learn well in school, columns 7 and 8) is the largest in size, almost twice the
size of the preference parameter for speaking, and statistically significant at the 1%
level.
Controlling for mother-level covariates in the cost function does not change the
magnitude or precision of the preference and cost parameters (see the first vs the
second column for each outcome). As a matter of fact, maternal characteristics ex-
plain little of the variation in investments (see Table A.9, which presents the effect
of mother’s characteristics for all investments compared to no play and no breast-
feeding). Wealthier women are more likely to make both investments (breastfeeding
and play), as opposed to making no investment. On the other hand, women who
were diagnosed with depression are less likely to make both investments, and women
who already have at least two other children are less likely to choose playing and no
breastfeeding.
We next estimate equation (1.3) by considering the child’s health, cognitive, psycho-
emotional, and learning outcomes jointly in the decision-making process, see columns
(9) and (10) of table 1.5. Now only the preference parameter for learning well at school
is statistically significantly different from zero at 1%. A reason for the dominance
of this outcome may be that doing well at school requires success with the other
outcomes – it requires cognitive ability (putting 2-3 words together by age 2), be-
ing healthy (lower diarrhea) and being socially well-grounded (playing happily with
other children by age 3), so it may in fact incorporate concern over these other out-
comes. Interestingly, the ordering of the estimated preference parameters is in line
with self-reported valuations of developmental outcomes that we also elicited. In our
sample, 80% of mothers responded that the ability of a child learning well is very
important for a child’s development, in contrast with a share of 64 to 67% for the
other outcomes (table 1.1a), and this difference is statistically significant at the 1%
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level.21
In all the specifications in Table 1.5, we find a negative and precisely estimated
cost for playing, while the cost for breastfeeding is not precisely estimated.
Goodness of fit. We assess the fit of the estimated model by comparing actual in-
vestments to the model-predicted probability of the investments. See Appendix Table
A.10, which shows that the model fit is very good not only overall but, importantly,
for a number of sub-samples.
1.5.3 Choice elasticity
We next use the model parameter estimates to analyze the predicted responsiveness
of investment choice to changes in expected returns and costs. We focus on the
specification that estimates the preference parameters for all developmental outcomes
jointly (Column 10, Table 1.5), and report results for expected returns in terms of
the probability of a child learning well at school.
Results are shown in Table 1.6. A 1% increase in the expected return to breast-
feeding increases by 0.47% the predicted probability that a woman decides only to
breastfeed, and reduces the probability of neither breastfeeding nor playing by 0.23%.
A 1% increase in the expected return to playing with the child increases the predicted
probability of playing by 0.62%, which is the same increase in the probability of mak-
ing both investments when the expected return from both increases by 1%.
We next look at the elasticity of investments to expected costs (last column of
Table 1.6). A 1% increase in the cost of playing (playing becomes more tiring as
opposed to not tiring) reduces the predicted probability of a mother playing with the
child by 0.15% (irrespective of whether or not she also breastfeeds). Since we found
21We refrain from drawing conclusions about the mother’s ranking of preferences for educational
attainment or language development over health, recognizing that our marker for health at 3-month
(frequent diarrhea) is only one indicator of health, and one that, in poor communities in Pakistan,
is so common that it may be regarded as “natural”.
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no evidence that the perceived costs of breastfeeding influence mother’s choices, we
do not explore responsiveness to this cost.
The elasticities with respect to expected returns are about 4 to 5 times larger than
in studies investigating the elasticities of educational choices to expected earnings
(Arcidiacono, 2004; Delavande and Zafar, 2019; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). For exam-
ple, also in Pakistan, Delavande and Zafar (2019) report elasticities of 0.12. There are
no previous studies on the elasticity of maternal investment with respect to perceived
costs.
1.5.4 Willingness to pay
Our estimates have shown that mothers value child developmental outcomes, most
of all learning well at school, and that they incur an effort cost of playing. In this
section, we seek to monetize these results. We calculate the factor g by which family
income would need to be increased to keep the mother’s utility constant when the
probability of her child’s outcome j decreases from π1 to π2, i.e. we solve:
βln(yi) + π1uji(j) = βln(yi · g) + π2uji(j)
Table 1.7 displays the results. We take the average of the three coefficients associated
with income from the multinomial logit results and evaluate income at the sample
mean and median. We estimate that mothers would be willing to forgo 60% of
monthly household income to increase the probability of their child learning well at
school by 10 pp, and 41% to reduce by 10 pp the effort cost of playing.22
These estimates are useful in affording a metric with which to compare the relative
importance of expected returns and costs, but we are wary of interpreting them as a
22For this exercise we replace the asset-based index proxying wealth with the log of household
income in the baseline estimation. Appendix table A.11 shows that the estimated preference and
cost parameters are similar to the main results in Table 1.5.
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measure of the absolute willingness to pay as this will depend on factors such as the
period over which the mother obtains utility, and the period for which the investments
are made.
1.5.5 Heterogeneity in preferences
So far, we have assumed that all mothers have the same preference parameters for
child development ωj and effort cost parameters δj. We now relax this assumption
to evaluate whether heterogeneity in preferences over child developmental outcomes
explains heterogeneity in investment decisions. We do this in two ways. First, we
estimate a mixed logit model where the parameters ωj are assumed to have a normal
distribution.23 The mixed logit relaxes the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA) imposed by the multinomial logit. The results in Appendix Table A.12 in-
dicate no heterogeneity in preferences for child development, as we systematically
reject the hypothesis that the variance of the normal distribution of ωj is different
from zero. Second, we interact the expected returns and effort costs with mother
characteristics, allowing ωj, δ1 and δ2 to be different for mothers with high and low
education levels (Column 1), high and low wealth (Column 2), and for depressed
and non-depressed mothers (Column 3), see Table 1.8. In general, we find limited
evidence of heterogeneity by these characteristics.24
All in all, these results point to limited if any systematic differences in mothers’
valuations of child development outcomes, suggesting that differences in expected
returns and effort costs are the main drivers of the observed differences in investment
levels in children. This is in contrast to Cunha (2014) that finds that white parents
value children developmental outcomes significantly more than black parents in the
23When estimating the mixed logit model we replace the categorical variables of education and
parity with their continuous version in order to achieve convergence.
24There is a statistically significant difference in the health preferences parameter by depression
status, but the estimates for each group are not statistically significantly different from zero. There
is some evidence that less wealthy mothers value speaking more, and value health less.
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US based on hypothetical choice questions. Using simulations, he concludes that
heterogeneity in preferences is important to understand the racial gap in parental
investments.
1.6 Robustness checks
This section reports a series of validation and specification checks designed to assess
the robustness of our results.
Investment constraints
We first discuss time constraints and then physiological constraints on breastfeeding.
The maximization problem stated in equation (1.3) abstracts away from time con-
straints. We allow for this to some extent by introducing expected effort costs, but
it is possible that women who report a low expected cost when queried in pregnancy
discover an actual time constraint when breastfeeding or playing 3 months after birth.
If women were in fact time-constrained in their investment choices, we would expect
them not to be able to act on their subjective expected returns. In this case, the
coefficient associated with the beliefs would not be precisely estimated, but this is
not what we see in Table 1.5.
Still, if some women are more constrained than others, the coefficients we estimate
may be biased. We investigate this by allowing the coefficients associated with beliefs
(ω) to vary with the a priori likelihood that a mother experiences different time
constraints. First, we compare mothers living with an older female child (62% of
the sample), and the rest. Given anecdotal evidence that older girls help the mother
with household chores and childcare, we expect they contribute to relaxing time
constraints. For the same reason, we group mothers by whether or not the child’s
grandmother lives in the household (55% of the sample). Third, we compare women
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who live in farming households (60% of the sample) with those who do not, as women
often contribute to farm labour, tightening time constraints. We find no systematic
significant differences across these groups (Appendix Table A.13). While this evidence
is not conclusive, it is consistent with non-binding time constraints.
We have implicitly assumed that exclusive breastfeeding is a choice. However, some
mothers may be unable to breastfeed for a number of medical or physiological reasons.
To investigate this, we restrict the sample to women that report always having had
enough money to buy food during pregnancy, and then to women with weight above
the 10th percentile at the time the investments were measured (3 months). Appendix
Table A.14 shows that the estimates for these relatively unconstrained samples are
qualitatively very similar to those in Table 1.5. We are unable to test constraints
imposed by the health of the child as we do not have childbirth weight or any other
measure of their ability to breastfeed.
Complementarity of the investments
The baseline estimation assumes that there is no (subjective) complementarity of the
investments (Assumption 3). We now discuss how we assessed this assumption after
the data used in the main analysis were collected. We recruited a different sample
of twenty women in Pakistan of similar background to the women in this study, and
elicited from them their probabilistic beliefs about the returns from making joint
investments while also asking them the original questions with the investments pre-
sented independently.25 Using responses to both sets of questions we can estimate
perceived complementarities between breastfeeding and playing and correct our esti-
mates in the main sample accordingly. More specifically, we seek to identify θ in the
25Women were asked the likelihood of a specific developmental outcome occurring when (i) the
mother does not play and does not breastfeed, (ii) the mother breastfeeds but does not play, (iii)
the mother does not breastfeed but plays, and (iv) the mother both breastfeeds and plays. We
gratefully thank Ammara Riaz and Ayesha Riaz for invaluable help in the implementation of the
questionnaire in the field.
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following equation:
Pi(ai|ei1 = 1, ei2 = 1) = max
(





Pi(ai|ei1 = 1), Pi(ai|ei2 = 1)
)
(1.4)
Data from this small pilot reveal an estimated θ of 0.018, or that mothers expect a
complementarity among investments of 1.8%. We replicated Table 1.5 using equation
(1.4) to evaluate Pi(ai|ei1 = 1, ei2 = 1) instead of relying on assumption 3. We present
estimates with the estimated θ of 1.8% and, to analyze sensitivity to the alternative
values also 5% and 10%, see Appendix Table A.15. The model estimates are very sim-
ilar to those obtained using the baseline specification assuming no complementarity,
and this is the case independently of the level of complementarity assumed.
Sensitivity to samples
We excluded treated women because of concerns that the intervention might have
directly encouraged women to increase investments. As a robustness check, we re-
estimated the model including treated mothers. The estimates are similar to those
in Table 1.5, see Column (1) of Appendix Table A.16.
As discussed in Section 1.3.2, while the elicited beliefs data are on average of
high quality, some women report negative expected returns from undertaking the
investments. We assess the robustness of our results to how we treat these answers.
First, we exclude mothers who expect more than one negative return out of eight, and
the results are very similar to those in Table 1.5, see column (2), Appendix Table
A.16. In an alternative specification where we use the whole sample, we replace
negative returns with zero returns.26 Again, we obtain very similar results to Table
1.5, see column (3), Appendix Table A.16.
26This affects 8 to 11% of the sample, depending on the outcome and investment. One exception
is experiencing diarrhea with the playing investments, where this affects 24% of the sample.
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Alternative definitions of play
We investigate the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of the play
investment. Instead of using one item from the HOME inventory, we use: (i) the
overall HOME score; (ii) a score based on items related to stimulation (i.e., those
from the Responsivity and Involvement sections); (iii) the first principal component
(PCA) of the items related to stimulation. We assume that women in the top tertile
in terms of these measures are those who play frequently to make it comparable to
our current main playing variable. See Data Appendix B for details. Table 1.9 shows
that the results using these 3 other definitions for play are very similar to our baseline
results.
Alternative specifications
Our main specification assumes that investments entail effort costs, but some women
may instead derive utility from playing and breastfeeding (Caucutt et al., 2017).
In fact, in the survey, 80% of mothers report they found playing and breastfeeding
enjoyable “most of the time.” We re-estimated the model generalizing the cost function
to allow that making the investments is enjoyable, see Column (4) of Appendix Table
A.16. We find that self-reported enjoyment does not predict the investment choices.
We elicited expected return and effort cost in pregnancy to avoid feedback effects
from behaviour to beliefs/cost. However, our main sample includes mothers of all
parity, including women who may have had the opportunity to learn from earlier
pregnancies. This could bias the preferences parameters if women endowed with high
expected returns were more likely to have invested and revised their beliefs upward.
As a robustness check we re-estimated the model restricting the sample to mothers
who were pregnant with their first child at baseline; see columns (5-6), Appendix
Table A.16. Although slightly less precise, the results are similar.
Finally, we also replicate our baseline model without using weights, and again, the
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results are robust (column 7, Table A.16).
Within-village correlations of beliefs, cost and investments
Subjective expectations of returns and effort costs may respond to social norms. And
the questions eliciting returns from individual women were phrased to ask her what
she thought the returns for a generic woman in her community would be. To the
extent that women live in close-knit communities, their investment behaviours may
also be similar. This generates the concern that a spatial correlation in beliefs and
investments could generate the results in Table 1.5 without women acting on their
beliefs. To investigate this, we analysed the variation in beliefs, costs, and investments
between and within villages. See Figure A.5, where panel (a) depicts a box plot of
the expected return on “learning well” from breastfeeding for each of the 40 villages
under study, showing considerable within village variation. Although not shown,
similar variation is evident for the other developmental outcomes and investments.
Panel (b) shows that there is also a lot of within village variation in the expected
costs and investment realizations. Overall, this undermines the concern.
1.7 Policy experiments
We use the estimated preference parameters to simulate mothers’ behavioural re-
sponses to a series of different plausible policy interventions targeted at increasing
breastfeeding and stimulation during early-life. These include interventions that ma-
nipulate expected returns, effort costs, mother’s education, and depression status.
The simulations assume that all women fully comply with the intervention (e.g., they
fully revise their expectations, they all recover from depression, etc.), and the results
we present will therefore constitute the upper bound of the effects of an actual policy.
The estimates are in Table 1.10 for the full sample and in Appendix Tables A.17a
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and A.17b for various subsamples. Column (0) shows the baseline distributions of
investments predicted by the multinomial logit model (Table 1.5, column 10) before
any of the policies are introduced. We first discuss the average predicted probabilities
of making the four possible investments under different information interventions,
see columns (1)-(3). The first intervention shifts the expected returns of less wealthy
mothers to the average of wealthy mothers (i.e., above median wealth index). This
has limited impacts on overall investments, consistent with the raw data showing only
moderate differences in expected returns across wealth groups (7.3 pp on average) as
well as with the heterogeneity in expected returns within the low wealth group. The
second raises the expected return to each investment by 10 pp for all women. Now
the predicted probabilities of breastfeeding and playing increase by 1.4 pp (2.9% of
baseline) and 0.9 pp (2.9% of baseline), respectively. The third intervention raises
beliefs by increasing the expected return to each investment by the interquartile
range of the average expected return from single investments (an increase of 43 pp
on average).27 We now see large increases in the probabilities of breastfeeding and
playing of 6.3 pp (13%) and 3.8 pp (12.4%) respectively. Overall, a large increase in
expected returns is required to obtain a large increase in investments.
We next simulate results of eliminating effort costs of playing. We notionally
ascribe this to the creation of a mother group or playgroup in the community,
where effort is pooled and mothers feel supported, see column (4). This is associated
with an increase of 3.8 pp (12.4% of baseline) in the predicted probability of play,
and a corresponding reduction in the predicted probability of not making either
investment of 2 pp (5.7%).
We then combine first the second and then the third information intervention with
the cost alleviating intervention. The predicted probability of playing increases by 4.8
27The expected probability of achieving a developmental outcome cannot be higher than 1. In the
scenario in which the new computed expected probability would violate this, we obtain the desired
increase in expected returns by lowering the expected probability of achieving the developmental
milestone when mothers do not invest.
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pp (15.3%) in the former case, and by 7.9 pp (25.5%) in the latter. Note that the effect
of combining the two policies is slightly larger than their separate effect (e.g., 7.9 pp
in column 6 versus 3.8+3.8=7.6pp in columns 3 and 4). This is suggestive that effort
costs might prevent mothers from fully acting on newly acquired beliefs. Overall, a
fairly large effect on playing can be achieved by jointly increasing perceived returns
and lifting effort costs. This combined intervention is also effective at reducing the
gaps in investment across groups. It reduces by about two-thirds the gap in playing
between low and high educated mothers, low and high SES, and depressed and non-
depressed (see Appendix Table A.17a).
The next simulation investigates impacts of an intervention that treats maternal
depression, column (7). We posit that treated women are affected in three ways:
the covariate indicating depression is set to zero, their expected costs are set to the
average cost of non-depressed mothers, and their expected returns are set to the
average returns reported by non-depressed mothers. In the subsample of depressed
mothers, treating depression has, as we may expect, larger effects: an increase of 3.7
pp (7.9% of baseline in this sample) in breastfeeding and 8.2 pp (34.6%) in playing,
see Appendix Table A.17a, panel A, column (7). Treating depression is the policy
with the largest effects in this subsample, where investments are low at baseline, with
effects similar to that of the intervention that simultaneously targets an increase in
expected returns and elimination of psychic costs. This is consistent with the results
in Baranov et al. (2019), who find that mothers treated for depression make larger
time-intensive and monetary investments in children as long as seven years after the
end of the intervention.
Finally, we consider an education program that results in all women achieving
at least ten years of education. The education covariate is set to 10+ years and,
at the same time, the expected beliefs and costs of less-educated women are set to
the averages for women with 10 or more years of education. We see fairly limited
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effects on average (column 8, Table 1.10), though the effects are larger among the
subsample of less-educated mothers (Appendix Table A.17a, column 8, panel B):
for example, educating mothers increases playing by 3 ppt (10.1% of baseline in
this subsample). Education is a relatively costly program compared, for instance,
with providing information on returns and creating a playgroup in the community.
However, education is likely to have benefits beyond the making of investments, for
instance, on choices that influence the mother’s own wellbeing.
We see larger effects of some of these policies on women who report zero or negative
returns (panel D of Appendix Table A.17b) and on women who report high effort
costs (panel E).28 Among women who expect to find breastfeeding or playing costly
most of the time, the mother group intervention increases play by 9.8 pp (41.5% of
baseline), and the intervention that simultaneously increases returns and lowers costs
increases play by 13.8 pp (58.5%). This is the largest increase among all the policies
and subsamples we consider. While targeting interventions to these more responsive
groups is currently difficult, if future household surveys elicit expected returns and
costs, this problem may be alleviated.
Overall, our simulations suggest that providing information that increases women’s
subjective expected returns, alleviating psychic or effort costs, treating depression,
and educating women all tend to increase maternal investment in children. Moreover,
the returns to intervening are higher in the subgroups that are most treatable on
account of low expected returns, high expected costs, baseline maternal depression,
or low levels of maternal education.
28For example, the information intervention that moves the expected returns of low SES women
up to the expected returns of wealthy women yields an increase of 2.3 ppt (5.3%) for breastfeeding
and 1.3 ppt (5.2% of baseline) for play among women who report at least two expected zero or
negative returns (column 1, panel D), while this increase was of the order of 0.2 ppt and 0.3 ppt
respectively in the aggregated sample.
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1.8 Conclusions
Heterogeneity in maternal investments may be driven by differences in expectations
about returns to investments, preferences for child development outcomes, and finan-
cial as well as psychic resources. We investigate the role of subjective expectations
of returns to and effort costs of the two main investments that mothers make in
newborns. We find that differences in maternal beliefs regarding the technology of
skills formation, and differences in perceived effort costs associated with investments
in children both contribute to explaining the observed variation in maternal invest-
ments across families. We find limited evidence of heterogeneity in preferences over
early child development outcomes in rural Pakistan, which suggests that mothers
value these outcomes similarly.
We provide the first evidence for maternal investments in newborns in a devel-
oping country of the links between socio-economic status, expected returns, and
investments, complementing recent work on US and UK data (Boneva and Rauh,
2018; Cunha et al., 2013). We also provide the first estimates in any context that
a mother’s perceived cost of effort constrains her investment. Moreover, we identify
one important predictor of perceived costs among mothers of newborns, which is
perinatal depression.
Simulation exercises suggest that policies aimed at increasing the mother’s beliefs
about returns and alleviating effort costs, through providing information on returns,
creating mothers’ groups, or treating postnatal depression, can substantially raise
average investment levels. Future research is needed to better understand how to
change women’s expected returns. First, not all beliefs are equally responsive to
information (Ciancio et al., 2020). Second, large effects on investments requires large
changes in beliefs. More work is also needed to identify the most cost-effective way
to alleviate effort cost among new mothers, especially in low-income settings where
poverty and depression are widespread.
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Note: Individual differences in the subjective probability of children achieving de-
velopmental outcomes when a mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months versus
if a mother does not exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months.
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Note: Individual differences in the subjective probability of children achieving de-
velopmental outcomes when a mother plays frequently with her child versus if a
mother plays rarely with her child.
1.10. Tables 47






















































Playing with children is tiring
1.10 Tables
48 Chapter 1. Maternal Investments in Children
Table 1.1a: Baseline sample descriptives (mothers’ and households’ characteristics)












Mothers’ age (years) 26.71 26.58 26.65 0.13 −0.07 0.06
(4.54) (4.44) (4.51) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Mother’s education (years) 7.70 8.04 8.03 −0.34* 0.00 −0.33*
(4.48) (4.45) (4.48) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Husband’s education (years) 8.63 8.83 8.90 −0.20 −0.07 −0.28*
(3.42) (3.38) (3.30) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Parity 2.58 2.48 2.45 0.10* 0.03 0.13**
(1.51) (1.46) (1.43) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Household’s income (US dollars) 214.23 224.58 225.72 −10.35 −1.14 −11.49
(170.30) (177.32) (181.18) (8.74) (9.72) (9.56)
Mother normally works 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Woman is depressed 0.49 0.30 0.30 0.19*** 0.00 0.19***
(0.50) (0.46) (0.46) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Depression score 8.67 6.39 6.32 2.28*** 0.06 2.35***
(6.71) (6.17) (6.07) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29)
High SES (above median) 0.50 0.54 0.55 −0.04** −0.01 −0.05**
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Item non-response rate 0.06 0.06 0.06 −0.01 0.00 −0.01
(0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother’s education (categorical)
Education: 0 years 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.02 −0.00 0.01
(0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Education: 1-5 years 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.02 −0.00 0.02
(0.40) (0.38) (0.38) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education: 6-10 years 0.44 0.45 0.45 −0.01 0.00 −0.01
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education: +10 years 0.22 0.24 0.24 −0.02 −0.00 −0.02
(0.41) (0.43) (0.43) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Parity (categorical)
Child in womb: 1st 0.29 0.31 0.31 −0.02 −0.00 −0.02
(0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Child in womb: 2nd 0.26 0.27 0.27 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01
(0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Child in womb: 3rd or higher 0.45 0.42 0.42 0.03 0.00 0.03
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Stated preferences
Importance speaking 0.63 0.64 0.63 −0.01 0.00 −0.00
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Importance diarrhea 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Importance playing 0.66 0.67 0.66 −0.01 0.00 −0.00
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Importance learning 0.79 0.80 0.80 −0.01 0.00 −0.01
(0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 1154 1154 871
Note: Stated preferences reflect the level of importance that mothers attach to the developmental milestones
under study (putting 2-3 words together in speaking by age 2, the frequency of diarrhea episodes, playing
happily by age 3, and learning well in school) in promoting a child’s development (mentally and physically)
in the future, and depict the share of mothers that consider the specific milestone to be very important
against unimportant, little important, moderately important, or just important.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Continues on next page.
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Table 1.1b: Baseline sample descriptives (beliefs and costs)












Likelihood of putting 2-3 words in speaking by age 2
If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months 0.70 0.70 0.70 −0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother plays with the child frequently 0.74 0.74 0.73 −0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother plays with the child rarely 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Likelihood of diarrhea episodes
If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother plays with the child frequently 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.01 −0.01 0.00
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother plays with the child rarely 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Likelihood of playing happily by age 3
If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months 0.73 0.73 0.73 −0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months 0.41 0.41 0.41 −0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother plays with the child frequently 0.75 0.75 0.75 −0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother plays with the child rarely 0.43 0.43 0.43 −0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Likelihood of learning well
If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months 0.41 0.41 0.41 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother plays with the child frequently 0.78 0.78 0.77 −0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
If the mother plays with the child rarely 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Expected return of breastfeeding
On speaking 0.30 0.30 0.30 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
On diarrhea 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
On playing happily 0.32 0.32 0.32 −0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
On learning well 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Expected return of playing
On speaking 0.33 0.33 0.32 −0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
On diarrhea 0.16 0.16 0.15 −0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
On playing happily 0.31 0.32 0.31 −0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
On learning well 0.35 0.35 0.34 −0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Costs of investments
Breastfeeding is tiring 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.02 −0.01 0.02
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Playing is tiring 0.38 0.35 0.36 0.02 −0.01 0.02
(0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Either breastfeeding or playing is tiring 0.51 0.48 0.49 0.03 −0.00 0.02
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 1154 1154 871
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Continues on next page.
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Table 1.1c: Follow-up sample descriptives (investments)












Attrition rate 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.00 −0.01 −0.01
(0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Investments
Exclusively breastfed last 24 hr 0.48 0.49 0.49 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Guided play 0.31 0.33 0.33 −0.02 0.00 −0.02
(0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Joint investments
Not breastfeeding and not playing 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Breastfeeding and not playing 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.01 −0.00 0.01
(0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Not breastfeeding and playing 0.15 0.15 0.15 −0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Breastfeeding and playing 0.16 0.18 0.18 −0.02 −0.00 −0.02
(0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 1154 1154 871
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 1.2: Heterogeneity in joint investments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
no-bf, no-pl no-bf, no-pl bf, no-pl bf, no-pl no-bf, pl no-bf, pl bf, pl bf, pl
Education: 1-5 years −0.082 −0.066 0.028 0.050 0.025 0.004 0.029 0.012
(0.062) (0.065) (0.058) (0.056) (0.049) (0.052) (0.046) (0.044)
Education: 6-10 years −0.016 0.031 0.010 0.057 0.012 −0.025 −0.006 −0.063
(0.059) (0.064) (0.046) (0.054) (0.043) (0.052) (0.046) (0.053)
Education: +10 years −0.122* −0.049 −0.011 0.067 0.095* 0.034 0.038 −0.051
(0.062) (0.066) (0.054) (0.069) (0.050) (0.070) (0.052) (0.063)
Age (years) −0.046 −0.051 0.009 −0.003 −0.010 0.015 0.046 0.039
(0.043) (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.033) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031)
Age squared 0.001 0.001 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Index child is female 0.012 0.015 −0.012 −0.009 0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003
(0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025)
Husband’s education (years) −0.001 −0.005 0.002 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Asset-based SES −0.019 −0.012 0.006 0.026**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.012)
Child in womb: 2nd −0.009 0.042 −0.102** 0.069*
(0.060) (0.054) (0.042) (0.038)
Child in womb: 3rd or higher 0.047 0.065 −0.129** 0.018
(0.051) (0.043) (0.049) (0.042)
Woman is depressed 0.057* 0.030 −0.007 −0.081**
(0.032) (0.042) (0.031) (0.034)
Constant 1.064* 1.110* 0.150 0.295 0.241 −0.044 −0.455 −0.362
(0.547) (0.597) (0.653) (0.693) (0.426) (0.466) (0.426) (0.449)
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662 662 662
R2 0.013 0.023 0.002 0.009 0.010 0.030 0.006 0.033
Note: Results estimated with an OLS regression of joint investment choices on mothers’ characteristics. no-bf, no-pl = not
breastfeeding and not playing; bf, no-pl = breastfeeding but not playing; no-bf, pl = not breastfeeding but playing; bf,
pl = breastfeeding and playing.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Sample: Excludes depressed mothers in the intervention group.
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Table 1.3a: Heterogeneity in expected returns from breastfeeding

















Education: 1-5 years 0.094** 0.078** 0.102** 0.085* 0.086** 0.080** 0.108*** 0.099**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.047) (0.044) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037)
Education: 6-10 years 0.083*** 0.046 0.143*** 0.110*** 0.079** 0.060 0.075** 0.054
(0.030) (0.032) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042) (0.035) (0.038)
Education: +10 years 0.079** 0.026 0.131*** 0.082* 0.079** 0.055 0.056 0.025
(0.034) (0.036) (0.039) (0.044) (0.037) (0.044) (0.034) (0.038)
Age (years) 0.020 0.015 0.020 0.022 0.015 0.004 0.032* 0.026
(0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.027) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020)
Age squared −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001* −0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Husband’s education (years) 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Asset-based SES 0.024*** 0.017 0.017** 0.016*
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Child in womb: 2nd 0.027 0.011 0.038 0.037
(0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027)
Child in womb: 3rd or higher 0.040 −0.012 0.078** 0.044
(0.032) (0.038) (0.031) (0.033)
Woman is depressed 0.013 0.035 0.008 0.017
(0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024)
Constant −0.057 0.037 −0.043 −0.079 0.060 0.211 −0.134 −0.053
(0.289) (0.325) (0.354) (0.371) (0.264) (0.275) (0.255) (0.268)
Observations 1090 1090 1090 1090 1090 1090 1090 1090
R2 0.008 0.020 0.017 0.022 0.008 0.019 0.012 0.020
Note: Results estimated with an OLS regression of expected returns from breastfeeding on mothers’ characteristics. Bf is short for
breastfeeding. Bf on speaking = Expected return from breastfeeding on the probability that a child puts 2-3 together in speaking by
age 2; Bf on diarrhea = Expected return from breastfeeding on the probability of lower incidence of diarrhea episodes; Bf on social
= Expected return from breastfeeding on the probability that a child plays happily with other children by age 3; Bf on learning =
Expected return from breastfeeding on the probability of a child learning well.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Sample: All mothers.
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Table 1.3b: Heterogeneity in expected returns from playing

















Education: 1-5 years 0.108** 0.092** 0.091* 0.080 0.069 0.056 0.078* 0.061
(0.041) (0.038) (0.051) (0.051) (0.042) (0.041) (0.044) (0.043)
Education: 6-10 years 0.119*** 0.079* 0.060 0.037 0.090** 0.057 0.072* 0.035
(0.041) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.036) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041)
Education: +10 years 0.110*** 0.054 0.062 0.021 0.074* 0.024 0.090** 0.034
(0.038) (0.043) (0.043) (0.052) (0.037) (0.044) (0.039) (0.049)
Age (years) 0.067*** 0.059*** −0.001 0.003 0.029 0.023 0.032* 0.029
(0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** 0.000 −0.000 −0.001* −0.000 −0.001* −0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Husband’s education (years) −0.002 0.007* 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Asset-based SES 0.029*** 0.001 0.018** 0.022***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Child in womb: 2nd 0.072*** −0.029 0.056** 0.030
(0.021) (0.030) (0.025) (0.028)
Child in womb: 3rd or higher 0.036 −0.023 0.027 0.011
(0.025) (0.037) (0.028) (0.031)
Woman is depressed 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.014
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022)
Constant −0.673** −0.543* 0.107 0.024 −0.122 −0.056 −0.134 −0.095
(0.277) (0.278) (0.344) (0.360) (0.253) (0.265) (0.237) (0.251)
Observations 1090 1090 1090 1090 1090 1090 1090 1090
R2 0.025 0.046 0.004 0.009 0.013 0.027 0.010 0.021
Note: Results estimated with an OLS regression of expected returns from playing with the child on mothers’ characteristics. Playing on
speaking = Expected return from playing on the probability that a child puts 2-3 together in speaking by age 2; Playing on diarrhea
= Expected return from playing on the probability of lower incidence of diarrhea episodes; Playing on social = Expected return from
playing on the probability that a child plays happily with other children by age 3; Playing on learning = Expected return from playing
on the probability of a child learning well.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Sample: All mothers.
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Table 1.4: Effort costs by characteristics









Education: 1-5 years −0.078 −0.041 −0.142** −0.094*
(0.061) (0.061) (0.057) (0.055)
Education: 6-10 years −0.127** −0.049 −0.212*** −0.107**
(0.051) (0.055) (0.044) (0.048)
Education: +10 years −0.161*** −0.054 −0.246*** −0.096
(0.058) (0.069) (0.054) (0.059)
Age (years) 0.045 0.053 0.068** 0.073**
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Age squared −0.001 −0.001 −0.001** −0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Husband’s education (years) 0.008 0.005
(0.006) (0.004)
Asset-based SES −0.044*** −0.058***
(0.014) (0.014)
Child in womb: 2nd −0.008 0.040
(0.038) (0.043)
Child in womb: 3rd or higher 0.028 0.019
(0.036) (0.039)
Woman is depressed 0.097** 0.080**
(0.038) (0.030)
Constant −0.105 −0.356 −0.406 −0.630
(0.394) (0.411) (0.396) (0.415)
Observations 1021 1021 1044 1044
R2 0.012 0.038 0.029 0.063
Note: Results estimated with an OLS regression of expected effort cost of investments
on mothers’ characteristics.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the village
level in parentheses.
Sample: All mothers.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.6: Elasticities of investments to beliefs on learning and to cost of playing
Learn
Investment choice BF return PL return Joint investments return Not investing return Playing cost
(change in %) (1 % increase) (1 % increase) (1 % increase) (1 % increase) (1 % increase)
Pr(No-bf, no-pl) -0.23 -0.10 -0.12 0.28 0.06
Pr(Bf, no-pl) 0.47 -0.10 -0.12 -0.17 0.06
Pr(No-bf, pl) -0.23 0.62 -0.12 -0.17 -0.15
Pr(Bf, pl) -0.23 -0.10 0.62 -0.17 -0.15
Note: Predicted probabilities estimated after a multinomial logit model that evaluates the preference for developmental outcomes
jointly and where mothers’ alternatives are: no-bf, no-pl = not breastfeeding and not playing; bf, no-pl = breastfeeding but not play-
ing; no-bf, pl = not breastfeeding but playing; bf, pl = breastfeeding and playing. Estimates of the model are shown in Column 10
of Table 1.5. BF is short for breastfeeding. PL is short for playing.
Table 1.7: Estimated monetary value of learning well and cost of playing
Evaluated at Evaluated at Proportion of
mean income* median income** monthly income
Increase of 10 pp in the
probability of learning well 14,480.6 11,186.0 0.60
Increase of 10 pp in the
cost of playing -9,786.6 -7,560.0 -0.41
*Income (mean) PKR 23,948.9
**Income (median) PKR 18,500.0
Note: Marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) calculated using (a) the coefficient estimates of
the preference parameter of learning well and the cost of playing from a multinomial logit
model and (b) the average of the coefficient estimates of the log of household income (esti-
mates shown in Table A.11)
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneity in the preference parameters
(1) (2) (3)
Education SES Depression
ω_speak x 1[Low charac.] 0.110 0.944* 0.101
(0.374) (0.511) (0.431)
ω_speak x 1[High charac.] 0.559 −0.396 0.488
(0.903) (0.480) (0.460)
ω_health x 1[Low charac.] −0.271 −0.654 0.386
(0.307) (0.448) (0.337)
ω_health x 1[High charac.] 0.818 0.597** −0.611
(0.704) (0.298) (0.399)
ω_social x 1[Low charac.] −0.235 −0.419 −0.264
(0.433) (0.573) (0.496)
ω_social x 1[High charac.] −0.569 −0.095 −0.472
(0.752) (0.537) (0.771)
ω_learn x 1[Low charac.] 0.846** 0.712 0.563
(0.395) (0.554) (0.469)
ω_learn x 1[High charac.] 1.383* 0.870* 1.651***
(0.768) (0.470) (0.574)
Breastfeeding is tiring x 1[Low charac.] 0.455*** 0.312 0.156
(0.163) (0.252) (0.199)
Breastfeeding is tiring x 1[High charac.] −0.412 0.146 0.513**
(0.302) (0.206) (0.212)
Playing is tiring x 1[Low charac.] −0.439* −0.845*** −0.450*
(0.229) (0.219) (0.248)
Playing is tiring x 1[High charac.] −1.043** −0.423 −0.973**
(0.421) (0.258) (0.437)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
p-value: ω_speak[Low charac.] = ω_speak[High charac.] 0.638 0.062 0.537
p-value: ω_health[Low charac.] = ω_health[High charac.] 0.172 0.016 0.050
p-value: ω_social[Low charac.] = ω_social[High charac.] 0.716 0.695 0.841
p-value: ω_learn[Low charac.] = ω_learn[High charac.] 0.529 0.826 0.169
p-value: Bf Tiring[Low charac.] = Bf Tiring[High charac.] 0.012 0.636 0.219
p-value: Pl Tiring[Low charac.] = Pl Tiring[High charac.] 0.228 0.156 0.346
Observations 2504 2504 2504
# mothers 626 626 626
Note: Results estimated using a multinomial logit model where mothers’ alternatives are: no-bf, no-pl =
not breastfeeding and not playing; bf, no-pl = breastfeeding but not playing; no-bf, pl = not breastfeeding
but playing; bf, pl = breastfeeding and playing. The model includes a constant and the investment alter-
natives are evaluated against not breastfeeding and not playing (omitted category). ω_speak = preference
parameter for a child being able to put 2-3 words together in speaking by age 2. ω_health = preference
parameter for a child not experiencing frequent diarrhea. ω_social = preference parameter for a child
playing happily with other children by age 3. ω_learn = preference parameter for a child learning well
at school. Controls include the age of the mother and its square, the sex of the index child, 3 levels of
parity (first child in womb, second, and third or higher), 4 levels of mother’s education (no education, 1-5
years, 6-10 years, and +10 years), husband’s education in years, a SES asset-based index, and a dummy
for being diagnosed with depression at baseline. Column (1) interacts beliefs and costs with education
level (high characteristic = +10 years of education). Column (2) interacts beliefs and costs with SES level
(high characteristic = SES above median). Column (3) interacts beliefs and costs by depression status
(high characteristic = depressed).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
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no-bf, no-pl bf, no-pl no-bf, pl bf, pl
Distribution of joint investments by education








no-bf, no-pl bf, no-pl no-bf, pl bf, pl
Distribution of joint investments by SES








no-bf, no-pl bf, no-pl no-bf, pl bf, pl
Distribution of joint investments by depression
Depressed Not depressed
Note: Joint investments: no-bf, no-pl = not breastfeeding and not playing; bf, no-
pl = breastfeeding but not playing; no-bf, pl = not breastfeeding but playing; bf,
pl = breastfeeding and playing
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-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Pl on learning
























































-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Pl on learning
























































-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Pl on learning
Depressed Not depressed
Note: Kernel distributions of individual differences in the subjective probability of
children achieving developmental outcomes when a mother makes the high level
investment versus when a mother makes the low level investment. Bf is short for
breastfeeding. Pl is short for playing.
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-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Likelihood of going to the market within two weeks vs. within two days
Note: Individual differences in the probability that a woman would go to the market
within the next two weeks versus the probability a woman would go to the mar-
ket within the next two days. Negative values violate the monotonicity property.









0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Note: Incidence of repeated combinations of beliefs from low and high investment
levels across the different developmental outcomes considered.
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Figure A.5: Between and within village variation in beliefs, investments, and costs












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
(b) Variation in investments and costs
Exclusively Breastfeeding Playing
SD breastfeeding Playing is tiring is tiring
Overall 0.500 0.468 0.492 0.485
Between 0.152 0.177 0.156 0.196
Within 0.482 0.445 0.471 0.446
Observations 662 662 1021 1044
Clusters 40 40 40 40
Note: (a) Box plot (excluding outliers) of the expected return of breast-
feeding on learning well in each of the 40 villages under study.
(b) Within and between village variation in breastfeeding and playing
practices, and costs, in the villages under study.
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Table A.1: Attrition at month 3
(1) (2) (3)
No attrited Attrited Diff
Mothers’ age (years) 26.59 26.85 −0.27
Mother’s education (years) 8.05 7.97 0.08
Husband’s education (years) 8.92 8.83 0.09
Parity 2.49 2.35 0.14
Household’s income (US dollars) 229.64 214.31 15.33
Mother normally works 0.06 0.06 −0.00
High SES (above median) 0.55 0.56 −0.01
Likelihood of putting 2-3 words in speaking by age 2
If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months 0.70 0.68 0.02
If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months 0.39 0.40 −0.01
If the mother plays with the child frequently 0.74 0.71 0.03
If the mother plays with the child rarely 0.41 0.42 −0.02
Likelihood of diarrhea episodes
If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months 0.24 0.30 −0.06**
If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months 0.65 0.62 0.02
If the mother plays with the child frequently 0.35 0.34 0.01
If the mother plays with the child rarely 0.50 0.50 −0.00
Likelihood of playing happily by age 3
If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months 0.73 0.72 0.02
If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months 0.41 0.43 −0.02
If the mother plays with the child frequently 0.75 0.74 0.01
If the mother plays with the child rarely 0.43 0.45 −0.03
Likelihood of learning well
If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months 0.76 0.71 0.05*
If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months 0.41 0.42 −0.01
If the mother plays with the child frequently 0.77 0.75 0.02
If the mother plays with the child rarely 0.41 0.46 −0.04**
Costs of investments
Breastfeeding is tiring 0.39 0.41 −0.02
Playing is tiring 0.35 0.39 −0.04
Either breastfeeding or playing is tiring 0.48 0.52 −0.03
Observations 662 209
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.2: Feeding practices at 3 months
(1) (2) (3)
All mothers Breastfeeding butnot exclusively Not breastfeeding
Breast milk 0.930 1.000 0.000
Ghutti 0.024 0.049 0.042
Herbal water (Kehwa/Gripe water) 0.138 0.279 0.242
Water 0.094 0.192 0.149
Tea (Chai) 0.010 0.023 0.000
Formula Milk 0.178 0.321 0.544
Other animal milk (cow/goat/buffalo) 0.183 0.346 0.456
Semi solid food 0.015 0.030 0.023
Solid food 0.007 0.017 0.000
Other 0.017 0.032 0.045
Observations 662 290 46
Sample: Excludes depressed mothers in the intervention group.
Table A.3: Heterogeneity in single investments





Education: 1-5 years 0.057 0.062 0.054 0.016
(0.051) (0.051) (0.072) (0.071)
Education: 6-10 years 0.004 −0.006 0.006 −0.089
(0.048) (0.054) (0.060) (0.073)
Education: +10 years 0.027 0.016 0.133* −0.018
(0.057) (0.072) (0.067) (0.093)
Age (years) 0.056 0.037 0.037 0.054
(0.041) (0.045) (0.039) (0.041)
Age squared −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Index child is female −0.013 −0.012 −0.000 −0.006
(0.036) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033)
Husband’s education (years) −0.001 0.006
(0.008) (0.006)
Asset-based SES 0.014 0.031**
(0.016) (0.015)
Child in womb: 2nd 0.111* −0.033
(0.058) (0.054)
Child in womb: 3rd or higher 0.083 −0.111*
(0.055) (0.062)
Woman is depressed −0.051 −0.088**
(0.043) (0.040)
Constant −0.305 −0.066 −0.214 −0.406
(0.551) (0.621) (0.511) (0.550)
Observations 662 662 662 662
R2 0.005 0.015 0.015 0.044
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the village
level in parentheses.
Note: Results estimated with an OLS regression of single investments on mothers char-
acteristics.
Sample: Excludes depressed mothers in the intervention group.
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Table A.5: Mother’s characteristics and expected zero returns









Education: 1-5 years 0.026 −0.028 −0.060* −0.112**
(0.040) (0.033) (0.032) (0.052)
Education: 6-10 years −0.038 0.041 −0.067* −0.046
(0.036) (0.033) (0.035) (0.052)
Education: +10 years −0.032 0.055 −0.065 −0.007
(0.051) (0.043) (0.038) (0.059)
Age (years) 0.010 −0.013 −0.002 −0.040
(0.031) (0.022) (0.020) (0.028)
Age squared −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Husband’s education (years) 0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Asset-based SES −0.002 −0.033*** −0.008 −0.032***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Child in womb: 2nd 0.013 −0.011 −0.022 −0.010
(0.036) (0.023) (0.026) (0.036)
Child in womb: 3rd or higher −0.008 −0.024 −0.026 −0.032
(0.038) (0.024) (0.029) (0.032)
Woman is depressed −0.003 −0.015 −0.036 −0.011
(0.029) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021)
Constant 0.013 0.309 0.252 0.844**
(0.415) (0.281) (0.278) (0.371)
Mean depvar 0.190 0.130 0.107 0.215
Observations 1090 1090 1090 1090
R2 0.005 0.024 0.014 0.025
Note: Results estimated with an OLS regression of the incidence of expected null returns from investments on mothers’ char-
acteristics (Columns 1 to 3), and of the incidence of expected negative returns on mothers’ characteristics (Column 4).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Sample: All mothers.
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Table A.6: Calibration of beliefs
In sample expected likelihood Proportion of children with diarrhea in the
of frequent diarrhea episodes % last 2 weeks according to 2012-2013 Pakistan DHS %
If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months 25.2 < 6 months old 25.8
If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months 64.4 6-11 months old 35.3
If the mother plays with the child frequently 35.3 12-23 months old 32.9
If the mother plays with the child rarely 51.0
In sample expected likelihood Proportion of children that speak
of putting 2-3 words together by age 2 % partial sentences by age 2 %
If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months 69.8 In the US according to Cunha et al. (2020) 72.0
If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months 39.5
If the mother plays with the child frequently 74.1
If the mother plays with the child rarely 41.5
Table A.7: Effort cost by characteristics
Education SES Depression
Low High Low High Yes No
Breastfeeding is tiring
Rarely or never 0.57 0.61 0.51 0.63 0.49 0.62
Sometimes 0.27 0.23 0.30 0.22 0.30 0.24
Most of the time 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.09
Don’t know 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
Playing is tiring
Rarely or never 0.60 0.68 0.52 0.71 0.53 0.66
Sometimes 0.25 0.19 0.29 0.18 0.27 0.22
Most of the time 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.09
Don’t know 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03
Observations 854 236 548 542 547 543
Note: Low education = 10 years or less of education. High education = + 10 years of ed-
ucation. Low SES = SES asset-based index below the median. High SES = SES asset-
based index above the median. Depressed = PHQ-9 questionnaire score 10 or above.
Not depressed = PHQ-9 questionnaire score below 10.
Sample: All mothers.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.9: Baseline model estimates: Effect of characteristics on investment choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Speak Health Social Learn All outcomes
bf, no-pl
Education: 1-5 years 0.345 0.380 0.346 0.308 0.318
(0.300) (0.302) (0.303) (0.304) (0.308)
Education: 6-10 years 0.195 0.219 0.189 0.168 0.180
(0.280) (0.281) (0.283) (0.285) (0.295)
Education: +10 years 0.350 0.387 0.342 0.314 0.331
(0.304) (0.300) (0.317) (0.315) (0.331)
Child in womb: 2nd 0.202 0.214 0.206 0.168 0.167
(0.324) (0.321) (0.321) (0.327) (0.331)
Child in womb: 3rd or higher 0.134 0.158 0.125 0.104 0.116
(0.237) (0.234) (0.240) (0.227) (0.233)
Index child is female −0.019 −0.040 −0.033 −0.030 −0.028
(0.163) (0.163) (0.161) (0.163) (0.165)
Age (years) 0.164 0.180 0.179 0.158 0.152
(0.259) (0.255) (0.260) (0.261) (0.258)
Age squared −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Asset-based SES −0.002 0.004 −0.001 −0.000 0.001
(0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094)
Husband’s education (years) −0.016 −0.017 −0.015 −0.015 −0.016
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Woman is depressed −0.093 −0.088 −0.092 −0.086 −0.084
(0.187) (0.192) (0.190) (0.186) (0.184)
no-bf, pl
Education: 1-5 years 0.032 0.064 0.037 −0.005 0.001
(0.533) (0.532) (0.534) (0.538) (0.537)
Education: 6-10 years −0.365 −0.341 −0.368 −0.384 −0.374
(0.532) (0.528) (0.534) (0.535) (0.535)
Education: +10 years 0.173 0.189 0.155 0.128 0.144
(0.554) (0.553) (0.557) (0.560) (0.555)
Child in womb: 2nd −0.568 −0.528 −0.551 −0.546 −0.544
(0.369) (0.371) (0.370) (0.373) (0.366)
Child in womb: 3rd or higher −1.108*** −1.076*** −1.104*** −1.094*** −1.086***
(0.349) (0.353) (0.352) (0.358) (0.350)
Index child is female 0.087 0.069 0.078 0.072 0.072
(0.263) (0.262) (0.262) (0.263) (0.262)
Age (years) 0.242 0.283 0.281 0.242 0.225
(0.347) (0.346) (0.347) (0.349) (0.345)
Age squared −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Asset-based SES 0.073 0.084 0.082 0.074 0.070
(0.106) (0.105) (0.107) (0.105) (0.103)
Husband’s education (years) 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.006
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)
Woman is depressed −0.230 −0.221 −0.228 −0.227 −0.226
(0.254) (0.256) (0.257) (0.259) (0.258)
bf, pl
Education: 1-5 years −0.097 −0.070 −0.090 −0.134 −0.132
(0.388) (0.390) (0.390) (0.389) (0.392)
Education: 6-10 years −0.613 −0.600 −0.618 −0.631 −0.622
(0.422) (0.428) (0.419) (0.420) (0.429)
Education: +10 years −0.378 −0.360 −0.390 −0.403 −0.389
(0.523) (0.517) (0.519) (0.524) (0.529)
Child in womb: 2nd 0.331 0.348 0.331 0.322 0.326
(0.343) (0.341) (0.342) (0.345) (0.346)
Child in womb: 3rd or higher −0.064 −0.042 −0.081 −0.064 −0.044
(0.384) (0.383) (0.382) (0.381) (0.379)
Index child is female −0.033 −0.058 −0.048 −0.046 −0.042
(0.205) (0.203) (0.204) (0.204) (0.205)
Age (years) 0.322 0.350 0.354 0.314 0.299
(0.280) (0.275) (0.275) (0.279) (0.280)
Age squared −0.006 −0.006 −0.006 −0.005 −0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Asset-based SES 0.201** 0.214** 0.208** 0.203** 0.202**
(0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Husband’s education (years) 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.024
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
Woman is depressed −0.563* −0.557* −0.567* −0.575* −0.570*
(0.297) (0.296) (0.298) (0.302) (0.301)
Observations 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504
# mothers 626 626 626 626 626
Note: Results estimated using a multinomial logit model where mothers’ alternatives are: no-bf, no-pl = not breastfeeding and not play-
ing; bf, no-pl = breastfeeding but not playing; no-bf, pl = not breastfeeding but playing; bf, pl = breastfeeding and playing. The model
includes a constant and the investment alternatives are evaluated against not breastfeeding and not playing (omitted category). Speak =
when estimating the preference parameter for a child being able to put 2-3 words together in speaking by age 2. Health = when estimat-
ing the preference parameter for a child not experiencing frequent diarrhea. Social = when estimating the preference parameter for a child
playing happily with other children by age 3. Learn = when estimating the preference parameter for a child learning well at school. All
outcomes = when estimating all preference parameters simultaneously. Other coefficients are presented in Table 5.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Sample: Excludes depressed mothers in the intervention group.






























































































































































































































































Table A.11: Model estimates of the cost and preference parameters using income









Breastfeeding is tiring 0.256*
(0.152)
Playing is tiring −0.647***
(0.188)
Education: 1-5 years 0.343 0.024 −0.037
(0.323) (0.541) (0.391)
Education: 6-10 years 0.144 −0.336 −0.401
(0.282) (0.539) (0.418)
Education: +10 years 0.231 0.179 −0.075
(0.332) (0.571) (0.528)
Child in womb: 2nd 0.185 −0.536 0.339
(0.328) (0.372) (0.346)
Child in womb: 3rd or higher 0.116 −1.079*** −0.031
(0.229) (0.357) (0.386)
Index child is female −0.035 0.075 0.004
(0.164) (0.264) (0.219)
Age (years) 0.148 0.226 0.300
(0.261) (0.344) (0.277)
Age squared −0.002 −0.003 −0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Husband’s education (years) −0.028 0.007 0.048
(0.038) (0.054) (0.047)
Woman is depressed −0.074 −0.222 −0.621**
(0.189) (0.254) (0.295)




Note: Results estimated using a multinomial logit model where mothers’ al-
ternatives are: no-bf, no-pl = not breastfeeding and not playing; bf, no-pl =
breastfeeding but not playing; no-bf, pl = not breastfeeding but playing; bf,
pl = breastfeeding and playing. The model includes a constant and the in-
vestment alternatives are evaluated against not breastfeeding and not play-
ing (omitted category). ω_speak = preference parameter for a child being
able to put 2-3 words together in speaking by age 2. ω_health = preference
parameter for a child not experiencing frequent diarrhea. ω_social = pref-
erence parameter for a child playing happily with other children by age 3.
ω_learn = preference parameter for a child learning well at school.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the
village level in parentheses.
Sample: Excludes depressed mothers in the intervention group.
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Table A.12: Mixed logit model









Breastfeeding is tiring 0.201 0.202 0.200 0.231 0.243
(0.143) (0.152) (0.144) (0.147) (0.156)
Playing is tiring −0.599*** −0.644*** −0.608*** −0.581*** −0.606***










Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504
# mothers 626 626 626 626 626
Note: Results estimated using a mixed logit model where mothers’ alternatives are: no-bf,
no-pl = not breastfeeding and not playing; bf, no-pl = breastfeeding but not playing; no-
bf, pl = not breastfeeding but playing; bf, pl = breastfeeding and playing. The model in-
cludes a constant and the investment alternatives are evaluated against not breastfeeding
and not playing (omitted category). ω_speak = preference parameter for a child being
able to put 2-3 words together in speaking by age 2. ω_health = preference parameter
for a child not experiencing frequent diarrhea. ω_social = preference parameter for a
child playing happily with other children by age 3. ω_learn = preference parameter for
a child learning well at school. Controls include the age of the mother and its square, the
sex of the index child, parity, mother’s education in years, husband’s education in years,
a SES asset-based index, and a dummy for being diagnosed with depression at baseline.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level
in parentheses.
Sample: Excludes depressed mothers in the intervention group.
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Table A.13: Heterogeneity in the preference parameters by constraint levels
(1) (2) (3)
Female Child Grandmother Agricultural household
ω_speak x 1[Constrained] 0.109 0.450 −0.073
(0.575) (0.719) (0.524)
ω_speak x 1[No constrained] 0.240 0.097 0.515
(0.448) (0.403) (0.589)
ω_health x 1[Constrained] 0.080 −0.899 0.244
(0.403) (0.580) (0.339)
ω_health x 1[No constrained] 0.042 0.377 −0.107
(0.329) (0.319) (0.416)
ω_social x 1[Constrained] 0.059 0.023 −0.203
(0.689) (0.644) (0.535)
ω_social x 1[No constrained] −0.519 −0.260 −0.223
(0.397) (0.455) (0.721)
ω_learn x 1[Constrained] 0.651 0.996 1.456***
(0.506) (0.738) (0.492)
ω_learn x 1[No constrained] 1.095** 0.750* 0.159
(0.459) (0.443) (0.501)
Breastfeeding is tiring x 1[Constrained] 0.093 0.038 0.096
(0.279) (0.242) (0.234)
Breastfeeding is tiring x 1[No constrained] 0.374* 0.347* 0.405*
(0.214) (0.193) (0.214)
Playing is tiring x 1[Constrained] −0.476* −0.833** −0.300
(0.285) (0.377) (0.231)
Playing is tiring x 1[No constrained] −0.693*** −0.529** −1.082***
(0.225) (0.218) (0.290)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
p-value: ω_speak[Constr.] = ω_speak[No constr.] 0.861 0.675 0.497
p-value: ω_health[Constr.] = ω_health[No constr.] 0.938 0.061 0.506
p-value: ω_social[Constr.] = ω_social[No constr.] 0.445 0.727 0.984
p-value: ω_learn[Constr.] = ω_learn[No constr.] 0.512 0.789 0.078
p-value: Bf Tiring[Constr.] = Bf Tiring[No constr.] 0.477 0.324 0.368
p-value: Pl Tiring[Constr.] = Pl Tiring[No constr.] 0.504 0.473 0.022
Observations 2504 2504 2504
# mothers 626 626 626
Note: Results estimated using a multinomial logit model where mothers’ alternatives are: no-bf, no-pl = not
breastfeeding and not playing; bf, no-pl = breastfeeding but not playing; no-bf, pl = not breastfeeding but
playing; bf, pl = breastfeeding and playing. The model includes a constant and the investment alternatives
are evaluated against not breastfeeding and not playing (omitted category). ω_speak = preference parame-
ter for a child being able to put 2-3 words together in speaking by age 2. ω_health = preference parameter
for a child not experiencing frequent diarrhea. ω_social = preference parameter for a child playing happily
with other children by age 3. ω_learn = preference parameter for a child learning well at school. Controls
include the age of the mother and its square, the sex of the index child, 3 levels of parity (first child in
womb, second, and third or higher), 4 levels of mother’s education (no education, 1-5 years, 6-10 years, and
+10 years), husband’s education in years, a SES asset-based index, and a dummy for being diagnosed with
depression at baseline. Column (1) interacts beliefs and costs with a dummy indicating whether there is an
older female child in the household (constrained = no female child). Column (2) interacts beliefs and costs
with a dummy indicating whether the grandmother lives in the household (constrained = grandmother not
in household). Column (3) interacts beliefs and costs with a dummy indicating whether the mother lives in
an agricultural household (constrained = agricultural household). A household is considered agricultural if
anyone in the household owns or rents land for farming.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Sample: Excludes depressed mothers in the intervention group.
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Table A.14: Women with potentially no breastfeeding constraints
(1) (2)









Breastfeeding is tiring 0.253 0.146
(0.169) (0.156)




# mothers 554 562
Note: Results estimated using a multinomial logit model where mothers’ alterna-
tives are: no-bf, no-pl = not breastfeeding and not playing; bf, no-pl = breast-
feeding but not playing; no-bf, pl = not breastfeeding but playing; bf, pl = breast-
feeding and playing. The model includes a constant and the investment alterna-
tives are evaluated against not breastfeeding and not playing (omitted category).
ω_speak = preference parameter for a child being able to put 2-3 words together
in speaking by age 2. ω_health = preference parameter for a child not experi-
encing frequent diarrhea. ω_social = preference parameter for a child playing
happily with other children by age 3. ω_learn = preference parameter for a child
learning well at school. Controls include the age of the mother and its square, the
sex of the index child, 3 levels of parity (first child in womb, second, and third or
higher), 4 levels of mother’s education (no education, 1-5 years, 6-10 years, and
+10 years), husband’s education in years, a SES asset-based index, and a dummy
for being diagnosed with depression at baseline.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the vil-
lage level in parentheses.
Sample: Excludes depressed mothers in the intervention group. In addition, Col-
umn (1) excludes women that did not have enough money to by food at baseline,
and Column (2) excludes women with weight equal or below the 10th percentile.
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Table A.15: Model estimates of the preference parameters with complementarities in
investments
Speak Health Social Learn All outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Complementarity from pilot
ω_speak 0.584** 0.531** 0.233 0.191
(0.250) (0.242) (0.363) (0.342)
ω_health 0.209 0.194 0.039 0.037
(0.265) (0.254) (0.276) (0.268)
ω_social 0.401* 0.389 −0.371 −0.303
(0.225) (0.245) (0.355) (0.369)
ω_learn 0.942*** 0.861*** 1.023*** 0.923***
(0.229) (0.241) (0.335) (0.348)
Breastfeeding is tiring 0.203 0.213 0.195 0.204 0.201 0.211 0.233* 0.241 0.233* 0.241
(0.132) (0.145) (0.131) (0.145) (0.131) (0.144) (0.134) (0.148) (0.134) (0.148)
Playing is tiring −0.690*** −0.611*** −0.722*** −0.638*** −0.703*** −0.621*** −0.674*** −0.596*** −0.675*** −0.597***
(0.185) (0.192) (0.180) (0.188) (0.180) (0.189) (0.180) (0.189) (0.183) (0.191)
5% complementarity
ω_speak 0.588** 0.535** 0.230 0.188
(0.251) (0.242) (0.366) (0.345)
ω_health 0.208 0.192 0.036 0.033
(0.265) (0.254) (0.276) (0.268)
ω_social 0.400* 0.388 −0.395 −0.328
(0.225) (0.245) (0.358) (0.372)
ω_learn 0.961*** 0.882*** 1.059*** 0.963***
(0.229) (0.240) (0.340) (0.353)
Breastfeeding is tiring 0.203 0.213 0.195 0.204 0.202 0.212 0.234* 0.242 0.234* 0.242
(0.132) (0.145) (0.131) (0.145) (0.131) (0.144) (0.134) (0.148) (0.135) (0.148)
Playing is tiring −0.690*** −0.611*** −0.722*** −0.638*** −0.703*** −0.621*** −0.674*** −0.596*** −0.675*** −0.598***
(0.185) (0.192) (0.180) (0.188) (0.180) (0.189) (0.181) (0.189) (0.184) (0.191)
10% complementarity
ω_speak 0.592** 0.541** 0.225 0.184
(0.253) (0.243) (0.371) (0.348)
ω_health 0.206 0.189 0.031 0.026
(0.265) (0.254) (0.276) (0.268)
ω_social 0.396* 0.384 −0.428 −0.365
(0.225) (0.244) (0.361) (0.375)
ω_learn 0.987*** 0.912*** 1.111*** 1.020***
(0.228) (0.240) (0.345) (0.359)
Breastfeeding is tiring 0.204 0.214 0.195 0.204 0.202 0.212 0.235* 0.244 0.236* 0.244
(0.132) (0.145) (0.131) (0.145) (0.131) (0.144) (0.134) (0.149) (0.135) (0.149)
Playing is tiring −0.691*** −0.611*** −0.722*** −0.638*** −0.704*** −0.622*** −0.673*** −0.596*** −0.676*** −0.599***
(0.185) (0.192) (0.180) (0.188) (0.180) (0.189) (0.181) (0.189) (0.184) (0.191)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504
# mothers 626 626 626 626 626 626 626 626 626 626
Note: Results estimated using a multinomial logit model where mothers’ alternatives are: no-bf, no-pl = not breastfeeding and not playing; bf,
no-pl = breastfeeding but not playing; no-bf, pl = not breastfeeding but playing; bf, pl = breastfeeding and playing. The model includes a
constant and the investment alternatives are evaluated against not breastfeeding and not playing (omitted category). ω_speak = preference
parameter for a child being able to put 2-3 words together in speaking by age 2. ω_health = preference parameter for a child not experiencing
frequent diarrhea. ω_social = preference parameter for a child playing happily with other children by age 3. ω_learn = preference parameter
for a child learning well at school. Controls include the age of the mother and its square, the sex of the index child, 3 levels of parity (first child
in womb, second, and third or higher), 4 levels of mother’s education (no education, 1-5 years, 6-10 years, and +10 years), husband’s educa-
tion in years, a SES asset-based index, and a dummy for being diagnosed with depression at baseline. “Complementarity from pilot” defines a
1.8% complementarity between investments when mothers both breastfeed and play with the child. This level of complementarity is calculated
using a sample of women for which expected returns from investments where asked both jointly and independently. “5% complementarity” as-
sumes there is a 5% complementary between investments when mothers both breastfeed and play with the child; while “10% complementarity”
assumes this level is of the order of 10%.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
Sample: Excludes depressed mothers in the intervention group.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.17a: Policy evaluations for different subsamples
Panel A: sample of depressed mothers (30% of women)
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline High SES Increase Increase Playing Treat Educate
Predicted beliefs returns (v1) returns (v2) not costly 2 + 4 3 + 4 depression women
Pr(No-bf, no-pl) 41.2 40.6 39.4 32.7 38.9 37.2 30.6 35.8 37.8
Pr(Bf, no-pl) 34.8 35.0 35.8 39.9 32.9 33.8 37.4 32.0 35.6
Pr(No-bf, pl) 12.3 12.5 12.5 13.9 14.3 14.6 16.1 13.9 15.5
Pr(Bf, pl) 11.8 11.9 12.2 13.5 13.9 14.4 15.8 18.3 11.0
Pr(Bf) 46.6 46.9 48.0 53.4 46.8 48.2 53.2 50.3 46.7
Pr(Pl) 24.0 24.4 24.7 27.4 28.2 29.0 31.9 32.3 26.5
∆ Pr(No-bf, no-pl) 0.0 -0.6 -1.8 -8.5 -2.2 -4.0 -10.5 -5.4 -3.4
∆ Pr(Bf) 0.0 0.4 1.5 6.8 0.2 1.6 6.6 3.7 0.1
∆ Pr(Pl) 0.0 0.4 0.7 3.4 4.2 4.9 7.9 8.2 2.5
Gap (Bf) 3.7 3.3 2.2 -3.2 3.5 2.1 -3.0 -0.1 3.5
Gap (Pl) 10.6 10.2 9.9 7.2 6.4 5.6 2.7 2.3 8.0
Panel B: sample of low educated mothers (76% of women)
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline High SES Increase Increase Playing Treat Educate
Predicted beliefs returns (v1) returns (v2) not costly 2 + 4 3 + 4 depression women
Pr(No-bf, no-pl) 38.5 38.0 36.7 30.2 36.4 34.7 28.4 36.6 34.6
Pr(Bf, no-pl) 32.9 33.1 33.9 37.5 31.1 31.9 35.1 32.0 33.9
Pr(No-bf, pl) 12.3 12.5 12.7 13.9 14.0 14.4 15.7 12.9 16.4
Pr(Bf, pl) 16.2 16.4 16.7 18.3 18.5 19.1 20.8 18.4 15.1
Pr(Bf) 49.1 49.5 50.6 55.8 49.6 51.0 55.9 50.5 49.0
Pr(Pl) 28.6 28.9 29.4 32.3 32.5 33.4 36.5 31.3 31.5
∆ Pr(No-bf, no-pl) 0.0 -0.5 -1.8 -8.3 -2.1 -3.9 -10.1 -1.9 -3.9
∆ Pr(Bf) 0.0 0.3 1.5 6.7 0.4 1.8 6.8 1.4 -0.2
∆ Pr(Pl) 0.0 0.3 0.9 3.7 3.9 4.9 8.0 2.8 3.0
Gap (Bf) 0.1 -0.3 -1.4 -6.6 -0.4 -1.8 -6.7 -1.3 0.2
Gap (Pl) 11.8 11.5 10.9 8.1 7.8 6.9 3.8 9.0 8.8
Panel C: sample of mothers with low SES (45% of women)
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline High SES Increase Increase Playing Treat Educate
Predicted beliefs returns (v1) returns (v2) not costly 2 + 4 3 + 4 depression women
Pr(No-bf, no-pl) 40.1 39.2 38.3 31.6 37.7 36.0 29.6 37.9 36.4
Pr(Bf, no-pl) 34.6 34.9 35.6 39.6 32.6 33.5 36.9 33.6 35.9
Pr(No-bf, pl) 11.8 12.2 12.2 13.4 13.8 14.2 15.5 12.6 15.3
Pr(Bf, pl) 13.5 13.8 13.9 15.3 15.9 16.4 18.0 15.9 12.4
Pr(Bf) 48.1 48.6 49.5 54.9 48.5 49.9 54.9 49.4 48.3
Pr(Pl) 25.3 25.9 26.1 28.8 29.7 30.6 33.5 28.5 27.7
∆ Pr(No-bf, no-pl) 0.0 -0.9 -1.8 -8.4 -2.3 -4.1 -10.5 -2.1 -3.6
∆ Pr(Bf) 0.0 0.5 1.4 6.8 0.4 1.7 6.8 1.3 0.1
∆ Pr(Pl) 0.0 0.6 0.8 3.5 4.4 5.3 8.2 3.2 2.4
Gap (Bf) 1.9 1.4 0.5 -4.9 1.5 0.2 -4.9 0.6 1.7
Gap (Pl) 11.3 10.7 10.5 7.9 7.0 6.1 3.1 8.1 8.9
Note: Predicted probabilities estimated after a multinomial logit model where the preference parameters for children’s de-
velopmental outcomes are evaluated jointly and where mothers’ alternatives are: no-bf, no-pl = not breastfeeding and not
playing; bf, no-pl = breastfeeding but not playing; no-bf, pl = not breastfeeding but playing; bf, pl = breastfeeding and
playing. Col (0) - Baseline predicted probabilities; Col (1) - Low SES mothers have the beliefs held by the high SES moth-
ers; Col (2) - The probability of children achieving developmental outcomes is increased by 10 pp. Col (3) - The probability
of children achieving developmental outcomes is increased by the IQR of the average expected return of single investments
(average increase of 43 pp); Col (4) - The effort cost of playing is suppressed; Col (5) - Combines Col (2) and Col (4); Col
(6) - Combines Col (3) and Col (4); Col (7) - Depression status is changed to not depressed, and beliefs and costs are set at
the value that not depressed mothers have; Col (8) - Education level is set at +10 years of education, and beliefs and costs
are set at the value that mothers with +10 years of education have. Low educated mothers are defined as those with 10 or
less years of education. The gap in investments is given by the difference between the predicted investment level among the
treated group in each of the policy scenarios and the predicted investment level at baseline of the untreated group, which is:
Panel A = nondepressed mothers; Panel B = high educated mothers; Panel C = high SES mothers.
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Table A.17b: Policy evaluations for different subsamples
Panel D: sample of mothers with at least two expected zero return
(exluding 0 return on diarrhea from playing) (36% of women)
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline High SES Increase Increase Playing Treat Educate
Predicted beliefs returns (v1) returns (v2) not costly 2 + 4 3 + 4 depression women
Pr(No-bf, no-pl) 42.3 39.4 40.5 33.1 39.4 37.7 30.5 39.3 35.5
Pr(Bf, no-pl) 30.8 32.4 31.7 35.9 28.7 29.4 33.0 30.5 33.3
Pr(No-bf, pl) 12.5 13.1 12.9 14.4 14.8 15.3 16.9 13.5 16.7
Pr(Bf, pl) 14.3 15.1 14.8 16.6 17.1 17.6 19.6 16.7 14.5
Pr(Bf) 45.1 47.5 46.5 52.5 45.7 47.1 52.6 47.2 47.8
Pr(Pl) 26.8 28.2 27.7 31.0 31.9 32.9 36.5 30.2 31.2
∆ Pr(No-bf, no-pl) 0.0 -2.9 -1.8 -9.2 -2.9 -4.7 -11.8 -3.0 -6.8
∆ Pr(Bf) 0.0 2.3 1.4 7.4 0.6 1.9 7.5 2.1 2.6
∆ Pr(Pl) 0.0 1.3 0.9 4.1 5.1 6.1 9.6 3.3 4.4
Gap (Bf) 6.2 3.8 4.8 -1.2 5.6 4.2 -1.3 4.1 3.5
Gap (Pl) 7.1 5.8 6.2 3.0 2.1 1.1 -2.5 3.8 2.8
Panel E: sample of mothers with high cost on any investment (17% of women)
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline High SES Increase Increase Playing Treat Educate
Predicted beliefs returns (v1) returns (v2) not costly 2 + 4 3 + 4 depression women
Pr(No-bf, no-pl) 39.9 38.9 38.0 31.1 34.8 32.9 26.6 37.3 35.3
Pr(Bf, no-pl) 36.5 37.0 37.7 41.9 31.8 32.7 35.9 34.1 34.9
Pr(No-bf, pl) 9.8 10.0 10.1 11.1 14.0 14.4 15.6 11.5 15.2
Pr(Bf, pl) 13.8 14.1 14.3 15.8 19.4 19.9 21.8 17.1 14.5
Pr(Bf) 50.3 51.1 51.9 57.7 51.3 52.7 57.8 51.2 49.5
Pr(Pl) 23.6 24.1 24.4 26.9 33.4 34.3 37.4 28.6 29.7
∆ Pr(No-bf, no-pl) 0.0 -1.0 -2.0 -8.8 -5.1 -7.0 -13.3 -2.6 -4.6
∆ Pr(Bf) 0.0 0.8 1.6 7.4 0.9 2.4 7.4 0.9 -0.8
∆ Pr(Pl) 0.0 0.5 0.8 3.3 9.8 10.7 13.8 5.0 6.1
Gap (Bf) -1.0 -1.8 -2.6 -8.4 -1.9 -3.4 -8.4 -1.9 -0.2
Gap (Pl) 9.5 9.0 8.7 6.2 -0.3 -1.2 -4.3 4.5 3.4
Note: Predicted probabilities estimated after a multinomial logit model where the preference parameters for children’s de-
velopmental outcomes are evaluated jointly and where mothers’ alternatives are: no-bf, no-pl = not breastfeeding and not
playing; bf, no-pl = breastfeeding but not playing; no-bf, pl = not breastfeeding but playing; bf, pl = breastfeeding and
playing. Col (0) - Baseline predicted probabilities; Col (1) - Low SES mothers have the beliefs held by the high SES moth-
ers; Col (2) - The probability of children achieving developmental outcomes is increased by 10 pp. Col (3) - The probability
of children achieving developmental outcomes is increased by the IQR of the average expected return of single investments
(average increase of 43 pp); Col (4) - The effort cost of playing is suppressed; Col (5) - Combines Col (2) and Col (4); Col (6)
- Combines Col (3) and Col (4); Col (7) - Depression status is changed to not depressed, and beliefs and costs are set at the
value that not depressed mothers have; Col (8) - Education level is set at +10 years of education, and beliefs and costs are
set at the value that mothers with +10 years of education have. The gap in investments is given by the difference between
the predicted investment level among the treated group in each of the policy scenarios and the predicted investment level at
baseline of the untreated group, which is: Panel D = mothers with less than two expected zero returns (excluding 0 return




Now I am going to ask you some questions about your beliefs regarding certain
behaviours that a mother in your community could have and its effect on her child.
Before that, let’s talk about how I am going to understand your answers better.
We will use different sizes of bars to record your answer. I will show you ten bars
of different sizes. I would like you to choose one of the bars out of these ten bars
over here to express what you think is the chance of a specific event happening. The
smaller the bar, the lesser chances are for that specific event to happen. On the
other hand, the bigger the bar, the higher the chances are for that specific event to
happen. In other words, as you increase the size of the bar, the chances increase.
If you choose zero, it means you are sure that the event will NOT happen. If you
choose 1, it means one chance out of 10. If you choose 1 or 2, it means you think the
event is not likely to happen, but it is still possible. If you pick 5, it means that it is
just as likely it happens as it does not happen (fifty-fifty). If you pick 6, it means the
event is slightly more likely to happen than not to happen. If you put 10, it means
you are sure the event will happen. There is no right or wrong answer; I just want
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to know what you think.
Let me ask you a couple of questions to make sure you understand how to answer
using the bars.
Pick the size of the bar that reflects how likely the following event can happen. . .
(Training questions)
(a) A woman in your community will go to the market at least once within the next
2 days.
(b) A woman in your community will go to the market at least once within the next
2 weeks.
Within your community, the maternal behaviors that we are interested in are a)
breastfeeding and b) playing with the child. We are interested in whether you think
these might influence the health and growth of children (including getting ill, doing
well at school, being able to speak and engage with others).
Some people think these behaviors affect their children, and some people don’t
think they make a difference. Among people who think they make a difference, some
think they make a big difference and others think they make only a small difference.
There is no right or wrong answer; we just want to know what you think. When
answering the questions, please think of another mother like you.
First, I am going to ask you questions regarding breastfeeding and its influence on
the health and growth of children. Please provide your answers to the questions that
I will ask you with the help of the bars.
(1) In your view, what is the likelihood of a child/infant in your community to
frequently have diarrhea:
(a) If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months.
(b) If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months.
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(2) In your view, what is the likelihood of a child to put 2-3 words together in
speaking by age 2 years of his/her life:
(a) If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months.
(b) If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months.
(3) In your view, what is the likelihood that a child will happily play with other
children by age 3:
(a) If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months.
(b) If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months.
(4) In your view, what is the likelihood that a child in your community will learn
well at school:
(a) If the mother exclusively breastfeeds for 6 months.
(b) If the mother does not exclusively breastfeed for 6 months.
Now we are going to ask the same questions that we asked earlier but this time
we will relate them to someone who plays with the child instead of to breastfeeding
behavior. Again, there is no right or wrong answer; we just want to know what you
think.
Please provide your answers to the questions that I will ask you with the help of
the bars.
(1) In your view, what is the likelihood of a child/infant in your community to
frequently have diarrhea:
(a) If the mother plays with the child frequently to help them learn new
things.
(b) If the mother plays with the child rarely to help them learn new things.
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(2) In your view, what is the likelihood of a child to put 2-3 words together in
speaking by age 2 years of his/her life:
(a) If the mother plays with the child frequently to help them learn new
things.
(b) If the mother plays with the child rarely to help them learn new things.
(3) In your view, what is the likelihood that a child will happily play with other
children by age 3:
(a) If the mother plays with the child frequently to help them learn new
things.
(b) If the mother plays with the child rarely to help them learn new things.
(4) In your view, what is the likelihood that a child in your community will learn
well at school:
(a) If the mother plays with the child frequently to help them learn new
things.
(b) If the mother plays with the child rarely to help them learn new things.
B.2 Construction of variables
Measuring depression. Depression was assessed using the patient health question-
naire (PHQ-9), which queries a series of symptoms of depression, each being scored
on a four-point Likert scale. The PHQ-9 asks about the following 9 items: 1) Little
interest or pleasure in doing things. 2) Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless. 3) Trou-
ble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much. 4) Feeling tired or having little
energy. 5) Poor appetite or overeating. 6) Feeling bad about yourself, or that you
are a failure or have let yourself or your family down. 7) Trouble concentrating on
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things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television. 8) Moving or speaking
so slowly that other people could have noticed? Or the opposite, being so fidgety
or restless that you have been moving around a lot more than usual. 9) Thoughts
that you would be better off dead or of hurting yourself in some way. Women were
classified as depressed when their score was 10 or above, as this cut-off point has
been proven to have a high predictive power for the diagnosis of depressive disorder
(Kroenke, Spitzer, and Williams 2001).
Measuring maternal investments Exclusive breastfeeding is measured by asking
mothers all the nutrients given to their child in the last 24 hours, including breast
milk, a herbal cocktail (ghutti), herbal water, water, tea (chai), formula milk, other
animal milk (cow, goat, buffalo), semi-solid food, solid food, or other. See Appendix
Table A.2 for a detailed summary of feeding practices in our study area. Mothers are
considered as exclusively breastfeeding if they are giving only breast milk.
Play is measured through a question collected within the Infant-Toddler HOME
(Home Observation Measurement of the Environment) inventory questionnaire de-
signed for children aged 0-3 (Cox et al., 2002). The enumerators are instructed to
look out for the behavior and to question the mother. The HOME inventory has 6
sections covering the following topics:
I RESPONSIVITY
1. Parent permits child to engage in “messy” play.
2. Parent spontaneously vocalizes to the child at least twice.
3. Parent responds verbally to the child’s vocalizations or verbalizations.
4. Parent tells child name of object or person during visit.
5. Parent’s speech is distinct, clear, and audible.
6. Parent initiates verbal interchanges with visitor.
7. Parent converses freely and easily.
8. Parent spontaneously praises child at least twice.
9. Parent’s voice conveys positive feelings towards child.
10. Parent caresses or kisses child at least once.
11. Parent responds positively to praise of child offered by visitor.
II ACCEPTANCE
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12. No more than one instance of physical punishment during past week.
13. Family has a pet.
14. Parent does not shout at child.
15. Parent does not express overt annoyance with or hostility to child.
16. Parent neither slaps nor spanks child during visit.
17. Parent does not scold or criticize child during visit.
18. Parent does not interfere with or restrict child more than three times during
visit.
19. At least ten books are present and visible.
III ORGANIZATION
20. Child care, if used, is provided by one of three regular substitutes.
21. Child is taken to grocery store at least once a week.
22. Child gets out of house at least four times a week.
23. Child is taken regularly to doctor’s office or clinic.
24. Child has a special place for toys and treasures.
25. Child’s play environment is safe.
IV LEARNING MATERIAL
26. Muscle activity toys or equipment.
27. Push or pull toys.
28. Stroller or walker, kiddie car, scooter, or tricycle.
29. Cuddly toys or role- playing toys.
30. Learning facilitators-mobile, table, and chair, high chair, play pen.
31. Simple hand-eye coordination toys.
32. Complex hand-eye coordination toys.
33. Toys for literature and music.
34. Parent provides toys for child to play with during visit.
V INVOLVEMENT
35. Parent talks to child while doing household work.
36. Parent consciously encourages developmental advance.
37. Parent invests maturing toys with value via personal attention.
38. Parent guides during play/structures child’s play period.
39. Parent provides toys that challenge child to develop new skills.
40. Parent keeps child in visual range, looks at often.
VI VARIETY
41. Father provides some care daily.
42. Parent reads stories to child at least three times weekly.
43. Child eats at least one meal a day with mother and father.
44. Family visit relatives or receives visits once a month or so.
45. Child has three or more books of his/her own.
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All items are answered with either yes (value of 1) or no (value of 0). Our main
outcome of play uses the answer to item 38. In Section 1.6, we conduct robustness
checks by considering mothers to be making the playing investment when she scores
in the top tertile of:
1– The HOME Score
2– The Stimulation Score (combining the score in the Responsivity and Involvement
sections)
3– The first principal component (PCA) of the Stimulation items (Responsivity
and Involvement items)
Measuring expected cost We elicited expected effort costs associated with making
the investments by asking mothers at baseline (before birth) to report on a Likert
scale how tiring they expected it would be to breastfeed or to play with a baby. The
scale had 4 points, indicating rarely or never, sometimes, most of the times, or don’t
know.
Other constructed variables Wealth: We construct a measure of wealth using an
asset-based index that has been widely used in household surveys such as the De-
mographic and Health Surveys. It is constructed using polychoric correlations, more
suited for categorical variables than standard correlations (Kolenikov and Angeles,
2004). It includes asset variables for which less than or equal to 90% of people owned
the asset and less than or equal to 90% of people did not own the item. This ensured
enough variability in the items going into the principal components score. The full
list of assets meeting this condition was: own or rent a farm, ownership of animals,
radio, television, fridge, washing machine, electric water pump, bed, chair, cabinet,
clock, sofa, sewing machine, camera, laptop computer, wrist-watch, car/truck, piped
natural gas, flush toilet, roof made of reinforced brick cement or concrete cement,
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wall made of baked bricks or cement blocks, and floor made of bricks/terrazzo or
ceramic tiles.
Farming household : If women respond that she or any other household member owns
or rent any land for farming, we consider the women as living in an agricultural or
farming household (60% of households).
89
Chapter 2
Taking Cover: Human Capital
Accumulation in the Presence of
Shocks and Health Insurance
2.1 Introduction
In the past decades, the education level of the world’s population has experienced
a remarkable and sustained increase (J.-W. Lee and Lee, 2016). This has also been
the case for low and middle-income countries, for which the number of out-of-school
children has been steadily decreasing amidst the push to achieve universal primary
and secondary education (UIS, 2018). However, an alarming number of children
attending school perform poorly in cognitive assessments, large disparities in cognitive
achievement both across countries and population groups persist, and current learning
gaps are closing at a sluggish pace (Hanushek, 2013; UIS, 2017).
With the improvements in schooling, the international community has moved the
attention towards its quality. However, although schools and the teaching they pro-
vide play a critical role in the cognitive development of children (Araujo et al., 2016;
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Dearden et al., 2002; Deming et al., 2014), quality alone cannot provide an exhaustive
explanation of what is being considered a global learning crisis. There exist other im-
portant and complementary inputs in the education production function over which
families have a closer control and that explain a substantial part of the variation
observed in cognition levels, including time, monetary, and health investments in
children (see Currie and Almond (2011); and Almond et al. (2018) for a review of
the studies). Moreover families (especially in low-income areas), are often exposed to
shocks, and negative disturbances affecting family means might result in interruptions
in children’s cognitive development.
Whether shocks impact children’s human capital, however, depend on the ability
and coping mechanisms households have access to (Almond et al., 2018; Frankenberg
and Thomas, 2017). This study seeks to investigate the extent to which access to
public health insurance, a form of safety net, is able to protect children’s performance
in school during adversity. I define shocks as atypical rainfall levels and use the ex-
pansion of a large-scale pro-poor health insurance program in Mexico that sought to
extend access to public healthcare to the uninsured (estimated to be around half of
the population at the program start). The reasons why adverse rainfall might impact
learning include its effect on health and the disease environment (Aguilar and Vi-
carelli, 2011; Bleakley, 2010; Colón-González et al., 2013; Duque et al., 2019; Maccini
and Yang, 2009; Rocha and Soares, 2015; Rosales, 2014; Wu et al., 2015), on income,
food security, and the opportunity cost of schooling (Amare et al., 2018; Gabrysch
et al., 2018; Shah and Steinberg, 2017; Skoufias and Vinha, 2013), on mental distress
(OBrien et al., 2014; Rataj et al., 2016), and more broadly on economic and political
stability (Barrios et al., 2010; Hsiang et al., 2013; Miguel et al., 2004).
On the other hand, healthcare coverage has been linked to higher endowment
levels at birth (Bhalotra et al., 2019), lower incidence of sickness and preventable
hospitalizations (Currie et al., 2008; Miller and Wherry, 2019), better mental health
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(Finkelstein et al., 2012), and higher levels of education attained (Brown et al.,
2015; Cohodes et al., 2016; Levine and Schanzenbach, 2009; Miller and Wherry,
2019; Wherry et al., 2016). Moreover, studies have shown an association between
financial protection in health and a lower probability of suffering catastrophic and
impoverishing health expenditures (Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011; Wherry et al.,
2016), and higher levels of consumption through a reduction in precautionary savings
(Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999; Maynard and Qiu, 2009).
The health insurance program under study is Seguro Popular (or Popular Health
Insurance, hereafter also referred to as SP). The SP was the result of a reform of
the Mexican health system in response to a political debate after national estimates
showed that more than 50% of the health expenditures in the country were out of
pocket, with 2 to 4 million families estimated to be suffering from catastrophic and
impoverishing health expenditures each year (Knaul et al., 2006). Starting in 2002 as
a pilot program, it offered a comprehensive package of health services to individuals
outside of the social security system and, after ten years of program expansion and
more than 52 million new affiliations, it achieved its target of establishing universal
healthcare.
In this study I analyze the capacity of universal healthcare in protecting the cog-
nitive development of children in the event of negative shocks. To do so, I combine
information from a yearly national standardized test delivered to all students in cer-
tain grades in primary education, the expansion in health coverage induced by the
reform of the health system and the creation of Seguro Popular, and rainfall precipi-
tation measured at the school-locality level in a region where climatic conditions are
influenced by El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO)1. The results show that while
adverse rainfall shocks reduce mathematics and verbal attainment by 0.022 and 0.020
standard deviations respectively, a one standard deviation increase in healthcare cov-
1An irregular climatic phenomenon that has been shown to affect precipitation levels in Mexico.
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erage mitigates 55% and 52% of the negative effect.2 The estimated results are driven
by schools located in more marginalized and rural areas. Moreover, the impact of the
shocks differs by intensity and nature, with dry periods imposing a higher burden on
the process of learning and during which health coverage offsets the highest propor-
tion of the adverse effect. On the other hand, robustness specifications suggest a null
impact of health coverage on cognitive attainment in the absence of shocks.
An exploration of the underlying mechanisms using household survey data shows
that when hit by rainfall shocks, access to SP reduces the incidence of sickness among
children from eligible families, decreases the demand for children’s time, and protects
household’s consumption levels. While negative rainfall shocks increase by 6.6 per-
centage points the probability of children being sick, and by 14.1 percentage points
their probability of being involved in domestic chores, each additional year of SP
eligibility reduces these probabilities by 1.5 and 3.5 percentage points respectively
(significant at the 5% level). Similarly, rainfall shocks are associated with a reduc-
tion of 16% in consumption expenditures among program-eligible households (18%
in rural households and similar to the 16.7% reduction estimated by Bobonis (2009)
for a sample of rural households in Mexico). Each additional year of SP availability,
however, reduces by 4% (3%) the negative effect.
Overall, the story that emerges from the findings is one of positive spillovers on
education from public investments in health. It provides evidence of the capacity
of universal healthcare in building resilience in cognitive attainment against negative
shocks experienced during childhood, and contributes to our understanding of some of
the mechanisms at play. The results contribute to and are in line with recent studies
evaluating the extent to which different programs can mitigate the negative effect of
climatic and other environmental shocks on human capital. For instance, conditional
2The effect of rainfall shocks on mathematics test scores is equivalent to erasing more than
one-fourth of the gains from interventions that provide instructional materials, or more than one-
sixth of the gains from teacher training programs (see McEwan (2015) for a review of randomized
educational experiments in developing countries).
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cash transfers ease the negative effect of rainfall shocks on educational attainment
in Mexico (Adhvaryu et al., 2018) and Colombia (Duque et al., 2019), vitamin A
supplementation at-birth reduces the adverse effects of exposure to a tornado on
infant health in Bangladesh (Gunnsteinsson et al., 2019), a rural employment scheme
in India mitigates the impact of heatwaves on children’s cognition (Garg et al., 2017),
public health improvements in West Africa weaken the link between dust storms and
child mortality (Adhvaryu et al., 2019), and the introduction of air conditioning in
schools alleviates the effect of heat exposure on test scores in the US (Park et al.,
2020).
This study also speaks to the literature evaluating the effect of healthcare cov-
erage on children’s educational outcomes. While most of the previous studies have
focused on the role of health insurance in fostering education in advanced economies
and have limited the analysis to a sub-samples of households, I estimate the effect of
healthcare coverage in a context of high regional imbalances and exploit a nationwide
policy to implement universal health coverage.3 One other study has attempted to
evaluate the link between health insurance and education in Mexico (Alcaraz et al.,
2016), finding a positive association between healthcare coverage, school enrolment,
and educational performance at the municipality level. I expand on previous findings
by assessing the capacity of healthcare coverage in building resilience in children’s
performance in school, and by investigating some of the mechanisms by which univer-
sal healthcare might help children and their families endure adverse environmental
shocks. This study is similar in spirit as Liu (2016), who using survey data shows
that the expansion in health coverage across rural China increased the probability of
children being enrolled in school following a household health shock. To avoid the
potential endogeneity of health shocks and risk-sharing networks among neighboring
3Most of the evidence comes from the Medicaid program and the CHIP (Children’s Health
Insurance Program) in the US, which target families and children in poverty and under specific
vulnerable conditions.
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households, I focus on climatic shocks experienced at the locality level, and focus on
children’s performance in school (instead of enrollment) using administrative data.
Because adverse rainfall shocks are one of the most prevalent disturbances experi-
enced among the poor (Dinkelman, 2013), the results of this study are highly relevant
to a large share of the population of the world. Climate instability has consolidated
as one of the major threats to developmental gains, including gains in human capital,
and there is international consensus to develop and implement policies that mitigate
its negative effects on the population (Field et al., 2012). Universal health coverage
has recently evidenced its potential to protect the world’s population against global
health shocks (Aarabi et al., 2020). The WHO pushes for its expansion as a major
goal for health reform (WHO and World Bank, 2017, 2020), and many countries
across the world are increasing access to social health insurance among the disad-
vantaged population (Boerma et al., 2014; Marten et al., 2014; Reich et al., 2016).
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to assess the capacity of uni-
versal healthcare in mitigating the effect of negative shocks on children’s cognitive
performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the social
health insurance expansion in Mexico. Section 2.3 describes the academic, climate,
affiliation to Seguro Popular, and household survey data. The empirical strategy is
discussed in section 2.4, and the results follow in section 2.5. I conduct a series of
robustness checks in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 explores the mechanisms at play
and Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Seguro Popular: health insurance for the poor
Before the creation of Seguro Popular, social health insurance was administered by
two main institutions that still exist today. On the one hand, the Mexican Social
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Security Institute (IMSS), covering the workers of the private sector; and the Insti-
tute for Social Security and Services for State Workers (ISSSTE), covering public
employees.4,5
Those families not integrated into any of the former institutions could seek health-
care assistance through the conditional cash transfer program and main anti-poverty
program in the country (Progresa/Oportunidades), or in the Coverage Expansion
Program (PAC), which consisted of mobile healthcare teams visiting the most iso-
lated regions and communities in the country.6 All other workers in the informal
sector and individuals detached from the labor market could seek medical care in
either health facilities managed by the Ministry of Health (SSA) or in the private
sector. In both cases, medical attention and prescription drugs were at the expense
of the user. As a result, the health system left half of the population uninsured.
While Mexico ranked 51 out of 191 countries in the overall attainment in health in
the World Health Report 2000, its health system placed 144 with respect to its fair-
ness in financial contribution (WHO, 2000). National-level estimates showed that
more than 50% of the health expenditures were out of pocket and that between 2 to
4 million families suffered from catastrophic and impoverishing health expenditures
each year (Knaul et al., 2006).
The low levels of financial protection in health were one of the major catalysts
for the creation of Seguro Popular, which was introduced in 2002 as a pilot program
and became the central pillar of the reform of the health system of 2003. The new
law, effective from January 1st, 2004, created the System of Social Protection in
Health (or SPSS in its acronym in Spanish) to provide health coverage and financial
4Also playing a more marginal role, the Mexican Petroleums (PEMEX), covering workers in the
oil industries.
5These institutions also administered other benefits such as pensions, disability benefits, and
severance payments.
6The Progresa program started in 1997 in rural areas and was renamed Oportunidades in 2002
when it expanded to urban areas. In 2014 the program’s name changed to Prospera. The Coverage
Expansion Program or Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura (PAC) started in 1996.
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protection in health to all citizens with no access to social security and to consolidate
universal health care and the right to health (Knaul et al., 2006).7,8 The services
offered, listed in the Universal Catalog of Health Services (CAUSES), expanded as
the program consolidated across the territory, and included the most cost-effective
health interventions and the leading causes for outpatient and hospital utilization in
the country (Bonilla-Chacín and Aguilera, 2013).
The health reform also sought to increase the funds of the public health system
and to reduce the inequalities in public health spending across insurance schemes
and regions (Kurowski et al., 2012). See also Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The push for
universal healthcare resulted in the construction of new patient clinics and hospitals,
with the proportion of the Ministry of Health budget devoted to investments in
healthcare infrastructure increasing from 3.8% in 2000 to 9.1% in 2006 (Frenk et al.,
2009). Moreover, the gap in the availability of medical personnel between individuals
covered by the Social Security and those that were not decreased substantially (Knaul
et al., 2012), as did the difference in the number of hospitals and beds between poor
and rich municipalities (Conti and Ginja, 2017).
The financial resources of SP come mostly from the federal government and the
states.9 Although initially only families in the first two deciles of the income distri-
bution were exempt from any payments, in practice very few households ever paid
(Knaul et al., 2012).10 Furthermore, the reform introduced incentives for the states
to expand coverage, as historical health budget allocations were replaced with a pre-
7The self-employed, the underemployed, the unemployed, those detached from the labor market,
and their families.
8The requirements to enroll in SP are proof of residence, Mexican ID, and lack of access to
health insurance.
9The contributions to SP from the states are a subsidy in nature. These are set as a fraction of
the total expected cost in health services per capita (which vary by state) adjusted by differentials
in regional wages, and capped at a maximum of 30% of the total per-family expected cost.
10Knaul et al. (2006) show that by the end of 2011 only 1% of the families were paying the family
premium.
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mium based on the number of affiliates (Bonilla-Chacín and Aguilera, 2013).11 In
2012 and after having enrolled 52.6 million individuals, Mexico achieved universal
health coverage.
2.3 Data
This study combines an extensive array of publicly available information obtained
from different institutions, all described in greater detail below.
School and academic performance
I measure educational achievement with a yearly national standardized test: the
National Evaluation of Academic Achievement in Schools (or ENLACE in its acronym
in Spanish). Since its implementation in 2006 the test evaluates the mathematical
and verbal abilities of students in grades 3 to 6 in primary education and 7 to 9
in lower secondary education.12 The data are available from Mexico’s Ministry of
Education (SEP), with school results disaggregated by grade and subject. In this
study I focus on the evaluation of schools in primary education, for which I can
obtain disaggregated results by grade and subject for all the years in which the
test was implemented (2006-2013).13 The information provided includes test score
results in the different subjects under evaluation, the distribution of students falling
11Previously, the states’ budget for the health system was based on their infrastructure and
health care personnel in the late 1990s adjusted for inflation and mortality levels (Bonilla-Chacín
and Aguilera, 2013).
12From 2008 the test also evaluates competencies in a third subject that rotates on a yearly basis:
Natural Sciences in 2008, Civics and Ethics in 2009, History in 2010, Geography in 2011, Science in
2012, and Civics and Ethics again in 2013.
13The ENLACE was replaced by another standardized test (PLANEA), which was then canceled
in 2019 due to budget constraints.
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in different categories of proficiency: inadequate, fair, good, or excellent results14;
the number of students sitting the test, the number of students considered to have
been involved in copying, dictating answers, or other fraudulent practices, and the
level of marginalization experienced in the school’s location.15 The evaluation date is
scheduled in advance of the start of the academic year, and the test is simultaneously
administered to all schools during the national evaluation week (typically towards
the end of the school year).16
I complement these data with school information held in the Estadística 911 (Statis-
tic 911). The 911 is an administrative questionnaire that all schools in Mexico are
required to fill at the beginning and the end of the school year, detailing informa-
tion on students, teachers, and other school characteristics. With the information
provided I calculate the number of students per teacher, the share of female pupils,
and the dropout rate (the proportion of students that left the school throughout the
academic year), all for the grades evaluated in ENLACE. Also, I create an indicator
for whether the head of the school has teaching responsibilities.
Table 2.1 shows that around 20% of the pupils in each school do not achieve min-
imum levels of proficiency in both the mathematics and verbal section of ENLACE,
with around half of the students obtaining just a pass (see Appendix Figure C.1 for
a more detailed distribution of the test results). On average, there are no sex imbal-
ances in the classroom (49% of students are female), and there are 26 students per
14The definition of each of these categories is as follows: inadequate, the student needs to acquire
the knowledge and develop the relevant skills of the subject assessed; fair, the student needs to
strengthen most of the knowledge and develop the relevant skills; good, the student shows an
adequate level of knowledge and has the relevant skills; excellent, the student masters the knowledge
and the skills of the subject evaluated.
15The census authorities in Mexico create and maintain a marginalization index that reflects
the different levels of development observed throughout the country and at different administration
levels. At the smallest regional disaggregation (AGEB or Basic Geostatistical Area), it is calculated
with different measures related to education and literacy, access to services, child mortality, and the
quality of housing, depending on whether it is an urban or a rural location.
16More specifically, the test was administered from the 5th to the 9th of June in 2006, 23rd to
the 27th of April in 2007, 14th to the 18th of April in 2008, 23rd to the 29th of April in 2009, 19th
to the 23rd of April in 2010, 23rd to the 27th of May in 2011, 4th to the 8th of June in 2012, and
3rd to the 7th of June in 2013.
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teacher in the sample of schools. In 29% of the schools the head also teaches, and 137
is the number of students evaluated yearly in each school. Moreover, around 40% of
the schools are experiencing some degree of marginalization (but only 4% are in very
high marginalized areas).
During the study period three different school-level programs could have influ-
enced school performance in Mexico: the PES (Programa de Escuela Segura) or Safe
School Program, promoting an inclusive and peaceful environment in schools for ef-
fective learning; the PETC (Programa Escuelas de Tiempo Completo) or Extending
School Hours Program, extending the school day to expand learning opportunities
and strengthen the development of the curriculum; and the PEC (Programa Escue-
las de Calidad) or Quality Schools Program, a program involving schools and their
communities in resolving issues preventing schools from offering better educational
services. The list of schools participating in these programs in each academic year is
obtained from the Ministry of Education. Table 2.1 shows that the Quality Schools
program was the most expanded (implemented in 26% of the schools), followed by
the Safe School program (present in 17% of the schools), and the Extending School
Hours program (implemented in only 2% of the schools).
To derive the geolocation of the schools I use the 2013 school census, provided
by INEGI (the National Institute of Statistics and Geography), the Statistics 911,
and the ENLACE evaluation. The geographic information that all three sources
provide is the state, municipality, and locality code in which the school is located
(following the Unique Catalogue of Geostatistical State, Municipal, and Local Areas).
With this information, I match each school to its respective locality.17,18 The final
17Although the ENLACE evaluation provides information to track the localities in which the
schools are based, the information is not always consistent across all years (in part due to changes
in the coding system). Therefore, I prefer to use the school census of 2013 to infer the geographical
location of schools, and in the few occasions that this one is missing, infer it from the Statistics 911
and the ENLACE evaluation when the codes provided are consistent across all evaluation years.
18A locality in Mexico refers to the lowest of the three sub-national divisions contemplated by
the law.
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sample excludes those schools with inconsistent geographic information and in the
top percentile of the share of students considered to have cheated during the test.19
Moreover, I restrict the analysis to those schools observed in all periods, and with 15
or more students evaluated. After applying this filter, the sample consists of 49,751
schools, observed uninterruptedly for 8 years.
Health insurance coverage
Administrative records on affiliation to Seguro Popular are provided by the Ministry
of Health (SSA), containing the number of affiliates to the program by municipality
and quarter.20 I measure the expansion of SP across the country by dividing the
number of beneficiaries in a municipality by its population size. Yearly population at
the municipality level is calculated assuming linear growth between the two census
years of 2005 and 2010, and with projections of municipality population estimated
by the National Population Council (CONAPO) after 2010. Figure 2.3 displays the
evolution of the affiliation to SP and its coverage at the national level. It shows
that by 2013 the program was covering almost half of the Mexican population with
55 million beneficiaries. Figure 2.4 displays the regional expansion of the coverage
rate. In the sample of schools, the average coverage rate during the study period is
around 34%, and the average observed expansion is 36.3 percentage points (standard
deviation of 17.3) (Table 2.1).
In addition to the coverage rate, I calculate the start date of the program in each
municipality. Following previous studies (Bosch and Campos-Vazquez, 2014), I define
the quarter of program implementation as when at least 10 individuals enroll in SP.21
With this definition, Appendix Figure C.2 and C.3 display the timing and the pace
19Equivalent to excluding those schools where more than 58% of students have invalid test results.
20A municipality in Mexico refers to the second-level administrative division of the country, and
it is equivalent to a county in the US.
21The reason being is that some of the municipalities, especially at the beginning of the program,
show a very low affiliation (zero or close to zero) for several quarters, making it difficult to infer
whether the program was operational during that period.
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at which municipalities joined the program. As Appendix Figure C.3 shows, most
municipalities had already joined the program by 2008.
Rainfall shocks
I use rainfall data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
They offer monthly hydrometeorology information from 1950 to 2013 for all the North
America in grid cells of approximately 6 km width (1/16◦). The dataset improves
on previously available information in the reduction of transboundary discontinu-
ities and with an adjustment of orographic precipitations in Mexico (see Livneh et al.
(2015) for a more detailed discussion). I measure monthly precipitation at the school-
locality level by constructing a linear distance weighted rainfall variable using all the
data points located within a 20 km radius of each locality centroid. The baseline
specification defines the existence of a rainfall shock when the precipitation gathered
in a given locality in the 12 months preceding the academic evaluation is below or
above 1 standard deviation from the historical regional mean (since 1950). However, I
further explore heterogeneity in shock intensity and differentiate between rain excess
and rain shortage. With the use of a relative instead of an absolute measure of rainfall
I make sure that I am not comparing localities that are more prone to gather higher
levels of rainfall with localities that typically receive much less rain. Instead, the
measure captures the effect of locality-specific departures from their normal precipi-
tation levels. This definition of rainfall shock has shown to best explain the evolution
of agricultural income in Mexico (Adhvaryu et al., 2018; Bobonis, 2009). Figure 2.5
displays the geographical distribution of rainfall shocks with the previous definition
for the state of Puebla in 2006 and for localities with at least one school in the final
sample. Triangles depict periods when the rainfall gathered in a locality exceeded
in 1 standard deviation the historical regional rainfall mean (rain excess), crosses
represent rainfall levels below 1 standard deviation from the historical records (rain
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shortage), and grey dots represent stable precipitation. Rainfall variation in Mexico
is partly affected by the country falling under the influence of El Niño-Southern Os-
cillation (ENSO). This climatic phenomenon, which causes irregular fluctuations in
the temperature of the sea surface, alters precipitations in the country differently by
region and phase of the cycle (Magana et al., 2003).22 Appendix Figure C.5 shows the
evolution in the probability of ENSO-induced climate alterations in the past years.
MxFLS (Mexican Family Life Survey)
To inspect the potential mechanisms by which availability of health insurance might
interact with shocks and educational achievement I draw on the Mexican Family Life
Survey (MxFLS). The MxFLS is a multi-thematic longitudinal household survey rep-
resentative of the Mexican population at the national, urban, rural, and regional level,
interviewing around 8,400 households in 150 locations (Rubalcava and Teruel, 2006,
2013). Relevant to this study, the survey gathers information relating to children’s
health, time use, household economic resources, and availability and access to health
insurance. I focus the analysis on the children aged 6 to 14 during the third wave of
the survey (carried between 2009 and 2011). Table 2.2 shows summary statistics of
the children and their families. On average, children are 10 years old and have had
access to Seguro Popular in their municipality of residence (conditional on eligibil-
ity) for 4.6 years (standard deviation of 1.66 years). School enrolment is high (with
96% of children attending school), and the incidence of child labor is low (only 3%
work for pay, 3% work in agriculture, and 1% work in the family business). On the
other hand, the share of children with other household responsibilities is high, which
include domestic chores (56%), and caring for elder, sick members in the household,
or other children (16%).
22ENSO fluctuations can be divided by El Niño, periods with above-average temperature in the
sea surface; and La Niña, periods with sea surface temperature below the average.
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Other
Information on health facilities and medical personnel, on the share of eligible indi-
viduals at the program start, on pre-program indicators relating to primary education
(pass rate and completion rate), and on the marginalization level of municipalities is
obtained from SIMBAD (State and Municipal Database System). Also, I compute
a measure of regional political alignment with state and municipal election results
with data from CIDAC (Development Research Centre). I use these variables to an-
alyze the determinants of the rollout of the SP health insurance program across the
country, discussed in greater detail in Section 2.6.
2.4 Empirical strategy
To identify the extent to which health insurance can mitigate the impact of rainfall
shocks on children’s educational performance I exploit rainfall disturbances in the
school-locality and the expansion of Seguro Popular (SP) across municipalities. The
large scale of the program required a gradual implementation of SP across the country,
subject to financial resources and health infrastructure availability. Using the share
of the population covered at a given point in time in a municipality I estimate the
following equation:
yslmt = β1Rlmt + β2SPmt + β3SPmtRlmt + α
′Zslmt + ζ
′Xmt + δtµr + as + εslmt (2.1)
Where yslmt are the evaluation results of primary school s in locality l of municipality
m during the school year t, Rlmt is a rainfall shock dummy that equals one when
precipitation gathered in the school-locality during the 12 months preceding the aca-
demic evaluation is above or below one standard deviation from the regional historical
mean, SPmt is the coverage rate of Seguro Popular in municipality m measured at the
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end of the year in which the academic year started23, and SPmtRlmt is the interaction
of the two terms. The equation also includes a vector of school characteristics Zslmt
to control for the ratio of students per teacher, the share of girls, whether the school
principal has teaching duties, the marginalization level of the school area24, three
dummy variables indicating whether the school participates in educational programs
in year t (i.e., Safe School, Extending School Hours, or Quality School program),
and the share of students marked as carrying fraudulent practices during the test.
Xmt is a vector of covariates including population size25, the homicide rate, and the
transfers per capita from the Oportunidades/Progresa program26 at the municipal-
ity level. The regression further includes state-year fixed effects δtµr to account for
yearly disturbances common to all schools in a given state, and school fixed effects
as, which capture time-invariant characteristics of the school, its location, and the
environment.27
The coefficients of interest are β1 and β3; the impact of rainfall shocks on school
performance and the capacity of social healthcare to mitigate this effect. I focus on
the intensive instead of the extensive margin in health coverage because the school test
scores data are only available from the academic year 2005/06, and SP rollout began
in year 2002. Thus, there are no pre-SP school data for most schools. However, the
share of population covered by SP in a municipality is subject to endogeneity. While
school and state-year fixed effects might capture a lot of the relevant heterogeneity
in SP expansion and school performance, β2 (the effect of health insurance on test
23For example, for the academic year 2005/06, the healthcare coverage rate used is the one
observed at the end of 2005.
24In five categories: very low, low, medium, high, and very high marginalization.
25Divided into seven categories: i) less than 5k, ii) between 5k and 20k, iii) between 20k and 50k,
iv) between 50k and 100k, v) between 100k and 200k, vi) between 200k and 500k, and vii) higher
than 500k.
26The Mexican conditional cash transfer program for education.
27There are 30 states represented in the sample (out of 32 in the country) and 1,696 municipalities
(out of a total of 2,463). The sample totals an average of 107.6 municipalities per state (standard
deviation of 67.5), and 35.9 localities per municipality (standard deviation of 31.2). Municipalities
are at the second administrative division level in Mexico, and localities at the lowest of the three
sub-national divisions.
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scores during years of stable precipitations) is likely not identified. The SP coverage
rate is therefore introduced in the regression as a control, and I focus the discussion
on the estimates of β1 and β3. To interpret the effect of β2 as causal one would need
to assume that conditional on school and state-year fixed effects, the availability and
expansion of SP was orthogonal to the evolution of academic performance. Although
there could have been political interests in implementing the newly created health
insurance program earlier in regions that were seeing an improvement in their health
levels, it is less likely that SP rollout responded to educational performance.28 Section
2.6 explores the determinants of the timing and expansion of SP and conducts some
robustness tests to shed more light on this issue.
Moreover, the reduced form estimates will capture potential spillovers to the un-
treated population (not eligible for SP). These spillovers could be positive if there are
positive externalities from improved overall levels of the health and disease environ-
ment, or negative, if the increase in the demand for health services is not matched




Does health insurance mitigate the effect of negative rainfall shocks on educational
achievement? Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the results of estimating equation (2.1). Col-
umn 1 displays the results with test scores as the dependent variable, while columns
2 to 4 show estimates of the effect on the distribution of test achievement. Column
28Nevertheless, Conti and Ginja (2017) show that the expansion of SP was not associated with
pre-trends in child mortality.
29At least, Conti and Ginja (2017) show that the gap in terms of healthcare facilities and medical
personnel was reduced between individuals covered and not covered by the Social Security, as a result
of a higher increase in health care infrastructure in SSA centers (managed by the Health Ministry
and responsible for the provision of Seguro Popular), than in non-SSA centers.
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1 of Table 2.3 shows that students experiencing a negative rainfall shock during the
academic year score 0.022 standard deviations lower in the mathematics test, and
this reduction is significant at the 1% level. However, an increase of 10 pp in the
health coverage rate mitigates the negative effect by 0.007 standard deviations (32%
of the effect). A closer look at the distribution of test results shows that the share
of students failing the evaluation (inadequate performance) increases by 0.65 pp in
the event of a rainfall shock (column 2), with a 10 pp increase in health coverage
reducing the effect by 0.21 pp (both estimates significant at the 1%). The results
show a positive and significant correlation between the expansion of health insurance
and mathematics test results (of 0.020 standard deviations from a 10 pp increase in
health coverage), with stronger associations at the bottom of the test score distribu-
tion (see columns 2 to 4). Regarding the effect of other school characteristics, both a
higher number of students per teacher and having a school principal with teaching re-
sponsibilities are correlated with lower performance. On the contrary, a higher share
of girls in the classroom and participating in the school programs Extended School
Hours and Quality Schools are positively correlated with higher test score results in
mathematics.
Table 2.4 shows the results for the verbal test. The experience of a rainfall shock has
a smaller impact in the verbal section of the evaluation (-0.020 standard deviations,
column 1), with a 10 pp increase in the SP coverage rate mitigating in 0.006 standard
deviations the negative effect (both magnitudes significant at the 1% level).
2.5.2 Direction and intensity of shocks
The basic specification defined the occurrence of a shock when local precipitation de-
viates by one standard deviation from the historical regional mean. Now, I introduce
flexibility in the specification by allowing for a) different effects by the intensity level
of the shock, and b) differential impacts by the nature of the shock – differentiat-
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ing between periods with an excess of rainfall from periods characterized by rainfall
shortage. Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2 divide rainfall shocks in three intensity
categories: between 1 and 2 standard deviations away from normal precipitation, be-
tween 2 and 3 standard deviations, and 3 or more standard deviations. As expected,
more extreme climatic conditions, that will more likely resemble floods and droughts,
have larger impacts on test scores. While the reduction in the students’ mathemat-
ics achievement is of the order of 0.015 standard deviations in the event of milder
shocks (precipitations between 1 and 2 standard deviations), the occurrence of severe
shocks (precipitations above or below 3 standard deviations) reduce the mathematics’
achievement score by 0.15 standard deviations and increase the test failure rate by 4
pp (significant at the 1% level) (columns 1 and 2 of Table C.1). However, a 10 pp
increase in health coverage absorbs 33% of the effect of mild shocks on mathematics
test scores, and 22% of the effect during severe shocks (significant at the 1% level)
(column 1, Table C.1). In the verbal section (Table C.2), milder shocks lower the
attainment score by 0.014 standard deviations (column 1). In comparison, greater
adverse shocks reduce by 0.11 standard deviations the verbal mark, with a 10 pp
increase in health coverage offsetting by 24% the negative effect (both magnitudes
significant at the 1% level).
Appendix Table C.3 shows the results of dividing climate shocks by excess and
shortage of rainfall. The results show that while experiencing an abnormally high
period of rain does not have a significant effect on educational performance, the
occurrence of a dry spell does. In column 1 of Panel A we see that abnormally
dry periods reduce the students’ mathematics achievement score by 0.047 standard
deviations and in column 2, that they increase by 1.06 pp the share of students with
inadequate performance. This result is in line with the findings in Adhvaryu et al.
(2018), who show that droughts in Mexico carry a higher penalty for children in terms
of total years of completed education and grade progression. Nevertheless, a 10 pp
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increase in the share of individuals covered by health insurance buffers around 32%
of the impact on test scores, and 37% of the effect on the exam failure rate (columns
1 and 2). The results for the verbal test display a similar picture, but with somewhat
smaller point estimates (Panel B).
Appendix Tables C.4 and C.5 show the results of combining the intensity of rainfall
with the type of shock and divide shocks by floods (precipitations above 2 standard
deviations from the regional historical mean), rainfall above-normal levels (between
1 and 2 standard deviations above), below-normal rainfall (between 1 and 2 standard
deviations below), and droughts (below 2 standard deviations). The results show
that while floods increase by 0.91 pp the failure rate in mathematics (significant
at the 10% level) (column 1 of Table C.4), droughts increase the share of students
with inadequate attainment by 4.4 pp (significant at the 1% level). However, in the
event of droughts, each 10 pp increase in the SP coverage rate mitigates by 1.1 pp
the negative effect. Table C.5 shows similar results for the verbal evaluation, with
the experience of droughts having more negative consequences on students’ cognitive
attainment than periods of rainfall excess.
2.5.3 Regional disparities
Although disturbances in precipitation levels could impact students’ productivity in
school in many ways, the effect of rainfall in disrupting performance may vary across
areas with different levels of development and infrastructure. To assess whether
there is regional heterogeneity in the impact of shocks on cognitive achievement I
divide schools by the level of marginalization of the area in which they are located.30
When schools in marginalized areas experience a negative rainfall shock, students’
achievement score in mathematics drops by 0.022 standard deviations (column 1 of
30I consider a school to be marginalized if it is established in a locality considered to be expe-
riencing some degree of marginalization (medium, high, or very high) according to the National
Population Council (CONAPO).
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Table 2.5). However, each 10 pp increase in the health coverage rate absorbs 27% of
the negative effect (significant at the 1% level). This reduction is of 0.020 standard
deviations in the verbal section, with a 10 pp increase in the coverage rate mitigating
30% of the effect. On the other hand, rainfall shocks have no statistically significant
effect on test scores in non-marginalized areas (column 1 of Table 2.6).
I also differentiate the effects between rural localities, small urban localities with
less than 50,000 inhabitants, and large urban localities with more than 50,000 in-
habitants. The results show that while rainfall shocks negatively affect mathematics
learning in rural areas (Appendix Table C.6), they pose no statistically significant
reduction in test performance in urban areas irrespective of their population size
(Appendix Tables C.7 and C.8). The estimated results in the verbal section of the
national evaluation are similar. For instance, rainfall shocks in rural locations in-
crease the verbal failure rate by 0.43 pp, with health insurance mitigating by 0.15 pp
the negative effect per each 10 pp increase in the health coverage rate (column 2 of
Table C.6).
These results point out that rainfall shocks and health insurance have significant
differential effects depending on the region’s characteristics. In rural areas, where
precipitations are more closely linked to income generation through agricultural pro-
duction (or in more marginalized areas, where there is lower infrastructure and the
population is more vulnerable to shocks), the experience of atypical rainfall may re-
sult in higher stress levels for families and children. Indeed, Mexico is considered
an arid or semi-arid country, and according to the National Agricultural Survey31 of
2017, the share of rainfed agriculture in Mexico amounts to 79% of the total culti-
vated area. In urban areas, on the other hand, rainfall disturbances might not be
the best measure to capture shocks (either health or income shocks) to children and
their families, and the benefits from SP are less likely to be linked to its ability to
31Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria, carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and Geog-
raphy (INEGI).
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build resilience against climatic shocks.
2.6 Robustness
As noted earlier, the rolling out of Seguro Popular was not random (which prevents
from identifying β2 in equation (2.1) – the effect of health insurance in the absence
of shocks). The expansion of the program gave priority to states and municipalities
with a) low social security coverage, b) larger number of uninsured individuals in the
first six deciles of income, c) capacity to offer the services granted, d) higher pool of
potential affiliates, and e) explicit request from the state authorities, all subject to
available financial resources.32 In this section I first assess the determinants of the
timing of SP implementation following Bosch and Campos-Vazquez (2014) and Conti
and Ginja (2017) by estimating the following equation:
Quarterms = θXms + µs + εms (2.2)
Where Quarterms is the quarter of implementation of SP in municipality m of state
s, Xms is a series of socio-demographic, political, health care, and primary education
indicators measured before the program start, and εms is the error term. The regres-
sion includes state fixed effects µs, as the timing in which the states were offering
the new health scheme was negotiated with the federal government. On the other
hand, it was less clear as to which municipalities were to receive the program first.
Therefore, I study the determinants of the program rollout within states but also
estimate the model without state fixed effects for comparison. While I do not have
information on test results before the start of the program, I measure municipality
pre-program trends in education with the evolution of the primary completion rate,
32Diario oficial Viernes 04 de Julio de 2003: Acuerdo por el que la Secretaría de Salud da a
conocer las reglas de operación e indicadores de gestión y evaluación del Programa Salud para
Todos (Seguro Popular de Salud).
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and with the pass rate of the grades evaluated in ENLACE.
Appendix Table C.9 displays the results of estimating equation (2.2). Columns 1
and 3 show the model estimates without state fixed effects. At the country level, mu-
nicipalities with greater population size and with more medical personnel received the
program first. Political alignment is also a good predictor of program implementation,
as the occurrence of same political party in both the state and municipal government
predict the implementation of SP three quarters earlier than in municipalities without
political alignment. With this specification, municipalities with a higher share of eli-
gible population and with higher levels of marginalization implemented the program
later. In columns 2 and 4, when assessing the program expansion within states, we
observe a similar picture, except for the share of individuals that were eligible to the
program, which coefficient changes sign and suggests that within states the program
started first in areas with higher potential demand. Moreover, the evolution in the
primary completion rate and in the pass rate of the grades evaluated in ENLACE in
the 5 years preceding the program start is not significantly correlated with the timing
of the program implementation in any of the specifications. Although the coefficient
for missing pre-program information on the evolution of primary education predicts
receiving SP 2.5 quarters later, it is not statistically significant when including state
fixed effects.
I further inspect the determinants of the SP coverage rate expansion after it is
implemented in a municipality. Appendix Table C.10 shows the results of estimating
a variation of equation (2.2) where the dependent variable quarter of implementation
is replaced with the increase in the coverage rate in the first, second, and third year
after the program implementation. Columns 1 and 2 show that, once SP is imple-
mented, the share of eligible individuals is the main determinant of its expansion.
The coverage rate increases by 33 percentage points in the first year in a municipal-
ity where everybody is eligible. Higher marginalization, which is closely linked to
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eligibility, also explains higher program enrolment. On the other hand, population
size is negatively related with coverage expansion. Health infrastructure measured as
doctors per eligible population also predicts a small but significant higher coverage
expansion in the first year. In the second year (Columns 3 and 4), only eligibility and
population size are able to explain enrolment, and in the third year, only eligibility
remains significant (Columns 5 and 6). Political alignment and the evolution of in-
dicators in primary education do not predict coverage expansion. In line with these
results, Appendix Figure C.4 shows that coverage greatly responds to availability in
the first year, it is stable in the following four years, and further lowers from year six
onward as the program nears full coverage.
With the previous results, I test the robustness of the main findings to various spec-
ifications. Moreover, I also show the coefficient estimate of β2 from equation (2.1) to
examine how its value changes across specifications. Results for the mathematics test
are displayed in Table 2.7, while Table 2.8 shows the results in the verbal evaluation.
Column 1 shows the coefficient estimates from the main specification. In column 2 I
add an interaction term of the presence of a rainfall shock with municipality expenses
per capita on the Oportunidades/Progresa program. This interaction allows testing
whether the estimated shock-mitigating effect from the expansion of health insurance
partly reflects the mitigating effect of cash transfers in Mexico. Results remain un-
changed. Column 3 controls for the political alignment defined as same political party
in the state and municipal government. This specification accounts for the possibil-
ity that the political environment could be affecting the level of resources (including
higher expenses on both education and health) in the different municipalities. The
results are practically identical. In column 4 I include all the pre-program municipal-
ity characteristics correlated with the rollout of Seguro Popular (except for the share
of eligible individuals) interacted with a linear trend (see Appendix Tables C.9 and
C.10). Notice that this is a demanding test, as the information on test scores is only
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available from 2006 onward, and the expansion of SP could have already affected the
evolution of educational achievement. The point estimates reduce in magnitude. The
effect of a rainfall shock on the mathematics test scores reduces from -0.022 to -0.017
standard deviations, and the mitigating effect from 0.007 to 0.006 standard devia-
tions (column 4 of Table 2.7). Moreover, the correlation between SP expansion and
test scores during stable precipitations becomes null, suggesting that health insur-
ance impacted cognitive attainment only through its ability to mitigate the negative
effect of shocks on students’ performance in school. Column 5 further includes the
share of eligible individuals at the program start interacted with a trend. This spec-
ification produces the lowest point estimates, as the coverage rate of Seguro Popular
is highly correlated with population eligibility, and the program is suspected to have
the largest effect in regions with a higher proportion of eligible individuals. Even
then, the shock-mitigating effect of SP on mathematics test scores is estimated to be
of 0.005 standard deviations per each 10 pp increase in the coverage rate (column 5 of
Table 2.7), and of 0.004 standard deviations on the verbal results (column 5 of Table
2.8), both magnitudes significant at the 1% level. Column 6 displays the results of
a placebo test that consists of interacting future rainfall shocks with the healthcare
coverage rate and shows that future rainfall does not have a significant effect on cur-
rent test scores. Column 7 includes one lag of the rainfall shock and shows that the
effect on test scores is mainly driven by contemporaneous disturbances. However,
there is a lasting protective effect on current test scores from health coverage during
past negative shocks. In the base specification, I cluster the standard errors at the
municipality level. Column 8 shows standard errors adjusted for spatial correlation
with the method developed in Conley (1999), and using a radius of 200km around
each locality centroid to define areas independent of administrative boundaries. Col-
umn 9 excludes those localities in which there is no variation in rainfall shocks (either
always or never experienced a rainfall shock), and column 10 replaces school-locality
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level rainfall shocks with shocks measured at the municipality level. Rainfall shocks
measured at the municipality level have a larger effect on school achievement, and
healthcare coverage has a lower mitigating effect. However, this likely reflects the
impact of a larger shock in absolute terms, as average precipitations are more stable
when computed over a broader area. The results discussed above still hold.
As noted earlier, I do not have information on test scores before 2006 to test for
pre-trends in the full sample. However, I can conduct a test of pre-trends in academic
achievement for a sample of late reformers. With the available data the test consists
in analyzing whether the evolution in test scores between 2006 and 2007 (earliest
pair of years) can predict future SP implementation. Given that by the end of 2007
most of the municipalities had already implemented the social healthcare program
(see Appendix Figure C.3), I define late reformers as those municipalities in which
by 2007 the program had not yet been widely expanded (low coverage rate). More
specifically, I define two groups of late reformers: a) municipalities with a coverage
rate below 5% in 2007; and b) municipalities with a coverage rate below 10% in 2007.
Formally, I estimate the following equation:
∆score(06−07)slm = η + ρ∆SP(07−08)m + α
′Zslm + ζ
′Xlm + µr + εslm (2.3)
Where ∆score(06−07)slm is the increase in test scores between 2006 and 2007 in school
s, of locality l, in municipality m; ∆SP(07−08)m is the increase in the Seguro Popular
coverage between 2007 and 2008 in municipality m; Zslm and Xlm are the same school
and regional controls as in equation (2.1), and µr are state fixed effects. Appendix
Table C.11 shows the estimated results. In columns 1 and 3 the sample is restricted
to those municipalities in which the coverage rate in 2007 was lower than 5% and in
columns 2 and 4, lower than 10%. The estimated coefficient ρ is practically zero and
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the expansion in health coverage induced
by SP was not related to the evolution of students’ performance in school.
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Another concern for the validity of the results involves endogenous migration pat-
terns (or children leaving the school more generally). If rainfall shocks affect migration
decisions of families and family characteristics are related to both migration decisions
and child characteristics, the effect of rainfall shocks on school test scores could be
biased. The bias would be downwards if higher-performing children are the ones leav-
ing the school, or upwards, if the children leaving are those with lower educational
performance. Using the Statistics 911 I create an indicator for the ratio of children
that did not complete the academic year in the school in which they started it (the
share of students that drop out), and inspect whether this indicator is related to the
experience of rainfall shocks or the interaction term of rainfall with SP expansion.
Column 1 of Appendix Table C.12 shows that the probability of students dropping
out from the school is not associated with the experience of a rainfall shock in the
locality nor with SP expansion in the event of shocks.
Finally, to rule out any additional compositional bias arising from negative shocks
in the locality affecting the type of students that sit the academic evaluation, I test
whether the number of students evaluated in each school is affected by the experience
of a rainfall shock. The results of this test, displayed in column 2 of Appendix
Table C.12, show that neither rainfall shocks nor the interaction of rainfall with the
expansion of SP have a significant effect on the number of students evaluated.
2.7 Mechanisms
This section inspects potential channels that could help explain why rainfall shocks
negatively affect children’s performance in school, and the role of access to health
insurance in mitigating the effects. To do so, I move from school-level data to indi-
vidual and household-level data, described in greater detail in Section 2.3. I can now
construct a measure of access to social health insurance that exploits individual vari-
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ation: years of exposure to Seguro Popular. The number of years a child had access
to SP depends on the child’s age and the introduction date of the program in the
child’s municipality of residence (subject to eligibility). I assess the impact of rainfall
shocks and access to SP among children aged 6 to 14 and their families, and who were
interviewed during the third wave of the Mexican Family Life Survey (between 2009
and 2011). I also estimate a model of household fixed effects to assess the impact
of rainfall shocks and health insurance on household consumption by including the
consumption information available in the previous survey (years 2005-2006). Notice
that at the household level, exposure to SP only varies by its introduction date in
the municipality of residence.
In the MxFLS it is possible to infer whether a household is eligible to SP by
inspecting their availability and access to formal health insurance (in which case the
household is deemed ineligible). In the survey, individuals respond to all the different
health insurance schemes they benefit from, which include insurance from the Social
Security: IMSS, ISSTE, PEMEX, and other minor schemes; and other private plans
(either privately purchased or offered by their employer). As long as one household
member has access to any form of formal health insurance, this one extends to the rest
of the family, and I define such a household ineligible to Seguro Popular. All other
households in which none of the members have access to formal health insurance are
deemed eligible to SP (48% of all households in the sample). I focus on eligibility
rather than affiliation to SP to avoid a potential self-selection bias. On the other hand,
rainfall shocks are now measured at the municipality level, as opposed to shocks at
the locality level, as the latter information is deemed confidential and is not disclosed.
2.7.1 Specification
To capture the impact of rainfall shocks on educational inputs and any potential
mitigating effect arising from access to health insurance I estimate the following
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equation:
yim = β1Rm + β2SP (years)im + β3SP (years)imRm + ζ
′Xim + δt + µz + εim (2.4)
Where yim are indicators of the health and time use of children, Rm is a rainfall shock
dummy reflecting whether the precipitation gathered in the municipality of residence
in the 12 months preceding the interview date was above or below one standard
deviation from the historical regional mean, SP (years)im controls for the number of
years a child had Seguro Popular available in her municipality (which depends on the
child’s age and the introduction date of SP in the municipality), and SP (years)imRm
is the interaction of the two terms. Similarly as before, β1 and β3 are the coefficients
of interest. Xim is a set of children, family, and regional covariates33, δt and µz are
dummies for month and year of interview respectively, and εms is the error term.
Similarly, to capture the effect of rainfall shocks on household’s economic resources I
estimate the following equation:
log(Cimt) = β1Rmt + β2SP (years)mt + β3SP (years)mtRmt+
Ω′Himt + δt + µz + γi + υimt (2.5)
Where log(Cimt) is the logarithm of the equivalised household expenditures in non-
durable goods34, SP (years)mt is now defined at the household level (and depends
only on the date that SP was introduced in the municipality of residence), Himt is
33The child’s gender and age (categorical dummies), whether the child speaks an indigenous
language, attends a public school, and assists an evening shift, the age, gender, and marital status
of the household head, the total number of individuals in the household, dummies of mother’s
and father’s education (primary school, secondary school, and high school or higher), whether the
households owns the house, has piped water inside, or toilet, whether the household cooks with
wood or coal, dummies for the quality of the roof and floor, and type of location (urban or rural).
34That is, excluding expenses on electronic appliances, furniture, property, and acquisition of
vehicles. I construct the expenditures equivalence scale for Mexican households following Teruel
et al. (2005), and assign a factor of 0.77 to children from 0 to 5 years old, 0.80 to children from 6 to
12 years old, 0.74 to children from 13 to 18 years old, and 1 to adults above 18 years of age.
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a vector of household characteristics relating to household composition, wealth, and
information about the household head35, δt and µz are dummies for month and year
of interview respectively, γi are household fixed effects, and υimt is the error term.
2.7.2 Results: Mechanisms
Table 2.9 shows the results of estimating equation (2.4). Robust standard errors are
shown in parenthesis, while clustered errors at the municipality level are displayed
between brackets. Column 2 shows that rainfall shocks increase the probability of
children being sick in the four weeks prior to the interview date by 5 percentage
points (an increase in the probability of 61%). However, the availability of SP in the
municipality reduces this probability by 1.2 percentage points per year of exposure.36
Similarly, rainfall shocks increase the probability of children looking after elderly,
sick people, or other children, by 7 pp (44% increase, column 4), and doing domestic
chores by 9.3 pp (17% increase, column 6). However, and similarly, the expansion
and availability of financial protection in health reduces the demand for children’s
time in domestic tasks when hit by climatic shocks. The difference in the estimates
between the specification that includes basic controls (columns 1, 3, and 5) and the
specification that includes a broader set of controls (columns 2, 4 and 6) are small, in
line with rainfall shocks being orthogonal to children and households’ characteristics.
As discussed previously, the new healthcare scheme was targeted at those individ-
uals outside of the social security system, and therefore uninsured. Table 2.10 shows
35The full list of household characteristics are: the age, gender, education, and marital status of
the household head, the total number of individuals living in the household, the number of children
under age 5, the number of individuals between 6 and 10 years of age, between 11 and 18 years old,
between 19 and 45 years old, between 46 and 60 years old, and more than 60 years old, whether the
households owns the house, has piped water inside, toilet, whether the household cooks with wood or
coal, dummies for the quality of the roof and floor, type of location (urban or rural), an interviewer-
reported variable on the accuracy of reported expenditures (dummy for excellent accuracy), and
a dummy controlling for whether the household expenditures questionnaire was filled by the same
respondent in the different waves.
36The sickness variable’s exact definition is the inability of children to carry any of their normal
daily activities due to sickness in the last four weeks. Therefore, the variable should also capture
temporary school absence if the interview took place during the academic year.
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the results of estimating equation (2.4) separately by eligibility status (SP eligible –
with no formal insurance –, and SP ineligible – with access to formal insurance).37
We can see that the point estimates for the probability of sickness, caring for others,
and doing domestic chores of children in eligible families are higher in magnitude in
the event of negative shocks, as well as the mitigating effect from availability of SP
(Panel A). On the other hand, there are no statistically significant effects on health
status and time use for those children in families ineligible for the new healthcare
scheme (Panel B). While a rainfall shock increases by 6.6 percentage points the prob-
ability of being sick among children from eligible households (column 2 of Panel A),
each additional year of access to SP reduces by 1.5 percentage points this probability
(significant at the 5% level). Similarly, the probability of children carrying out house-
hold chores increases by 14.1 pp during adverse rainfall shocks (column 6 of Panel
A). However, an additional year of SP eligibility reduces the effect by 3.5 pp (signif-
icant at the 1% level). Dividing the sample by rural and urban locations generates
a similar picture (Appendix Table C.13), where the benefits from SP availability in
the event of rainfall shocks are mainly concentrated in rural areas (where the share
of eligible individuals is higher and adverse weather presumably has more pervasive
consequences on children and their families that in urban areas).
Finally, I assess whether the experience of negative climatic shocks affects the eco-
nomic resources of the household (measured as equivalised household consumption
expenditures in non-durable goods). In the consumption regression (equation [2.5]),
I exclude the households in the top and bottom percentile in equivalised household
expenditures. Column 6 of Table 2.11 shows that the experience of a rainfall shock
reduces by 16% the equivalised household consumption level among households eli-
gible to SP (with no formal insurance). However, each additional year of financial
protection in health reduces the negative effect by 4% (significant at the 10% level).
37I define insurance status at the household level, as the insurability of one of the family members
extends to the rest of the family.
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The point estimates of these effects are similar for households in rural areas (column
10). In rural areas, a negative rainfall shock reduces household consumption by 18%,
similar to the reduction estimated in Bobonis (2009) for a sample of rural households
in Mexico (16.7%). However, an additional year of SP availability reduces this ef-
fect by 3%. On the other hand, rainfall shocks do not translate into any significant
reduction in household consumption among families with access to formal health in-
surance or living in urban areas (in which case there are no additional benefits from
the expansion in health coverage).
2.8 Conclusion
As the world moves closer to achieving the Millennium Developmental Goal of uni-
versal primary completion, significant challenges to ensure effective learning in the
classroom remain. Poverty and marginalization continue to be significant predictors
of human capital accumulation among children, and negative shocks experienced dur-
ing childhood threaten to aggravate the existent inequalities by households’ ability to
cope with them. This study shows that a state intervention to reduce inequality in
healthcare access protected the educational achievement of primary school children
in the event of negative shocks. The expansion of social healthcare, instrumented
with the reform of the Mexican health system and the creation of a health program
addressed to the population ineligible for social health insurance, offset the nega-
tive effect of rainfall shocks on cognitive achievement by serving as a safety net for
children and their families.
This result points towards synergies from public investments in education and
health, and from higher returns to educational investments when the ability of fami-
lies to endure shocks is increased. In this regard, the study shows that the expansion
in health coverage mitigated the negative effect of rainfall shocks on children’s health
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among program-eligible households, reduced the demand for children’s time, and
protected household’s consumption from fluctuations accruing from rainfall distur-
bances. The results add to a new stream of research that investigates whether shocks
to human capital during childhood can be mitigated through different policies or in-
terventions, by showing the capacity of universal health coverage in buffering negative
environmental shocks.
As climate disturbances are felt the most in regions with weaker infrastructure
and higher dependence on climate, the discouraging evolution of weather patterns is
likely to aggravate the existing gap in cognitive achievement by socio-economic dis-
advantage. However, estimates show larger positive effects from universal healthcare
in more marginalized areas. The results presented here are also relevant amid the
growing number of countries expanding healthcare coverage and should be considered
when carrying out a cost-benefit analysis of public investments in health. Neverthe-
less, the extent to which the expansion in social health insurance is accompanied by
improvements in health care infrastructure, including its efficiency, will determine
the capacity of national health systems in protecting individuals and families from
financial and other health-related shocks.
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2.9 Figures
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Share of PHS on SS covered (left axis)
Share of PHS on not SS covered (left axis)
PHS as % of GDP (right axis)
Note: PHS: Public Health Spending. SS: Social Security.
Source: General Directorate of Health Information, Ministry of Health.
























1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Public health spending per capita in 2000 (thousand pesos)
Note: Cumulative growth refers to the increase in public health spending per
capita. The graph excludes Mexico City, for which the public health spending per
capita in the year 2000 was of 9,144 pesos, and where public health spending grew
by 35% between the year 2000 and 2013. Each dot conveys the information for the
remaining 31 states of Mexico.
Source: Directorate of Health Information, Ministry of Health.
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Affiliates (Millions) Coverage rate
Note: The coverage rate is defined as the number of affiliates divided by the total
population.
Source: Ministry of Social Security.
Figure 2.4: Geographical evolution of Seguro Popular coverage rate (%)
Note: The coverage rate is defined as the number of affiliates divided by the pop-
ulation size in each municipality.
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Figure 2.5: Pre-exam locality-level rainfall in the state of Puebla (2006)
Rainfall excess Rainfall shortage Stable rainfall
Note: Each mark in the map depicts a locality in which there is at least one school
evaluated in ENLACE. Rainfall excess is defined as precipitation in the 12 months
preceding the test evaluation above one standard deviation from the regional his-
torical mean, rainfall shortage is defined as precipitation levels below one standard
deviation, and stable precipitation as rainfall within one standard deviation.
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2.10 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics: Sample of schools (ENLACE)
Mean SD
Mathematics results
Math score 524.36 71.12
Math (% Inadequate) 20.38 16.30
Math (% Fair) 49.27 14.40
Math (% Good+) 30.35 21.63
Verbal results
Verbal score 516.35 63.84
Verbal (% Inadequate) 19.93 15.56
Verbal (% Fair) 49.59 13.96
Verbal (% Good+) 30.48 21.24
School characteristics
Share of girls 0.49 0.07
Students per teacher 26.51 8.07
Head of school also teaches 0.29 0.46
Students evaluated 136.86 114.42
Dropout rate (pp) 3.41 4.11
Very low marginalization 0.41 0.49
Low marginalization 0.18 0.38
Medium marginalization 0.12 0.33
High marginalization 0.24 0.43
Very high marginalization 0.04 0.21
School programs
Safe School 0.17 0.38
Extending School Hours 0.02 0.12
Quality Schools 0.26 0.44
Seguro Popular coverage
SP coverage rate (pp) 34.33 24.22
SP coverage increase (pp) 36.31 17.34
Rainfall shocks
Rain shock (total) 0.29 0.45
Rain excess 0.14 0.35
Rain shortage 0.14 0.35
# schools 49,751
# periods (years 2006-2013) 8
Observations 398,008
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Indigenous language 0.16 0.36
Sick 0.08 0.27
Attending school 0.96 0.19
Caring for others 0.16 0.37
Household chores 0.56 0.50
Work for pay 0.03 0.16
Work family business 0.01 0.09
Work in agriculture 0.03 0.18
SP exposure (years) 4.58 1.66
Rainfall shock 0.29 0.45
Mother’s education
No education (mother) 0.14 0.35
Primary (mother) 0.38 0.48
Secondary (mother) 0.31 0.46
High school + (mother) 0.17 0.38
Father’s education
No education (father) 0.30 0.46
Primary (father) 0.30 0.46
Secondary (father) 0.23 0.42
High school + (father) 0.17 0.37
Household variables
Male hh head 0.78 0.42
Age hh head 44.59 13.07
Married hh head 0.70 0.46
Household size 6.02 2.45
Owns house 0.66 0.47
Tubed water 0.25 0.43
Toilet 0.75 0.43
Cooks with wood or coal 0.39 0.49
Favorable floor material 0.36 0.48




Table 2.3: Test score results: Mathematics









Rainfall shock −0.022*** 0.647*** −0.253* −0.394**
(0.008) (0.148) (0.139) (0.171)
SP (coverage rate) 0.020*** −0.692*** 0.490*** 0.203**
(0.004) (0.089) (0.081) (0.085)
Rainfall shock X SP 0.007*** −0.206*** 0.091*** 0.115***
(0.002) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036)
Students per teacher −0.007*** 0.113*** 0.022*** −0.135***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014)
Head of school also teaches −0.053*** 0.954*** −0.192 −0.762***
(0.006) (0.110) (0.118) (0.141)
Share of girls 0.283*** −6.058*** 0.915* 5.142***
(0.026) (0.492) (0.531) (0.593)
Safe School program −0.002 0.389** −1.166*** 0.777***
(0.009) (0.154) (0.158) (0.205)
Extending School Hours program 0.084*** −1.356*** −0.304 1.660***
(0.015) (0.229) (0.252) (0.324)
Quality Schools program 0.015*** −0.547*** 0.304*** 0.243**
(0.005) (0.081) (0.078) (0.102)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 398,008 398,008 398,008 398,008
# schools 49,751 49,751 49,751 49,751
Note: Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the precipitation gathered in the school-
locality during the 12 months preceding the evaluation date of ENLACE is above or below 1 standard
deviation from the regional historical mean (since 1950). SP (coverage rate) is calculated by dividing
the number of affiliates to Seguro Popular in the municipality by its population size and scaled up by
a factor of 10 so that a value of 10 represents full coverage. Rainfall shock X SP is the interaction of
the two terms. The share of girls is defined from 0 to 1, and Safe School, Extending School Hours,
and Quality Schools programs are dummy variables indicating whether the school participates in any
of these programs. Controls include 5 dummies of marginalization level of the school, the share of stu-
dents with unreliable test results, 7 dummies of municipality size, municipality per capita expenses in
the Progresa/Oportunidades program, and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in
parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Test score results: Verbal









Rainfall shock −0.020*** 0.482*** −0.176 −0.307*
(0.007) (0.129) (0.151) (0.157)
SP (coverage rate) 0.013*** −0.558*** 0.526*** 0.032
(0.004) (0.078) (0.076) (0.073)
Rainfall shock X SP 0.006*** −0.149*** 0.058* 0.091***
(0.001) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033)
Students per teacher −0.006*** 0.105*** −0.000 −0.105***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011)
Head of school also teaches −0.052*** 0.939*** −0.289*** −0.650***
(0.006) (0.104) (0.108) (0.128)
Share of girls 0.528*** −9.821*** −0.269 10.091***
(0.024) (0.453) (0.497) (0.519)
Safe School program 0.006 0.343** −1.349*** 1.006***
(0.009) (0.135) (0.141) (0.192)
Extending School Hours program 0.075*** −1.342*** −0.200 1.542***
(0.015) (0.217) (0.222) (0.310)
Quality Schools program 0.013*** −0.447*** 0.273*** 0.174*
(0.005) (0.072) (0.073) (0.094)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 398,008 398,008 398,008 398,008
# schools 49,751 49,751 49,751 49,751
Note: Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the precipitation gathered in the school-
locality during the 12 months preceding the evaluation date of ENLACE is above or below 1 standard
deviation from the regional historical mean (since 1950). SP (coverage rate) is calculated by dividing the
number of affiliates to Seguro Popular in the municipality by its population size and scaled up by a factor
of 10 so that a value of 10 represents full coverage. Rainfall shock X SP is the interaction of the two terms.
The share of girls is defined from 0 to 1, and Safe School, Extending School Hours, and Quality Schools pro-
grams are dummy variables indicating whether the school participates in any of these programs. Controls
include 5 dummies of marginalization level of the school, the share of students with unreliable test results,
7 dummies of municipality size, municipality per capita expenses in the Progresa/Oportunidades program,
and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in paren-
theses.
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Table 2.5: Test score results: Marginalized schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Score (SD) Inadequate (pp) Fair (pp) Good+ (pp)
Panel A: Mathematics
Rainfall shock −0.022** 0.615*** −0.442** −0.173
(0.010) (0.215) (0.217) (0.216)
Rainfall shock X SP 0.006*** −0.187*** 0.119*** 0.068*
(0.002) (0.039) (0.044) (0.040)
Panel B: Verbal
Rainfall shock −0.020** 0.454** −0.411** −0.042
(0.010) (0.200) (0.205) (0.198)
Rainfall shock X SP 0.006*** −0.140*** 0.098** 0.042
(0.002) (0.036) (0.041) (0.038)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 185,112 185,112 185,112 185,112
# schools 23,139 23,139 23,139 23,139
Note: Marginalized schools are those established in a locality considered to be expe-
riencing some degree of marginalization (medium, high, or very high) according to the
National Population Council (CONAPO). Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that equals
1 when the precipitation gathered in the school-locality during the 12 months preceding
the evaluation date of ENLACE is above or below 1 standard deviation from the regional
historical mean (since 1950). Rainfall shock X SP is the interaction term of the rainfall
shock with the SP coverage rate (which is calculated by dividing the number of affiliates
to Seguro Popular in the municipality by its population size, and scaled up by a factor of
10 so that a value of 10 represents full coverage). Controls include the SP coverage rate,
the number of students per teacher, the number of students per group, the share of girls,
whether the head of the school also teaches, whether the school participates in the Safe
School, Extending School Hours, or Quality Schools programs, the share of students with
unreliable test results, 7 dummies of municipality size, municipality per capita expenses
in the Progresa/Oportunidades program, and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the munici-
pality level in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Test scores results: Non-marginalized schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Score (SD) Inadequate (pp) Fair (pp) Good+ (pp)
Panel A: Mathematics
Rainfall shock −0.012 0.201* 0.108 −0.309
(0.009) (0.117) (0.134) (0.202)
Rainfall shock X SP 0.004 −0.033 −0.079** 0.111*
(0.003) (0.034) (0.039) (0.057)
Panel B: Verbal
Rainfall shock −0.012 0.195* 0.093 −0.288
(0.009) (0.110) (0.118) (0.181)
Rainfall shock X SP 0.004 −0.029 −0.062* 0.091*
(0.003) (0.033) (0.036) (0.053)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 212,896 212,896 212,896 212,896
# schools 26,612 26,612 26,612 26,612
Note: Non-marginalized schools are those established in a locality considered to be ex-
periencing a low degree of marginalization (low or very low) according to the National
Population Council (CONAPO). Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that equals 1 when
the precipitation gathered in the school-locality during the 12 months preceding the eval-
uation date of ENLACE is above or below 1 standard deviation from the regional histor-
ical mean (since 1950). Rainfall shock X SP is the interaction term of the rainfall shock
with the SP coverage rate (which is calculated by dividing the number of affiliates to Se-
guro Popular in the municipality by its population size, and scaled up by a factor of 10
so that a value of 10 represents full coverage). Controls include the SP coverage rate,
the number of students per teacher, the number of students per group, the share of girls,
whether the head of the school also teaches, whether the school participates in the Safe
School, Extending School Hours, or Quality Schools programs, the share of students with
unreliable test results, 7 dummies of municipality size, municipality per capita expenses
in the Progresa/Oportunidades program, and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the munici-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.9: Children’s health and time use
Sick Caring Chores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rainfall shock 0.056 0.050 0.065 0.070 0.090 0.093
(0.022)*** (0.022)** (0.029)** (0.030)** (0.038)** (0.039)**
[0.030]* [0.029]* [0.052] [0.050] [0.053]* [0.054]*
Rainfall shock X SP(years) −0.013 −0.012 −0.015 −0.016 −0.026 −0.026
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
[0.006]** [0.006]** [0.009]* [0.009]* [0.010]** [0.011]**
Basic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean depvar 0.082 0.082 0.159 0.159 0.559 0.558
Observations 5.792 5.720 5.859 5.786 5.859 5.786
R2 0.011 0.017 0.045 0.063 0.143 0.149
Note: Sick is a binary variable equal to one if the child stopped doing any of her daily activities due to sick-
ness in the past four weeks. Caring is a dummy variable recording whether the child took care of elderly or sick
people and/or other children in the last week. Chores is a dummy variable equal to one if the child did domestic
chores in the past week. Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the precipitation gathered in
the municipality of residence during the 12 months preceding the interview date was above or below 1 standard
deviation from the regional historical mean (since 1950). Rainfall shock X SP(years) is the interaction term of
Rainfall shock with the number of years a child had Seguro Popular available. The basic controls are the num-
ber of years a child had Seguro Popular available, dummies for year and month of interview, child’s age, and
gender. Additional controls include whether the child speaks an indigenous language, four categories of father’s
and mother’s education: no education, secondary, and high school or higher, the age, gender, and marital status
of the household head, ownership status of dwelling, rural location, whether the household has piped water into
the house, toilet, cooks with wood or coal, and indicators of the quality of the materials of the floor and roof.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the municipality level in brackets.
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Table 2.10: Children’s health and time use by eligibility to Seguro Popular
Sick Caring Chores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: SP Eligible
Rainfall shock 0.067 0.066 0.098 0.088 0.145 0.141
(0.027)** (0.029)** (0.041)** (0.041)** (0.051)*** (0.052)***
[0.036]* [0.037]* [0.079] [0.073] [0.067]** [0.067]**
Rainfall shock X SP(years) −0.016 −0.015 −0.020 −0.018 −0.036 −0.035
(0.006)*** (0.006)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
[0.007]** [0.007]** [0.015] [0.015] [0.013]*** [0.013]***
Observations 2936 2900 2970 2933 2970 2933
R2 0.021 0.028 0.055 0.080 0.163 0.176
Panel B: Not SP Eligible
Rainfall shock 0.043 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.043 0.040
(0.035) (0.036) (0.043) (0.045) (0.058) (0.060)
[0.042] [0.042] [0.049] [0.049] [0.069] [0.071]
Rainfall shock X SP(years) −0.011 −0.008 −0.010 −0.009 −0.019 −0.017
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
[0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.014] [0.014]
Observations 2,827 2,797 2,859 2,829 2,859 2,829
R2 0.012 0.023 0.043 0.072 0.138 0.144
Basic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: A child is eligible to SP if family does not have any other form of health insurance. Sick is a binary
variable equal to one if the child stopped doing any of her daily activities due to sickness in the past four weeks.
Caring is a dummy variable recording whether the child took care of elderly or sick people and/or other children
in the last week. Chores is a dummy variable equal to one if the child did domestic chores in the past week.
Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the precipitation gathered in the municipality of residence
during the 12 months preceding the interview date was above or below 1 standard deviation from the regional
historical mean. Rainfall shock X SP(years) is the interaction term of Rainfall shock with the number of years
a child had Seguro Popular available. The basic controls are the number of years a child had Seguro Popular
available, dummies for year and month of interview, child’s age, and gender. Additional controls include whether
the child speaks an indigenous language, four categories of father’s and mother’s education: no education, sec-
ondary, and high school or higher, the age, gender, and marital status of the household head, ownership status of
dwelling, rural location, whether the household has piped water into the house, toilet, cooks with wood or coal,
and indicators of the quality of the materials of the floor and roof.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered
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Source: Evaluación Nacional de Logros Académicos (ENLACE). Ministry of Edu-
cation (SEP).
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Figure C.2: Implementation year of Seguro Popular
Note: The year of implementation is defined as the first year in which there were
at least 10 individuals enrolled in Seguro Popular in a given municipality.











































2002q3 2005q3 2008q3 2011q3
date_sp10_Q
Municipalities offering SP (cumulative)
Municipalities joining SP program
Note: The quarter of Seguro Popular implementation is defined as the first quar-
ter in which there were at least 10 individuals enrolled in the program in a given
municipality.
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8
Note: The coverage rate is defined in percentage points. Year 1 displays the Seguro
Popular coverage rate after the first year of implementation, the rest of bars display
the increase in the coverage rate in each of the consecutive years.
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Note: The multivariate ENSO (El Niño/Southern Oscillation) index (MEI.v2)
measures the probability of ENSO-induced climate variation with the leading com-
bined Empirical Orthogonal Function (EOF) of five different variables over the trop-
ical Pacific basin: sea level pressure, sea surface temperature, zonal and meridional
components of the surface wind, and outgoing longwave radiation.
Source: NOAA.
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Table C.1: Test score results in Mathematics: Rainfall shock intensity









Rainfall shock(1-2sd) −0.015** 0.456*** −0.179 −0.278*
(0.008) (0.145) (0.135) (0.169)
Rainfall shock(2-3sd) −0.058** 1.571*** −0.359 −1.212**
(0.026) (0.520) (0.351) (0.529)
Rainfall shock(+3sd) −0.147*** 4.026*** −1.768** −2.257**
(0.046) (1.018) (0.688) (0.950)
Rainfall shock(1-2sd) X SP 0.005*** −0.138*** 0.056* 0.082**
(0.002) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037)
Rainfall shock(2-3sd) X SP 0.018*** −0.485*** 0.206*** 0.280***
(0.004) (0.090) (0.074) (0.092)
Rainfall shock(+3sd) X SP 0.033*** −0.886*** 0.414*** 0.472***
(0.008) (0.168) (0.145) (0.162)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 398,008 398,008 398,008 398,008
# schools 49,751 49,751 49,751 49,751
Note: Rainfall shock(x) denotes whether the precipitation gathered in the school-locality dur-
ing the 12 months preceding the evaluation date of ENLACE was between 1-2 standard devia-
tions, 2-3 standard deviations or more than 3 standard deviations away from the regional histor-
ical mean (since 1950). Rainfall shock(x) X SP is the interaction term of the rainfall shock with
the SP coverage rate (which is calculated by dividing the number of affiliates to Seguro Popu-
lar in the municipality by its population size, and scaled up by a factor of 10 so that a value of
10 represents full coverage). Controls include the SP coverage rate, the number of students per
teacher, the number of students per group, the share of girls, whether the head of the school also
teaches, whether the school participates in the Safe School, Extending School Hours, or Quality
Schools programs, 5 dummies of marginalization level of the school, the share of students with
unreliable test results, 7 dummies of municipality size, municipality per capita expenses in the
Progresa/Oportunidades program, and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level in parentheses.
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Table C.2: Test score results in Verbal: Rainfall shock intensity









Rainfall shock(1-2sd) −0.014** 0.358*** −0.151 −0.207
(0.007) (0.129) (0.151) (0.153)
Rainfall shock(2-3sd) −0.044* 1.062** −0.065 −0.998**
(0.022) (0.445) (0.319) (0.448)
Rainfall shock(+3sd) −0.109*** 2.564*** −0.614 −1.950**
(0.042) (0.851) (0.678) (0.908)
Rainfall shock(1-2sd) X SP 0.004** −0.103*** 0.040 0.063*
(0.002) (0.029) (0.033) (0.033)
Rainfall shock(2-3sd) X SP 0.014*** −0.325*** 0.076 0.249***
(0.004) (0.076) (0.065) (0.083)
Rainfall shock(+3sd) X SP 0.026*** −0.604*** 0.259* 0.345**
(0.007) (0.143) (0.138) (0.155)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 398,008 398,008 398,008 398,008
# schools 49,751 49,751 49,751 49,751
Note: Rainfall shock(x) denotes whether the precipitation gathered in the school-locality during
the 12 months preceding the evaluation date of ENLACE was between 1-2 standard deviations, 2-
3 standard deviations or more than 3 standard deviations away from the regional historical mean
(since 1950). SP (coverage rate) is calculated by dividing the number of affiliates to Seguro Popular
in the municipality by its population size, and scaled up by a factor of 10 so that a value of 10 repre-
sents full coverage). Rainfall shock(x) X SP is the interaction term of the rainfall shock with the SP
coverage rate (which is calculated by dividing the number of affiliates to Seguro Popular in the mu-
nicipality by its population size, and scaled up by a factor of 10 so that a value of 10 represents full
coverage). Controls include the SP coverage rate, the number of students per teacher, the number of
students per group, the share of girls, whether the head of the school also teaches, whether the school
participates in the Safe School, Extending School Hours, or Quality Schools programs, 5 dummies of
marginalization level of the school, the share of students with unreliable test results, 7 dummies of
municipality size, municipality per capita expenses in the Progresa/Oportunidades program, and the
municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in
parentheses.
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Table C.3: Test score results: Asymmetry of shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Score (SD) Inadequate (pp) Fair (pp) Good+ (pp)
Panel A: Mathematics
Excess Rainfall shock 0.001 0.236 −0.109 −0.126
(0.011) (0.197) (0.184) (0.227)
Shortage Rainfall shock −0.047*** 1.059*** −0.401* −0.659**
(0.013) (0.277) (0.239) (0.268)
Excess Rainfall shock X SP −0.001 −0.010 0.027 −0.016
(0.002) (0.046) (0.044) (0.050)
Shortage Rainfall shock X SP 0.015*** −0.394*** 0.154*** 0.240***
(0.002) (0.050) (0.052) (0.056)
Panel B: Verbal
Excess Rainfall shock −0.002 0.265* −0.070 −0.195
(0.010) (0.158) (0.175) (0.207)
Shortage Rainfall shock −0.039*** 0.682*** −0.277 −0.406*
(0.012) (0.255) (0.247) (0.221)
Excess Rainfall shock X SP 0.000 −0.022 0.001 0.021
(0.002) (0.037) (0.039) (0.044)
Shortage Rainfall shock X SP 0.012*** −0.267*** 0.111** 0.156***
(0.002) (0.045) (0.052) (0.047)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 398,008 398,008 398,008 398,008
# schools 49,751 49,751 49,751 49,751
Note: Excess Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the precipitation gath-
ered in the school-locality during the 12 months preceding the evaluation date of ENLACE ex-
ceeded in 1 standard deviation the regional historical mean (since 1950), and Shortage Rainfall
shock is a dummy that equals 1 when the precipitation was 1 standard deviation below. Excess
Rainfall shock X SP and Shortage Rainfall shock X SP are the interaction terms of the rainfall
shock with the SP coverage rate (which is calculated by dividing the number of affiliates to Se-
guro Popular in the municipality by its population size, and scaled up by a factor of 10 so that
a value of 10 represents full coverage). Controls include the SP coverage rate, the number of
students per teacher, the number of students per group, the share of girls, whether the head of
the school also teaches, whether the school participates in the Safe School, Extending School
Hours, or Quality Schools programs, 5 dummies of marginalization level of the school, the
share of students with unreliable test results, 7 dummies of municipality size, municipality per
capita expenses in the Progresa/Oportunidades program, and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level in parentheses.
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Table C.4: Test score results in Mathematics: Intensity and asymmetry of rainfall
shocks









Rainfall(Flood) −0.042 0.911* 0.213 −1.124*
(0.028) (0.531) (0.363) (0.580)
Rainfall(Above normal) 0.008 0.092 −0.113 0.021
(0.010) (0.183) (0.180) (0.215)
Rainfall(Below normal) −0.040*** 0.786*** −0.193 −0.593**
(0.013) (0.279) (0.235) (0.274)
Rainfall(Drought) −0.082 4.381*** −3.934*** −0.448
(0.055) (0.931) (0.840) (1.120)
Rainfall(Flood) X SP 0.009* −0.208* 0.057 0.151
(0.005) (0.107) (0.086) (0.111)
Rainfall(Above normal) X SP −0.003 0.039 0.007 −0.046
(0.002) (0.044) (0.042) (0.051)
Rainfall(Below normal) X SP 0.012*** −0.297*** 0.089* 0.208***
(0.003) (0.053) (0.050) (0.057)
Rainfall(Drought) X SP 0.029*** −1.088*** 0.761*** 0.327**
(0.008) (0.133) (0.139) (0.165)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 398,008 398,008 398,008 398,008
# schools 49,751 49,751 49,751 49,751
Note: Rainfall(Flood) = 1 if precipitation gathered in the school-locality during the 12 months
preceding the evaluation date of ENLACE is above 2 standard deviations from the regional his-
torical mean (since 1950), Rainfall (Above normal) between 1 and 2 standard deviations, Rainfall
(Below normal) between -1 and -2 standard deviations, and Rainfall Drought below -2 standard de-
viations. Rainfall(x) X SP is the interaction term of the rainfall shock with the SP coverage rate
(which is calculated by dividing the number of affiliates to Seguro Popular in the municipality by
its population size, and scaled up by a factor of 10 so that a value of 10 represents full coverage).
Controls include the SP coverage rate, the number of students per teacher, the number of students
per group, the share of girls, whether the head of the school also teaches, whether the school par-
ticipates in the Safe School, Extending School Hours, or Quality Schools programs, 5 dummies of
marginalization level of the school, the share of students with unreliable test results, 7 dummies of
municipality size, municipality per capita expenses in the Progresa/Oportunidades program, and
the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
in parentheses.
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Table C.5: Test score results in Verbal: Intensity and asymmetry of rainfall shocks









Rainfall(Flood) −0.033 0.797* 0.046 −0.843*
(0.025) (0.472) (0.342) (0.485)
Rainfall(Above normal) 0.004 0.156 −0.052 −0.104
(0.010) (0.147) (0.175) (0.196)
Rainfall(Below normal) −0.033*** 0.535** −0.226 −0.309
(0.012) (0.260) (0.247) (0.225)
Rainfall(Drought) −0.050 1.984** −1.042 −0.944
(0.049) (0.811) (0.863) (1.033)
Rainfall(Flood) X SP 0.008* −0.173* 0.063 0.110
(0.005) (0.092) (0.079) (0.099)
Rainfall(Above normal) X SP −0.001 0.015 −0.024 0.009
(0.002) (0.035) (0.039) (0.044)
Rainfall(Below normal) X SP 0.009*** −0.210*** 0.094* 0.117**
(0.002) (0.049) (0.052) (0.048)
Rainfall(Drought) X SP 0.021*** −0.606*** 0.255* 0.351**
(0.007) (0.122) (0.138) (0.150)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 398,008 398,008 398,008 398,008
# schools 49,751 49,751 49,751 49,751
Note: Rainfall(Flood) = 1 if precipitation gathered in the school-locality during the 12 months pre-
ceding the evaluation date of ENLACE is above 2 standard deviations from the regional historical mean
(since 1950), Rainfall (Above normal) between 1 and 2 standard deviations, Rainfall (Below normal)
between -1 and -2 standard deviations, and Rainfall Drought below -2 standard deviations. Rainfall(x)
X SP is the interaction term of the rainfall shock with the SP coverage rate (which is calculated by di-
viding the number of affiliates to Seguro Popular in the municipality by its population size, and scaled
up by a factor of 10 so that a value of 10 represents full coverage). Controls include the SP coverage
rate, the number of students per teacher, the number of students per group, the share of girls, whether
the head of the school also teaches, whether the school participates in the Safe School, Extending School
Hours, or Quality Schools programs, 5 dummies of marginalization level of the school, the share of stu-
dents with unreliable test results, 7 dummies of municipality size, municipality per capita expenses in
the Progresa/Oportunidades program, and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in
parentheses.
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Table C.6: Test score results: Rural localities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Score (SD) Inadequate (pp) Fair (pp) Good+ (pp)
Panel A: Mathematics
Rainfall shock −0.016 0.610*** −0.524** −0.086
(0.011) (0.234) (0.224) (0.230)
Rainfall shock X SP 0.006*** −0.206*** 0.144*** 0.063
(0.002) (0.042) (0.046) (0.043)
Panel B: Verbal
Rainfall shock −0.015 0.428** −0.453** 0.025
(0.011) (0.217) (0.214) (0.212)
Rainfall shock X SP 0.005*** −0.151*** 0.115*** 0.036
(0.002) (0.039) (0.043) (0.040)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 162,536 162,536 162,536 162,536
# schools 20,317 20,317 20,317 20,317
Note: Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the precipitation gathered
in the school-locality during the 12 months preceding the evaluation date of ENLACE
is above or below 1 standard deviation from the regional historical mean (since 1950).
Rainfall shock X SP is the interaction term of the rainfall shock with the SP coverage
rate (which is calculated by dividing the number of affiliates to Seguro Popular in the
municipality by its population size, and scaled up by a factor of 10 so that a value of 10
represents full coverage). Controls include the SP coverage rate, the number of students
per teacher, the number of students per group, the share of girls, whether the head of the
school also teaches, whether the school participates in the Safe School, Extending School
Hours, or Quality Schools programs, 5 dummies of marginalization level of the school,
the share of students with unreliable test results, municipality per capita expenses in the
Progresa/Oportunidades program, and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the munici-
pality level in parentheses.
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Table C.7: Test score results: Small urban localities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Score (SD) Inadequate (pp) Fair (pp) Good+ (pp)
Panel A: Mathematics
Rainfall shock −0.015 0.164 0.069 −0.233
(0.011) (0.175) (0.183) (0.248)
Rainfall shock X SP 0.003 −0.022 −0.048 0.070
(0.003) (0.039) (0.042) (0.057)
Panel B: Verbal
Rainfall shock −0.013 0.115 0.079 −0.194
(0.011) (0.168) (0.170) (0.238)
Rainfall shock X SP 0.003 −0.019 −0.045 0.064
(0.003) (0.037) (0.040) (0.054)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 83,880 83,880 83,880 83,880
# schools 10,485 10,485 10,485 10,485
Note: Small urban localities are urban localities with less than 50,000 inhabitants.
Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the precipitation gathered in the
school-locality during the 12 months preceding the evaluation date of ENLACE is above
or below 1 standard deviation from the regional historical mean (since 1950). Rainfall
shock X SP is the interaction term of the rainfall shock with the SP coverage rate (which
is calculated by dividing the number of affiliates to Seguro Popular in the municipal-
ity by its population size, and scaled up by a factor of 10 so that a value of 10 repre-
sents full coverage). Controls include the SP coverage rate, the number of students per
teacher, the number of students per group, the share of girls, whether the head of the
school also teaches, whether the school participates in the Safe School, Extending School
Hours, or Quality Schools programs, 5 dummies of marginalization level of the school,
the share of students with unreliable test results, municipality per capita expenses in the
Progresa/Oportunidades program, and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the munici-
pality level in parentheses.
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Table C.8: Test score results: Large urban localities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Score (SD) Inadequate (pp) Fair (pp) Good+ (pp)
Panel A: Mathematics
Rainfall shock 0.002 0.053 0.190 −0.243
(0.013) (0.149) (0.217) (0.300)
Rainfall shock X SP 0.002 0.004 −0.152 0.147
(0.006) (0.072) (0.093) (0.130)
Panel B: Verbal
Rainfall shock 0.006 0.012 0.064 −0.077
(0.013) (0.151) (0.185) (0.274)
Rainfall shock X SP −0.001 0.045 −0.091 0.046
(0.006) (0.074) (0.082) (0.128)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150,968 150,968 150,968 150,968
# schools 18,871 18,871 18,871 18,871
Note: Large urban localities are urban localities with more than 50,000 inhabitants.
Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the precipitation gathered in the
school-locality during the 12 months preceding the evaluation date of ENLACE is above
or below 1 standard deviation from the regional historical mean (since 1950). Rainfall
shock X SP is the interaction term of the rainfall shock with the SP coverage rate (which
is calculated by dividing the number of affiliates to Seguro Popular in the municipal-
ity by its population size, and scaled up by a factor of 10 so that a value of 10 repre-
sents full coverage). Controls include the SP coverage rate, the number of students per
teacher, the number of students per group, the share of girls, whether the head of the
school also teaches, whether the school participates in the Safe School, Extending School
Hours, or Quality Schools programs, 5 dummies of marginalization level of the school,
the share of students with unreliable test results, municipality per capita expenses in the
Progresa/Oportunidades program, and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the munici-
pality level in parentheses.
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Table C.9: Determinants of timing of Seguro Popular implementation
Quarter of SP implementation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population (log) −1.047 −1.210 −1.047 −1.210
(0.112)*** (0.106)*** (0.112)*** (0.106)***
Marginalization Index 0.413 0.268 0.413 0.268
(0.173)** (0.157)* (0.173)** (0.157)*
Share of elegible individuals 2.485 −2.171 2.484 −2.172
(0.643)*** (0.624)*** (0.643)*** (0.624)***
Political party alignment −3.152 −1.494 −3.152 −1.494
(0.295)*** (0.305)*** (0.295)*** (0.305)***
Doctors per elegible (100,000)
In Outpatient Units −0.007 −0.004 −0.007 −0.004
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
In Inpatient Units −0.004 −0.002 −0.004 −0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)**
Evolution in Primary Education
Pass rate growth 96-01 (annual %) 0.324 0.285
(0.214) (0.197)
Completion rate growth 96-01 (annual %) 0.325 0.287
(0.214) (0.197)
Primary educ. info missing 2.497 0.400 2.497 0.402
(0.365)*** (1.277) (0.365)*** (1.277)
State FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,426 2,426 2,426 2,426
R2 0.314 0.549 0.314 0.549
Note: The timing of implementation is measured in quarters. All variables are defined at the mu-
nicipality level (the unit of implementation). The population, marginalization index, and the share
of eligible individuals are measured in the year 2000. The number of doctors is measured in the
year 2001 (the first available). The pre-program indicators of the evolution in primary education are
measured as the annual growth rate observed between 1996 and 2001.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
in parentheses.
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Table C.10: Determinants of Seguro Popular coverage rate expansion
First Year Second Year Third Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Population (log) −3.884 −3.883 −1.008 −1.008 −0.260 −0.261
(0.417)*** (0.417)*** (0.283)*** (0.283)*** (0.245) (0.245)
Marginalization Index 2.068 2.067 0.931 0.932 −0.767 −0.767
(0.780)*** (0.780)*** (0.575) (0.575) (0.490) (0.490)
Share of elegible individuals 33.247 33.242 7.976 7.977 4.993 4.994
(2.295)*** (2.295)*** (1.900)*** (1.899)*** (1.553)*** (1.552)***
Political party alignment 0.673 0.673 −0.372 −0.372 −0.846 −0.847
(0.939) (0.939) (0.522) (0.522) (0.529) (0.529)
Doctors per elegible (100,000)
In Outpatient Units 0.030 0.030 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
In Inpatient Units 0.008 0.008 −0.004 −0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.005)* (0.005)* (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Evolution in Primary Education
Pass rate growth 96-01 (annual %) 0.993 0.545 −0.357
(0.878) (0.624) (0.480)
Completion rate growth 96-01 (annual %) 1.009 0.541 −0.360
(0.877) (0.624) (0.480)
Primary educ. info missing −4.067 −4.053 5.227 5.224 3.510 3.508
(4.480) (4.479) (4.516) (4.515) (3.074) (3.074)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,426 2,426 2,426 2,426 2,426 2,426
R2 0.384 0.384 0.132 0.132 0.121 0.121
Note: The coverage rate is defined in percentage points. Dependent variable in columns “First Year” is the increase in the
coverage rate in the first year of SP implementation; “Second Year”, the increase in the coverage rate in the second year; “Third
Year”, the increase in the coverage rate in the third year. All variables are defined at the municipality level (the unit of imple-
mentation). The population, marginalization index, and the share of eligible individuals are measured in the year 2000. The
number of doctors is measured in the year 2001 (the first available). The pre-program indicators of the evolution in primary
education are measured as the annual growth rate observed between 1996 and 2001.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.
Table C.11: Test score trends and SP expansion
Mathematics Verbal









SP coverage increase (07-08) −0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
# schools 13,285 20,946 13,285 20,946
Note: Dependent variable: Variation in test scores between 2006 and 2007 (differ-
ence in standardized test scores). Independent variable: variation in the SP coverage
rate between 2007 and 2008 (in percentage points). Columns 1 and 3: sample of mu-
nicipalities with SP coverage rate below 5% in 2007. Columns 2 and 4: sample of
municipalities with SP coverage rate below 10% in 2007. Controls include the number
of students per teacher, the number of students per group, the share of girls, whether
the head of the school also teaches, whether the school participates in the Safe School,
Extending School Hours, or Quality Schools programs, 5 dummies of marginalization
level of the school, the share of students with unreliable test results, 7 dummies of
municipality size, municipality per capita expenses in the Progresa/Oportunidades
program, and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the mu-
nicipality level in parentheses.
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Table C.12: Endogenous responses
(1) (2)
Dropout rate (pp) Students evaluated
Rainfall shock 0.006 0.339
(0.043) (0.338)
Rainfall shock X SP −0.005 −0.080
(0.008) (0.063)
School FE Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Mean depvar 3.41 136.86
Observations 391,841 398,008
# schools 49,428 49,751
Note: The dropout rate records the proportion of students leav-
ing the school during the academic year (in percentage points).
Students evaluated records the number of students sitting the
ENLACE evaluation. Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that
equals 1 when the precipitation gathered in the school-locality
during the 12 months preceding the evaluation date of ENLACE
is above or below 1 standard deviation from the regional historical
mean (since 1950). Rainfall shock X SP is the interaction term of
the rainfall shock with the SP coverage rate (which is calculated
by dividing the number of affiliates to Seguro Popular in the mu-
nicipality by its population size, and scaled up by a factor of 10 so
that a value of 10 represents full coverage). Controls include the
SP coverage rate, the number of students per teacher, the number
of students per group, the share of girls, whether the head of the
school also teaches, whether the school participates in the Safe
School, Extending School Hours, or Quality Schools programs, 5
dummies of marginalization level of the school, the share of stu-
dents with unreliable test results, 7 dummies of municipality size,
municipality per capita expenses in the Progresa/Oportunidades
program, and the municipality homicide rate.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.
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Table C.13: Children’s health and time use by area type
Sick Caring Chores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Rural
Rainfall shock 0.065 0.064 0.136 0.139 0.093 0.124
(0.028)** (0.029)** (0.042)*** (0.042)*** (0.053)* (0.054)**
[0.042] [0.040] [0.083] [0.080]* [0.070] [0.071]*
Rainfall shock X SP(years) −0.016 −0.015 −0.027 −0.028 −0.026 −0.032
(0.006)*** (0.006)** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)** (0.011)***
[0.008]* [0.008]* [0.014]* [0.014]* [0.013]* [0.013]**
Observations 2644 2620 2676 2652 2676 2652
R2 0.026 0.031 0.052 0.075 0.167 0.179
Panel B: Urban
Rainfall shock 0.054 0.045 −0.020 −0.005 0.102 0.070
(0.034) (0.036) (0.043) (0.044) (0.056)* (0.058)
[0.043] [0.043] [0.047] [0.050] [0.080] [0.079]
Rainfall shock X SP(years) −0.011 −0.010 0.001 −0.001 −0.029 −0.022
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)** (0.012)*
Observations 3148 3100 3183 3134 3183 3134
R2 0.011 0.021 0.052 0.070 0.138 0.149
Basic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Sick is a binary variable equal to one if the child stopped doing any of her daily activities due to sick-
ness in the past four weeks. Caring is a dummy variable recording whether the child took care of elderly or sick
people and/or other children in the last week. Chores is a dummy variable equal to one if the child did domestic
chores in the past week. Rainfall shock is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the precipitation gathered in
the municipality of residence during the 12 months preceding the interview date was above or below 1 standard
deviation from the regional historical mean (since 1950). Rainfall shock X SP(years) is the interaction term of
Rainfall shock with the number of years a child had Seguro Popular available. The basic controls are the number
of years a child had Seguro Popular available, dummies for year and month of interview, child’s age, and gen-
der. Additional controls include whether the child speaks an indigenous language, four categories of father’s and
mother’s education: no education, secondary, and high school or higher, the age, gender, and marital status of
the household head, ownership status of dwelling, whether the household has piped water into the house, toilet,
cooks with wood or coal, and indicators of the quality of the materials of the floor and roof. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered
at the municipality level in brackets.
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Chapter 3
From Daughters to Mothers:
Fertility, Schooling, and Upward
Human Capital Spillovers
3.1 Introduction
The literature on the returns to children from parental investments is extensive. But,
do parents benefit from the human capital of their children?
Becker’s seminal 1960 paper on the economic analysis of fertility introduced chil-
dren as a commodity produced in the household from which parents derive utility
from both quantity (number of children) and quality (broadly defined as how much
is spent on them). The study introduced the quality-quantity trade-off in fertility
choice – further refined and formalized in Becker and Lewis (1973) – by which parents
decide between how many children to have and how much to spend on the average
child.1 Although the hypothesis opened up a new stream of empirical research aiming
to determine the existence and size of the trade-off (Angrist et al., 2010; Black et al.,
1Such trade-off arises as child quantity increases the shadow price of quality, and similarly, child
quality increases the shadow price of quantity.
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2005; Hanushek, 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980, among others), the relative
benefits arising to parents from their offspring quantity and quality received scarce
attention.
Inspecting whether parents benefit from the quantity and quality of their children
could be useful to better understand the evolution of fertility choices and parental
investments in children. For instance, Ager and Herz (2019) note that the decrease in
agricultural wages lowered the value of child labor and fertility levels in the American
South. This result is in line with the early work in Caldwell (1976), who hypothesized
a decrease in fertility levels arising from falling wealth transfers from children to their
parents. On the other hand, Chiswick (1988) shows that investments in the quality
of children are higher among those children from ethnicities with higher returns to
education in the US. Similarly, recent work on parental subjective expectations shows
that parents with higher expected returns to education invest more in their children
(Attanasio et al., 2019a; Boneva and Rauh, 2018). These studies suggest, taken to-
gether, that parents’ fertility and investment behavior respond to market returns to
human capital, in line with the theoretical predictions outlined in Galor (2012). As
a result, the observed decline in fertility levels, and the remarkable increase in global
educational attainment, might be partly explained by the effect that improvements
in the returns to education had on the present discounted value of different combi-
nations of children’s quantity and quality. While previous research has discussed the
relationship between returns to human capital and fertility choices using models of
parental utility maximization (Becker et al., 1990; Galor, 2012; Galor and Weil, 2000;
Hazan and Berdugo, 2002, among others), this study inspects returns to parents in
the form of measurable health outcomes in later life.
Moreover, while there is well-documented evidence that poverty transmits across
generations (Bird, 2013; Black and Devereux, 2010), and that part of the poverty per-
sistence is due to high fertility among poor households lowering average investments
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made in children (Moav, 2004), little is known about the extent to which parents
in larger families are affected by the lower human capital of their offspring. Parents
decide on their optimal number of children and the level of investments they are
willing to make depending on their preferences, expected outcomes, resources, and
the like. But why do the poor have larger families? While some of the motivations
regarding fertility choices among the poor might not be so different than that of the
non-poor, they are more likely to be shaped by a combination of social, cultural,
religious, and other economic considerations. For instance, reduced participation of
girls in education lowers the age at birth of the first child and increases total fertility
(McCrary and Royer, 2011; Schultz, 1997), early marriage and disempowerment lim-
its the control women have over desired fertility (Raj et al., 2009), limited knowledge
of and restricted access to contraception leads to higher conception rates (Bailey,
2010), and higher levels of child mortality are associated with fertility increases to
compensate for the lower expected probability of children’s survival (Ben-Porath,
1976; Doepke, 2005). Moreover, parents from more impoverished backgrounds might
have higher preferences for a larger sibship size as a source of income from child labor
(Caldwell, 1982) and protection at an old-age (Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977). In
labor-intensive subsistence economies where returns to skills are low, parents max-
imize at higher levels of children’s quantity. However, if returns to human capital
are sufficiently high and a larger sibship size lowers investments in children, high
fertility could be detrimental to both children and their parents. This would be the
case to the extent that human capital enables children to provide better support to
their aging parents (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). Insofar as the relative return
to the quantity and quality of children is unknown, so are the long-term parental
consequences of fertility choices, parental investment in children, and of government
policies aiming to influence them.
Most of the research investigating the impact of fertility on long-term parental
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outcomes have focused on measures of later life health. Results from correlational
studies have not been able to establish a clear pattern as to how fertility affects
parental health outcomes in later life (Schultz, 2007).2 The new evidence brought
about by causal studies also produces mixed results. Instrumenting fertility levels
with China’s Great Famine and the gender composition of the first pair of children,
Guodong and Xiaoyan (2009) find a positive link between the number of surviving
children and parents’ physical and cognitive health. Kruk and Reinhold (2014) in-
strument fertility with the occurrence of a multiple birth and the gender composition
of the first two births and find that higher fertility increases depression levels among
elderly Europeans.3 Exploiting China’s One Child Policy, Islam and Smyth (2015)
show that individuals with more children have lower levels of self-reported health but
find no effect on other health measures.4 On the other hand, Chen and Fang (2018)
show that the campaign “Later, longer, fewer”5 to reduce fertility levels in China
improved parents’ physical health but harmed their mental wellbeing.
However, and following Becker’s hypothesis, changes in offspring quantity are likely
to affect the average human capital that children accumulate – making it difficult to
disentangle the effect of quantity from that of offspring quality. While the number of
studies investigating the impact of offspring quality on long-term parental outcomes
is small (partly due to the limited availability of data to test the relationship), there
is enough evidence to argue that it matters. Studies on the effect of children’s human
capital on parental health outcomes have shown a positive correlation between off-
spring education and parental survival (Zimmer et al. (2007) in Taiwan, Torssander
2For instance, Buber and Engelhardt (2008) find a positive association between fertility and
mental health in continental Europe, Read et al. (2011) show that higher fertility is linked with higher
activity limitations due to health motives in the UK, Spence (2008) finds no relation between total
fertility and functional limitations or depressive symptoms in the US, and Hank (2010) estimates a
negative correlation between the number of children and maternal health in East Germany, and a
positive one in West Germany.
3Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzer-
land, Czechia, Poland, and Belgium.
4Activities of Daily Limitation (ADL), mental health, BMI, and blood pressure.
5(Wan, xi, shao). A campaign that initiated in 1970, prior to the One Child Policy.
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(2013) in Sweden, Friedman and Mare (2014) in the US, and De Neve and Harling
(2017) in South Africa). More recently, there is causal evidence of children’s edu-
cation increasing parents’ life expectancy in Sweden (Lundborg and Majlesi, 2018)
and Tanzania (De Neve and Fink, 2018), reducing depression in Europe6 (Everding,
2019), and improving the lung and cognitive function of parents in China (Ma, 2019).
This paper adds and expands on previous studies by examining parents’ long-term
health outcomes as a function of both their fertility decisions (number of children)
and their investments in child quality (children’s education level). It also reveals
important differences by the gender of the parent.7
I leverage two sources of exogenous variation affecting, in turn, the number of
children parents have, and the level of human capital children accumulate. I address
the endogeneity of family size by exploiting son preference among Chinese households
and the quasi-random assignment of the firstborn child’s gender. In line with J.
Lee (2008) for South Korea and Kugler and Kumar (2017) for India, I show that
the occurrence of a firstborn daughter predicts a larger sibship size (0.29 bigger on
average), with no significant differences between rural and urban households, parental
education, or across different parental cohorts.8 Moreover, as in previous studies
(Abrevaya, 2009; Almond and Edlund, 2008; Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010; Das
Gupta, 2005), I show evidence against sex-selection of the firstborn and rule out any
direct effect of firstborn’s sex on parental health.
To account for the endogeneity of parental investments in children’s human capital,
I leverage the staggered implementation of China’s 1986 compulsory schooling law,
which increased from 6 to 9 years the minimum schooling period. Ma (2019) uses
6Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, and Spain.
7As discussed below, the schooling reform that I use to effectively instrument for the education
of the child only raised the educational attainment of girls. Therefore, the analysis of the impacts
on parents of (exogenous variation in) child quality is restricted to the case of daughters.
8Similarly, Guodong and Xiaoyan (2009) find that at least one boy between the first two chil-
dren lowers total fertility by 0.29 children in the Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey
(CLHLS).
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the same school reform to obtain exogenous variation in children’s human capital.
However, in contrast to Ma (2019), I additionally exploit the initial gender gap in the
level of completed education before the date of implementation (of 1.6 years), which
favored boys. While the extension in the minimum compulsory schooling did not
affect educational attainment among sons, it created an upward shift in the education
level of daughters (of 0.63 years), initiating the convergence of girls’ education to that
of boys. Moreover, the differential effect of the reform by children’s gender (validated
with the use of two independent datasets) allows me to exploit the sample of sons as
a placebo group for the effect of the schooling reform on parental health.
Chinese society has traditionally relied heavily on family ties, which makes this
country an interesting case study to measure the effect of fertility decisions on parental
outcomes. Although improvements in the availability of pensions and public health
insurance have been observed in the past years, the still relatively low social protection
offered to elders, the large share of the old age population living in poverty or with low
income, and the rapid aging of its population accentuate the dependence of Chinese
aging parents on their children. Anecdotal evidence of the challenge that an aging
population poses in the country include the introduction in 2013 of the “Law of the
Protection of the Rights and Interest of the Elderly”, mandating children to visit
and look after their aging parents.9 Moreover, the data show that 63% of parents in
China expect to rely mainly on their children for financial support during old age,
compared to 29% of those expecting to rely on a pension or retirement salary.
In this study, I estimate the effect that offspring quantity and children’s education
have on indices of parental physical, mental, and cognitive health among a repre-
sentative sample of Chinese residents aged 45 and older interviewed in the China
Health and Retirement Survey (CHARLS).10 I find that while fertility does not have
9Presidential Decree No.72. Central Government portal, December 28, 2012, http://www.gov.
cn/flfg/2012-12/28/content_2305570.htm (accessed on November 6, 2020).
10Cognitive health is the ability to clearly think, learn, and remember.
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any statistically significant direct long-term effect on parental health, the reform-
induced increase in daughters’ education improved mothers’ physical health by 0.14
standard deviations (two-thirds of the gender gap in physical health), and increased
parental cognitive achievement by 0.16 standard deviations (29% of the cognitive
premium from primary school completion) - an effect driven by the sample of moth-
ers. These results are robust to specifications that account for children and parental
cohort fixed effects, regional trends, the intensity in the regulation and sanctions of
the One Child Policy, household wealth, confounders at different regional levels, and
to different methods of constructing the health indices.
An inspection of some of the potential mechanisms at play shows that while the
extension in the minimum years of compulsory schooling did not change labor force
participation among daughters, it increased the share of girls working in clerical
occupations (while decreasing the share of girls employed in agriculture). While the
reform also induced an increase in parental expectations regarding future financial
help from their daughters, there seems not to be a significant effect on current financial
transfers, nor on the contact intensity or functional help received by their children.
The physical improvement that mothers experience from higher-educated daughters
could be explained by an increase in the quality of such parental contact. This is the
mechanism observed in Lundborg and Majlesi (2018), who document an increase in
parental life expectancy arising from better information on the production function of
health among children. Although one can imagine that an increase in the schooling
of daughters improved mothers’ cognition either through direct teaching (to read
and write for instance) or from a higher exposure to more educated individuals, in
practice this hypothesis is hard to test. The larger estimated effects observed among
the sample of mothers are likely to be partly explained by their lower initial levels
of human capital. However, descriptive evidence also shows that mothers are more
likely to rely on their children for help and care in later life than fathers, who instead
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expect more care from their spouses.
This study documents higher measurable health returns to parents from invest-
ments in children than from increased fertility. This is particularly relevant to the
extent that higher fertility is detrimental to children’s human capital, as shown by
Li et al. (2008), Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), and also in this study, in the Chi-
nese context.11 Moreover, the study shows that the pecuniary return to education
seems not to be the driver of the observed results. This distinction is important when
assessing the external validity of the findings, since returns to education have been
increasing in China since 1990.12
The results also suggest an underestimation in previous studies of the effect of poli-
cies promoting higher education among girls as a means to reduce gender inequality,
as they typically fail to account for the positive externalities accruing to their moth-
ers. More generally, this study shows there are potential gains for parents across
the developing world from increasing daughters’ schooling. This result is not trivial,
as parents continue to be one of the main barriers preventing girls in many coun-
tries from pursuing further education (due to security concerns and cultural norms,
among others). This paper also provides a potential new explanation for the findings
in many studies that higher investments in children are made when additional eco-
nomic resources are given to mothers (Rubalcava et al., 2009; Thomas, 1990), and
for stronger intergenerational intra-female resource transfers (Baranov et al., 2020;
Duflo, 2003). While the hypothesis so far has been that mothers have a stronger
11While the analysis abstracts from the short-term effects of parental fertility choices, which
could be relevant if households face inter-temporal budget constraints and children are used as
a productive asset in the household, these are indirectly accounted for when assessing long-term
outcomes.
12Up until 1990 (when the youngest cohort of children in the study sample were born), the returns
to education in China were very low by international standards (4% or less for an additional year
of schooling) (Fleisher et al., 2005; Fleisher and Wang, 2004). However, as the collective economy
declined, the weight of state-owned enterprises reduced, and the productivity and efficiency of the
economy improved, so did the return to education. In 2001, it was estimated to be at 10.2% for an
additional year of schooling (Zhang et al., 2005), and it is estimated at 20% in contemporary China
(Fang et al., 2012).
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preference for child quality, this study shows that part of this preference can be ex-
plained by mothers benefiting more than fathers from their offspring in later life.
This additional expected return would be mechanical if mothers expect to outlive
their husbands (the common pattern observed across the world [WHO, 2019]), and
significant if mothers are less capable of generating resources of their own (or are
more vulnerable) independently of their civil status. In this regard, the data show
that mothers are more likely to rely on their children for financial old-age support
and for help with functional limitations than fathers (who, on the contrary, enjoy
better access to a pension and retirement salary and expect more help from their
spouses).13
Evaluating the return to offspring quantity and quality is not only critical to un-
derstanding fertility behavior and parental investments, but also to assess potential
externalities accruing to parents from policies promoting reduced fertility levels, ban-
ning child labor, or expanding compulsory schooling as a means to increase children’s
human capital. Such policies disregard the effect that a smaller sibship size might
have on the aging quality of parents. If reduced fertility levels were beneficial for chil-
dren but compromised long-term parental health outcomes or parents’ sustenance in
old-age, such policies would generate a moral dilemma. However, this study shows
that both children and parents’ human capital benefit from reduced fertility levels
and higher investments in children.14 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
study that attempts to disentangle the relative return from offspring’s quantity and
quality.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the household survey
data and examines descriptive evidence relating fertility decisions with parental long-
13While I show no effect from increased daughters’ education on current financial transfers, the
results show an increase in future expected financial transfers. Similarly, although the contact inten-
sity seems not to be affected by higher levels of education among daughters, a potential improvement
in the quality of such contact should have an impact on the quality of old-age support.
14However, I find that an additional child is associated with an increase of 0.02 standard devia-
tions in the total net monetary transfers that parents receive from their children in later life.
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term health outcomes. Section 3.3 discusses the challenges to identification and
the empirical strategy implemented. Section 3.4 presents the results, followed by a
series of robustness investigations in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 I provide an analysis
of potential mechanisms to help explain the findings, and Section 3.7 offers some
concluding remarks.
3.2 Data
This study draws on information from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal
Study (CHARLS). The CHARLS is a longitudinal household survey modeled on
the Health and Retirement Study in the US (HRS).15 It contains information from
a representative sample of Chinese residents aged 45 and older and their spouses,
living in about 10,000 households in 28 out of the 33 provincial-level regions in which
the country is divided (Zhao et al., 2014). The survey provides a large array of
items regarding socio-economic and health circumstances. In this study, I use the
information collected in 2013 (second wave), which contains a fertility history module
that records, for all children born to respondents and independently of their current
residency status, their year of birth, and completed education level. In addition, the
fertility history module includes measures of interaction and support between parents
and their children.
3.2.1 Dataset construction and measures of aging quality
With the fertility history module, it is possible to construct a dataset of parent-child
observations by matching every child to their respective parents in the main survey.
In a given household, only one of the respondents provides answers to the fertility
questionnaire. Adopted or foster children are also included in the survey, but I focus
15Also, on the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing in the UK (ELSA), and the Survey of
Health, Ageing and Retirement in continental Europe (SHARE).
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the analysis on biological children (representing close to 99% of all child observations).
If a given child is reported to be the biological child of both parents in the household,
I match the child observation to both parents.16 Otherwise, I only match the child
observation to the biological parent responding to the fertility questionnaire.17
Using all survey modules I construct four datasets: a) the child dataset, where
the level of observation is the child; b) the parent dataset, recording one observa-
tion per parent; c) the household fertility dataset, where the level of observation is
the respondent to the fertility history module and therefore only includes one record
per household; and d) the parent-child dataset, which contains one observation per
parent-child relation. In the latter, survey weights are adjusted to account for differ-
entials in fertility levels (otherwise, higher-fertility parents would be overrepresented
in the sample). That is, since a parent with three children would appear three times
in the data, I re-weight the survey weight of that parent by one third so that the sum
of weights is equal to the original survey weight. I further restrict the sample to those
parents for whom all children are old enough to have completed their education (23
years old and older). Arguably, these parents have also completed their fertility.18
Summary statistics for parents and their children are shown in Table 3.1 and Table
3.2, respectively. Table 3.1 shows that parents are, on average, 62 years of age (born
between 1910 and 1968). Mothers have about 2.7 years less schooling than fathers on
average, and 42% of them have no formal education (as opposed to 12% of fathers).19
The average number of children per parent is about 2.6, and around half the parents
in the sample have three or more children. In Table 3.2, we see that children of the
main respondents are around 38 years old on average (born between 1922 and 1990).
The level of education completed among sons is about 1.2 years higher than the one
16This is the case in 97% of all child observations among married individuals.
17Parents that are divorced, separated, never married, or cohabiting, represent only around 1.3%
of the parental observations. The incidence of widowhood is of 11%.
18Remember that the sample of respondents is aged 45 and older.
19The years of schooling of both children and parents are computed from the level of completed
education.
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completed by daughters, showing that the inter-generational gender gap in education
has closed by 56 percentage points between parents and their children. Moreover, the
share of illiterate daughters (with no education), has almost halved with respect to
that of their mothers (22% versus 42%), but the primary completion rate still lies 11
percentage points below that of sons, at 78%. Around 35% of sons live in the parental
house, while this percentage is 10% among the sample of daughters. Nevertheless,
around 76% of all children reside in the same district in which their parents live.
To measure parental health outcomes, I construct a series of indices using Inverse
Covariance Weighting (Anderson, 2008) of different measures reflecting parental phys-
ical, mental, and cognitive health in later life.20 The physical health index is con-
structed from a series of self-reported functional limitations (with varying degrees
of severity) in activities of daily living (ADL): jogging; walking 1 km; walking 100
meters; getting up from a chair after sitting for a long period; climbing several flights
of stairs without resting; stooping, kneeling, or crouching; reaching or extending the
arms above shoulder level; lifting or carrying weights like a heavy bag of groceries;
picking up a small coin from a table; and a self-assessed measure of own health sta-
tus.21 The mental health index is constructed using the variables from the 10-item
CES-D instrument, commonly used to screen for depression among older adults (An-
dresen et al., 1994). This shorter version of the full questionnaire (20-items CES-D),
asks for the frequency over the past week of having felt bothered, depressed, fearful,
lonely, hopeful about the future, happy, effortful, experiencing restless sleep, having
trouble to keep focused on the task at hand, or the feeling of not being able to get
going in a 4-point Likert scale.22 In addition, a variable of general life satisfaction
20The index gives more weight to those variables with lower covariance with the rest of the index
components (that is, those variables that provide more “new” information).
21The levels of severity in functional limitations are a) No, I do not have any difficulty; b) I
have difficulty but can still do it; c) Yes, I have Difficulty and Need Help; and d) I cannot do it.
Self-assessed health is rated from very poor to very good in a 5-point scale.
22a) Rarely or none of the time (< 1 day); b) Some or a little of the time (1- 2 days); c)
Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3 - 4 days); and d) Most or all of the time (5 - 7
days).
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is also included with answers ranging from completely satisfied to not at all satisfied
on a 5-point scale. Finally, the cognitive health index is constructed using variables
that measure cognitive functioning and that include the ability to do the mathe-
matical operation of subtracting 7 from 100 (dummy equal to 1 if correct answer),
the ability to recall words previously presented to the respondent (total number of
recalled words), the ability to replicate a drawing (dummy equal to 1 if able to draw
the picture), and self-rated memory ability on a 5-point scale ranging from poor to
excellent. Appendix Table D.1 shows summary statistics for all the health measures
evaluated separately by parents’ gender.
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the different indices of parental health by gender
and age of the parent. Note that these measures are derived from cross-sectional data,
and so the age of the parent in the interview year is collinear to the parents’ birth
cohort. As a result, the evolution of the different health indicators is influenced by
secular cohort trends, and by the positive survival selection of respondents. In general
terms, physical and cognitive health is worse for the older cohorts. The pattern for
mental health is less clear. While mental health shows a slow but monotonic decline
by age among men, for women, it reaches its lowest point at the age of 61 before it
starts improving thereafter.23 Nonetheless, mothers obtain lower scores than fathers
in all the constructed health indices for any given cohort and perform worse in each
of the individual health components evaluated (see Appendix Table D.1). In what
follows, I inspect the correlation between parental health in later life and different
attributes of parents and their children.
23When inspecting the evolution of the individual health components, I observe that the improve-
ment in mental health among mothers is due to an improvement in the measures of life satisfaction,
feelings of depression, bothersome, and focus on the tasks at hand.
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3.2.2 Associations between aging quality and parental char-
acteristics
Table 3.3 shows correlations between the parental health indices and characteristics of
parents and their children. The results display a clear and positive education gradient
in physical, mental, and cognitive health. Parents with completed primary school
score 0.06 standard deviations higher in the physical health domain than parents
with no education (column 1), and those with completed high school or higher score
0.17 standard deviations above (significant at the 1% level). Similarly, column 3
shows that parents finishing primary education score 0.06 standard deviations higher
in mental health than parents with no education (significant at the 10% level), and
those with high school studies or higher obtain a mental health premium of 0.18
standard deviations. As expected, the level of education is an even stronger predictor
of cognitive achievement in old age. Completing primary education is associated with
a cognition score 0.54 standard deviations higher than having no education (column
5) while graduating from high school or higher is associated with a 0.82 standard
deviation increase in cognitive health (both significant at the 1% level). As discussed
earlier, women present on average lower levels of health in all domains, with the
gender gap in health being larger than the rural-urban gap in health.
The results in Table 3.3 also show that even after controlling for parents’ edu-
cation, there remains a strong and positive correlation between children’s years of
education and parental health in all domains (columns 1, 3, and 5). As for the effect
of fertility on parental health outcomes, higher fertility is associated with negative
health outcomes. However, conditional on children’s education, only physical health
is statistically and significatively correlated with offspring quantity (-0.02 standard
deviations in the physical health score for each additional child, column 1). When
excluding children’s education from the regression to account for the potential trade-
off between offspring quantity and quality (columns 2,4, and 6), the results show
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a stronger negative association between total fertility and physical health (-0.027
standard deviations per additional child), and cognitive attainment (-0.029 standard
deviations), both significant at the 1% level. This result suggests that while there
might be a direct effect of total fertility on parental health outcomes, there seems to
be an additional indirect (negative) effect operating through higher fertility lowering
the educational attainment among children. Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Appendix Ta-
ble D.2 show that in this sample of Chinese households, an additional child lowers
between 0.43 and 0.54 the average years of education of the sibship. The trade-off
between sibship quantity and quality in China has also been shown in Li et al. (2008)
using population census, and in Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) using the Chinese
Child Twins Survey (CCTS). Moreover, the positive correlation between children’s
education and parental health is observed for both sons’ and daughters’ education
(see Appendix Table D.3).
When inspecting the correlation between offspring quantity and parental health
separating the effect by parents’ gender (Appendix Table D.4), we see that the neg-
ative effect of fertility on physical health is more pronounced among the sample of
mothers (column 4), with each additional child lowering by 0.032 standard deviations
the score of the physical health index (significant at the 5% level). On the other hand,
the negative association between fertility and parental cognitive attainment is driven
by the sample of fathers (column 10). Some other interesting observations from
splitting the sample by parents’ gender are that the education gradient in cognitive
achievement is more pronounced among women (column 11) than men (column 9),
and that the rural-urban gap in parental health is almost entirely explained by the gap
between rural and urban women (except for cognitive health, in which rural men also
score lower than their counterparts in urban areas (0.09 standard deviation lower and
significant at the 1% level, column 9). Assessing the relationship between children’s
education and fertility on parental health outcomes through the use of categorical
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instead of continuous variables does not change the discussion of the correlational
results (see Appendix Table D.5).24
3.3 Empirical strategy
Fertility and investments in children are potentially endogenous to the parental health
outcomes considered. Parents decide how many children to have and the level of
investments towards their human capital. This section discusses the strategy to
estimate the causal effect of offspring quantity and children’s education on parental
health outcomes.
3.3.1 Exogenous variation in the number of children
To address the potential endogeneity of parental choice over the desired number of
children, I exploit son preference among Chinese households. In China, as in other
countries in the South and East of Asia, in North Africa, and the Middle East, the
higher role reserved for men in both the family and society makes the preference for
giving birth to boys higher than that of girls. If parents have a predilection for sons
over daughters, and to the extent that the sex of the firstborn child is random, the
occurrence of a female firstborn would create an exogenous shift in the probability of
having another child (with parents hoping to give birth to a son in the next delivery).
I make use of the quasi-randomness in firstborn’s sex assignment (Abrevaya, 2009;
Almond and Edlund, 2008; Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010; Das Gupta, 2005), and
instrument sibship size with the occurrence of a firstborn daughter.
The following equation models the effect of having a female firstborn on total
24Using dummy variables of whether children completed primary education, middle school, high
school, or college instead of using children’s years of education; and dummy variables of whether
parents have two children, three, for, or five or more children instead of using the number of children.
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fertility:
Sh = α + ρGirl
fb
h + ψ
′X + ϕa + µp + εh (3.1)
Where Sh is the sibship size of household h, Girlfbh is a dummy variable that equals
one when the firstborn child is a girl, and X is a vector of characteristics of the parent
interviewed in the fertility history module; consisting of parent’s gender, education
level, parent’s ethnicity, and a dummy for rural household. The equation also includes
parent birth cohort fixed effects (ϕa), province fixed effects (µp), and an error term
(εh).
The results of estimating equation (3.1) are shown in Table 3.4. Families in which
the first child is a girl end up with a sibship size 0.29 larger on average than parents for
whom their firstborn is a boy (Column 1). This result is similar to the one estimated
by Kugler and Kumar (2017) and Jensen (2005) for India, and slightly higher than the
one estimated by J. Lee (2008) for South Korea.25 Moreover, the preference for sons
among Chinese parents seems not to significantly differ by parental characteristics,
as the interaction of having a female firstborn with parental education (Column 2);
with rural location (Column 3); and with parents from older cohorts (Column 4), are
all statistically insignificant.
As in previous research, I assume that there is no parental sex-selection for first
births (Abrevaya, 2009; Almond and Edlund, 2008; Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010;
Das Gupta, 2005). Appendix Table D.6 shows estimates of an OLS regression that
predicts the occurrence of a female firstborn with different parental characteristics.
The only variable statistically associated with female firstborn occurrence is belonging
to Han ethnicity (at the 10% level). All other variables are statistically insignificant,
25Kugler and Kumar (2017) estimate that completed fertility increases by 0.22 when the firstborn
is a girl, the estimate is of 0.47 in Jensen (2005), and of 0.18 in J. Lee (2008). Similarly, Guodong
and Xiaoyan (2009) find that at least one boy between the first two children lowers total fertility by
0.29 children in the Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS).
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and the model explains almost none of the variation in sex of the firstborn. Moreover,
to rule out concerns about sex of firstborn affecting parental health in later life other
than through an increase in offspring quantity, Appendix Table D.7 shows the results
of a regression in which parental health is regressed against the sex of the firstborn
child controlling for the number of children. The results show that giving birth to
a girl in the first delivery does not have any statistically significant direct effect on
parental health among fathers (Panel B), nor mothers (Panel C). This result is in
favor of the assumption being made that the sex of the firstborn child only affects
parents’ later life health through its effect on total fertility.26
3.3.2 Exogenous variation in children’s education
To address the potential endogeneity of offspring quality, I make use of the imple-
mentation of China’s national compulsory schooling law of 1986. The new regulation
increased the minimum schooling period from 6 to 9 years (Ming, 1986; Pepper,
1990). Under the new law, all children were required to attend school until the age
of 14. Therefore, children aged 15 or older at the time of the law becoming effective
in their province of residence were never affected by the new regulation and they
are used as a control group in the analysis. Moreover, the introduction of the new
extended minimum schooling period was staggered across the territory (see Figure
3.2). Figure 3.3 displays the evolution of the average years of children’s completed
education as a function of their cohort of birth and province of residence, centered
around the implementation date (vertical solid red line).
Period 1 on the x-axis displays the level of education attained by those children
aged 14 in the first year of the newly introduced minimum compulsory schooling.
Period 2 shows the average education of children that were aged 13, and so on.
26At least in the short-run, however, there is evidence that Chinese mothers spend longer time
outside of the labor market, and that household cigarette consumption reduces more significatively,
following the birth of a son instead of a daughter (Wang, 2019).
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Similarly, period 0 reflects the average years of education of those children that missed
by one year being affected by the education reform (aged 15 at the introduction
date). While the figure shows there is no discontinuity in the level of education
achieved among boys around the cut-off (whose educational attainment on average
was already close to 9 years), there is a clear jump in the completed years of education
among girls (for whom the education level was more than two years below the new
compulsory minimum). Figure 3.4 displays the coefficient estimates of the size and
significance of the discontinuity, net of birth cohort and province effects, and depicts a
similar picture. All in all, the schooling reform initiated the convergence of daughter’s
education towards that of sons.
I assess the effect of extending the minimum compulsory schooling on children’s
education by estimating the following equation:
Eicp = α + βTreatcp + σ
′Z + θc + µp + εi (3.2)
Where Eicp are the completed years of education of child i, belonging to cohort c,
and born in province p, Treatcp is a dummy equal to one if the child was affected by
the introduction of the schooling reform and is a function of the child’s birth cohort
and province of birth, Z is a vector of characteristics of the parent responding to
the fertility questionnaire and child characteristics that include parent’s education
level, parent’s ethnicity and gender, dummies of offspring quantity, and a dummy for
whether the child was born in a rural area. Child cohort fixed effects are depicted
by θc, province fixed effects by µp, and εi is the error term. In line with the figures
discussed above, Table 3.5 shows that while the introduction of the extended mini-
mum compulsory schooling did not affect schooling attainment among sons (column
4), it increased by 0.63 years the education level among daughters (significant at the
5% level, column 6).
As explained below in more detail, I will exploit the differential effect of the edu-
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cation reform by children’s gender to argue in favor of the causality of my estimates
of the effect of extending the minimum compulsory schooling on long-term parental
health.
3.3.3 Causal effect of fertility and children’s education on
parental outcomes
To estimate the causal effect of children’s education on parental health in later life I
estimate the following reduced form equation for sons and daughters separately:
yj = α + βTreaticp + Φ
′M + ϕa + θc + µp + εi (3.3)
Where yj are the long-term health indices in physical, mental, and cognitive health
of parent j, Treaticp is a dummy variable that equals one for those children of parent
j affected by the school reform, M is a vector of parent and child characteristics that
include the education level of the parent, whether married, the parent’s gender and
ethnicity, and a dummy variable for rural area. ϕa are parent cohort fixed effects,
θc are children cohort fixed effects, µp are province fixed effects, and εi is the error
term. As the extended minimum compulsory schooling only affected the education
level among daughters, I use the sample of sons as a placebo group for the effect
of the education reform on parental health outcomes. Moreover, I will also discuss
the results obtained from a two-stage instrumental variable regression of the effect of
daughters’ education on parental long-term health using the schooling reform as the
instrument.
To evaluate the effect of fertility on long-term parental health outcomes I first
estimate a similar reduced form equation using the occurrence of a female firstborn:
yj = γ0 + γ1Girl
fb
j + Ω
′J + ϕa + µp + εj (3.4)
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In equation (3.4), yj denotes the different constructed measures of parental health
(physical, mental, and cognitive health) of parent j, and Girlfbj denotes whether the
firstborn child of parent j is a girl. Similar to the notation previously described, ϕa
depict parent cohort fixed effects, µp are province fixed effects, and εj are the error
terms. Moreover, J is a vector of characteristics that include the parent’s education
level, gender, marital status and ethnicity, and a dummy for rural area. Given the
preference for sons among Chinese households (Table 3.4), the assumption of quasi-
randomness in sex of firstborn (Appendix Table D.6), and the null direct effect of
sex of firstborn on parental health (Appendix Table D.7), the coefficient estimate on
Girlfbj will show the effect of an increase in desired fertility on parental long-term
health due to the occurrence of a female firstborn. I will also discuss the results
of a two-stage instrumental variable regression of the effect of offspring quantity
on parental health outcomes when using the incidence of a female firstborn as the
instrument.
3.4 Results
The results of estimating equation (3.3) are shown in Table 3.6. Panel A displays
the effect of the reform-induced increase in daughters’ education on parental health
outcomes. We see that while the increase in education among daughters does not have
any statistically significant effect on long-term parental physical health (Column 2),
nor on mental health (Column 4), the extended minimum schooling period increased
by 0.16 standard deviations parental cognition, significant at the 5% level (Column
6). This estimate is equivalent to 29% of the cognitive premium from primary school
completion (see Column 5 of Table 3.3).
Given that the school reform did not increase educational attainment among sons,
we should not expect to see any impact of the reform on parental health arising from
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treated sons. Panel B of Table 3.6 shows the results of a placebo test of the effect
of the education reform on parental health arising from exposed or treated sons.
Reassuringly, the results confirm the hypothesis of no effects.
In Table 3.7 I show the results of estimating equation (3.3) splitting the sample by
parents’ gender. We see that the observed increase in parental cognition arising from
treated daughters is driven by the sample of mothers (0.21 standard deviations and
significant at the 5%, column 6). The estimated coefficient of the effect on fathers,
although positive, is no longer significant.27 The difference in the estimated effect
across parents’ gender might be explained by the marked gender gap in the cognitive
health score, which favors fathers (see Figure 3.1), or it may arise from the greater
interaction of mothers with children and, especially daughters. Moreover, we can
now see that the reform-induced increase in daughters’ education improved mothers’
physical health by 0.14 standard deviations (Column 2), an effect equivalent to two-
thirds of the gender gap in physical health (see Column 1 of Table 3.3). In Column 1
of Table 3.7 we see that, although not statistically significant, there is a negative and
sizeable relationship between daughters’ exposed to the school reform and fathers’
physical health (-0.109 standard deviations).
Appendix Table D.8 shows the results of estimating the effect of daughters’ edu-
cation on parental health in a two-stage instrumental variable regression using the
exposure to the schooling reform as the instrument. The finding that higher educa-
tion among daughters is beneficial for mothers’ physical and cognitive health persists
(Panel C). While the magnitude of the effects is consistent with the one estimated
using a reduced form equation (Tables 3.6 and 3.7), the coefficients are slightly less
precisely estimated. Moreover, when splitting the sample by parent’s gender (Panel B
and Panel C), the F-statistic of the excluded instrument test in the first-stage reduces
considerably in size (drops below the rule of thumb of 10 in all specifications).
27However, it is not statistically different than the one estimated for mothers.
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The results of estimating equation (3.4) showing the effect of a firstborn daughter on
parental health outcomes are shown in Table 3.8. Columns 1, 3, and 5, do not control
for the average years of children’s education, while Columns 2, 4, and 6, do. This
distinction is made to account for the potential effect that higher fertility, induced
by a female firstborn, might have on the educational attainment of children. Panel A
displays the results when pooling all parents together and shows that the occurrence
of a female firstborn does not have any statistically significant effect on long-term
parental health regardless of the specification used. The estimated magnitude of the
effect is similar across the different specifications and tends to be close to zero. The
same can be said when splitting the sample by parents’ gender, Panels B (fathers),
and C (mothers).
A null effect of total fertility on long-term parental outcomes is also documented in
Appendix Table D.9 using a two-stage instrumental variable regression in which total
fertility is instrumented with the incidence of a female firstborn. A common pattern
observed is that the specification that controls for children’s education produces more
positive effects on parental health than the specification that does not condition on
children’s education. For instance, while an additional child improves fathers’ physi-
cal health by 0.047 standard deviations conditional on offspring’s education (Panel B,
Column 1), this magnitude reduces to 0.033 when accounting for the possibility that
higher fertility reduces average educational investments in children (Panel B, Column
2). The same can be said for all other outcomes and the sample of mothers (Panel
C). Moreover, there is a consistently negative relationship between higher fertility
and mental health for both fathers and mothers (columns 3 and 4). However, while
higher fertility is also associated with lower physical and cognitive health among the
sample of mothers when children’s education is not controlled for (columns 2 and
6 of Panel C), the relationship between offspring quantity and fathers’ physical and
cognitive health is positive (columns 2 and 6 of Panel B). Nevertheless, the estimated
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coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero. The F-statistic of
the excluded instrument test in the first-stage is high, with values ranging from 79
to 183.
In Appendix E, I discuss the strategy and the results of estimating the causal
effect of both the number of children and children’s education on parental health
at once. While doing so requires some adjustments in the estimation specification
due to the extension in the minimum compulsory schooling only affecting daughters,
results confirm a null effect of fertility on parental long-term health, and an increase in
mothers’ cognition arising from the higher educational attainment of their daughters.
Two important implications arise from the findings. The first concerns the imple-
mentation of policies to foster education among children, including the expansion of
minimum compulsory schooling. The results provide support for policies promoting
higher education among girls as a means to reduce gender gaps, and suggest under-
estimated impacts of educational programs targeting girls as studies typically fail to
account for the positive externalities accruing to their mothers. The second involves
the effect of fertility levels on parental long-term outcomes. While this study shows
a null direct effect of offspring quantity on parental health in later life in a context
where social protection of the elderly is limited, higher fertility could be detrimen-
tal to parents in the long run to the extent that it hampers children’s quality. This
study does not fully address the complexity of parental returns to fertility and invest-
ment decision in children – this involves more complex considerations regarding the
optimal distribution of total resources over children, the non-linearity of returns to
quality, and the minimum investment levels in quality that offset the shadow price of
quantity. Nonetheless, my results show that parents (mothers) obtained higher long-
term health returns from offspring quality (daughters’ quality) than from children
quantity.
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3.5 Robustness and other considerations
This section reviews the strategy implemented and provides additional evidence to
validate the estimated results.
Different specifications
I conduct a series of robustness tests to probe the sensitivity of the results to changes
in the estimated specification. Appendix Table D.10 examines robustness of the
results of the effect of the schooling reform on parental health. The first four columns
show estimates of the effect on parental physical health. Column 1 (Trends), includes
province-specific time trends of both child and parent birth cohorts. This specification
accounts for trends in parental health outcomes and children’s education not captured
by birth cohort and province fixed effects. Column 2 (OCP), includes province-year
measures of the intensity of the enforcement of the One Child Policy measured by
fines, bonuses, and premium punishments of excess fertility obtained from Ebenstein
(2010). This specification captures potential behavioral effects of the introduction of
the OCP on fertility choices among parents that were still of fertile age.28 In column
3 (Village FE), I replace province fixed effects with village fixed effects. Finally,
column 4 (Wealth) includes measures of household wealth in the regressions.29 The
estimates show that the positive effect on maternal physical health from increased
schooling among daughters (columns 1 to 4 of Panel B) and on maternal cognitive
attainment (columns 9 to 12 of Panel B) are robust to all specification changes. So is
the null effect on parental health arising from sons affected by the education reform
(Panels C and D).
28The birth cohorts of the children in my sample range between 1922 and 1990. The One Child
Policy was first introduced in 1979/1980.
29Household wealth is measured in the current period (as it is not known at the time of fertility
and investment decisions in children). The household wealth variables are: whether the building is
made of concrete, whether there is running water inside the residence, the existence of in-house bath
or shower facilities, of a telephone connection, availability of coal gas or natural gas, and whether
the main source of cooking fuel is coal, crop residue, or wood.
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Appendix Table D.11 shows the reduced form effect of a female firstborn on parental
health implementing the same specification changes as in Table D.10. The previously
estimated null effect of fertility on parental later life health is maintained, with coef-
ficient estimates gravitating around zero across the different specifications.
Alternative methods to construct indices
In Appendix Table D.12 I assess the effect of the education reform on parental health
using alternative methods to construct the health indices. The results displayed in
the column header “PCA” are estimated using parental health indices obtained using
a principal component variable (PCA). In the column header “SEM”, the indices
are estimated using a latent variable indicator constructed from structural equation
modeling. Both indices use the same set of health variables as index components.30 As
can be seen in Panel B of Table D.12, independent of the method used to construct
the indices, the results show a significant and positive effect on maternal physical
health and cognitive attainment arising from daughters affected by the education
reform. The magnitude of the effects, although slightly smaller, are very similar to
the ones estimated using Inverse Covariance Weighting (Table 3.7). The estimated
null effect of having a female firstborn (increase in desired fertility) on parental health
is also insensitive to the use of alternative methods to construct the health indices
(see Appendix Table D.13).
Parents with missing health outcomes
Although the data are rich in the number of variables available to measure different
later life health outcomes, the presence of missing values is substantially large. As
a result, the constructed indices of parental physical, mental, and cognitive health
30See Appendix Table D.1 for a detailed list of the health components used to construct the
indices.
3.5. Robustness and other considerations 179
outcomes are missing for a significant share of survey respondents (ranging from 14%
to 23%). In Appendix Table D.14 I assess whether child exposure to the education
reform or the sex of the firstborn child predict a missing value in the parental health
index. If this were the case, there would be a problem of sample selection. Results
show that both the school reform treatment and the sex of the firstborn are orthogonal
to the probability of not observing the health of a parent due to missing values in
the index components.
Data validation
In the main analysis, I show the effect of the extension in the minimum compulsory
schooling on children’s education using information from the fertility histories in
CHARLS. Using an independent dataset (China Family Panel Studies), I can validate
the estimated effect with information provided by adults that were of school-age
at the time of the reform (instead of recall information from parents). The China
Family Panel Studies (CFPS), as the CHARLS survey, is a longitudinal and nationally
representative sample of Chinese families and individuals (Xie and Hu, 2014). The
results of estimating an OLS regression of the effect of being exposed to the education
reform on the years of completed education are reported in Appendix Table D.15.
These results confirm the previously estimated increase in the educational attainment
of girls (columns 3 and 6), and the statistically insignificant impact it had among the
sample of boys (columns 2 and 5). The estimated increase in the schooling of girls
using the CFPS dataset is 0.75 years and significant at the 1% level, slightly larger
than the magnitude estimated using the fertility histories from CHARLS (0.63 years).
The One Child Policy as an instrument for family size
Another potential instrument for family size could be the One Child Policy (OCP).
Implemented in China towards the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, it sought
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to reduce its population size by limiting the number of children families could have.
The policy was gradually implemented and had to overcome resistance by parents
(Scharping, 2013). It also introduced some exceptions for ethnic groups, and some
changes were implemented in the mid 1980’s to allow for a second child in rural areas
when the firstborn child was a girl (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, 1988; Qian,
1997). However, Appendix Figure D.1 shows that completed fertility across cohorts
of Chinese women had already been decreasing well before the implementation of the
OCP (as also shown in Almond et al., 2019). While total fertility of the women in my
sample born before 1937 was above four children, for women born between 1955 and
1965 (aged between 14 and 24 years of age at the OCP implementation) completed
fertility remained stable at around two children.31 Moreover, Appendix Figure D.2
shows that the percentage of families with only one child had been increasing for ten
years before the implementation of the OCP. In 1985 (6 years after the introduction
of the OCP), the probability of being an only child in the cohort was around 30%,
well below the scenario of a single child.32 Moreover, no clear discontinuity in the
probability of being an only child around the policy implementation date is observed
(vertical red lines).33 Appendix Figure D.2 also shows that although the only child
incidence had been increasing for both boys and girls in the years prior to the OCP,
this was more accentuated among boys during the whole study period. This suggests
that, in line with the preferred instrument, parents whose firstborn was a girl were
more likely to have a second child, both before and after the introduction of the OCP.
31The birth cohort of mothers in my sample range from 1911 to 1968.
32The figure is weighted by the inverse of the number of siblings in the family so that all siblings
sum as one observation. Otherwise, multiple-children families would drive down the incidence of
“only child” in the cohort.




Finding the causal mechanism relating higher human capital among children and
improvements in parental health in later life is not straightforward. For instance,
although one can hypothesize that the increased schooling among daughters created
upward cognitive spillovers to mothers either through direct teaching (to read and
write for instance) or through more interactions with higher educated individuals,
in practice, it is hard to prove. On the other hand, an improvement in daughters’
education could have positively affected mothers’ physical health either from better
knowledge about the production function of health or through additional availability
of economic resources. In what follows, I investigate possible explanations of the
effect of the school reform on long-term parental health outcomes.
Children’s labor market experience
In Figure 3.5 I inspect the effect of extending the minimum compulsory schooling on
two labor market indicators: a) labor market participation, and b) occupation type.
The hypothesis is that better outcomes of children in the labor market would pre-
sumably benefit their parents through additional economic resources. The estimated
effect of the education reform on daughters is displayed in the left-side and in red. In
blue and on the right side of the figure is the estimated effect for boys (the placebo
group). The figure shows a rather small and insignificant effect of the extension of
the minimum compulsory schooling on daughters’ labor market participation (which
was already high, see Table 3.2) of 2.2 pp. However, the reform had a statistically
and significant impact on their occupation type. More pronounced is the increase in
the share of females working in clerical occupations (3.8 pp or 54%, significant at the
1% level). While not statistically significant, the increase in the share of daughters
working in clerical occupations would mostly come from a reduction of 1.9 pp in the
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share of girls working in agriculture (the sector that employs most of the daughters
(45%), see Table 3.2). Therefore, a first potential explanation of the improvement
in physical and cognitive health of mothers could be due to the direct effect of in-
creased schooling and improved labor market experiences among their daughters. As
expected, the education reform did not affect labor market outcomes among sons.
Support given to parents
To investigate the mechanism through which daughter’s education benefits their par-
ents I also examine whether the extension in the minimum compulsory schooling
affected the support received by parents either financially, through child-parent con-
tact, or some other form of functional help. This information is obtained from the
fertility history module, and therefore there is only one record per child and household
(i.e., information on support from children is not available for mothers and fathers
separately). Figure 3.5 shows that the education reform increased by 10 pp the prob-
ability that parents expect to receive future financial help from a treated daughter
(significant at the 5% level). However, there is no effect on current net monetary
transfers received (neither total nor regular).34 Although not statistically significant,
parents are less likely to have regular contact from a treated daughter but more likely
to receive functional help in case of need. Moreover, there is an estimated positive
but not significant coefficient on the probability of parents relying on children for
functional help in the future when these have been affected by the schooling reform.
However, the functional help measure is imprecise because it is not child-specific, and
therefore cannot be separated by children’s gender.
Overall, the evidence does not point to a mechanism of increased financial resources
from the offspring or an increase in the contact intensity with children in later life.
34Total net transfers refer to the total amount of monetary net transfers received in the past
year, while regular net transfers refer to the amount of the total net transfers that have some level
of periodicity.
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While education might have provided daughters’ with better information on the pro-
duction function of health and therefore the quality of parental contact could have
improved (the mechanism identified in Lundborg and Majlesi (2018) for the effect
of children’s education on parental survival), this explanation remains a hypothesis.
However, it is plausible that the increase in daughters’ schooling would have gener-
ated a pure spillover effect on parents’ cognition and especially on mothers’ cognition
(see the large gender gap in cognition observed in Figure 3.1 favoring fathers).
Sibship size and mechanisms
For consistency, and although the findings show that fertility does not have any causal
impact on parental health, Figure 3.6 shows the effect of a female firstborn on the
same labor market indicators of children and support received by parents introduced
above. The only statistically and significant effect, although very small, is that the
occurrence of a female firstborn influences the total net transfers received by parents
(0.006 standard deviations higher, significant at the 10% level). If evaluated using
a two-stage instrumental variable regression, this increase is estimated to be at 0.02
standard deviations per additional child, significant at the 10% level (not shown).
This result is in line with studies discussing higher fertility in developing countries as
a means to receive financial support during old age (Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977).
Stronger effects among mothers
The increase in daughters’ education shows a stronger impact on maternal health.
This could be explained by a higher preference of daughters for mothers, or as a
consequence of the lower initial levels of human capital among mothers (see Figure
3.1, Table 3.1, and Appendix Table D.1). The summary statistics shown in Table 3.9
offer another potential explanation. The table displays information regarding intra-
family help and caring arrangements. Panel A summarizes information regarding the
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need and identity of the helper/career in activity limitations experienced by parents.
These include limitations in doing household chores, preparing hot meals, shopping,
making telephone calls, and taking medications. The information is provided by
parents’ gender, for all households and for “two-partners households”, separately.35
In line with their lower levels of health, mothers are more likely to be experiencing
activity limitations than fathers (11 pp more likely), but both parents are as likely to
receive help in case of need. However, we can see that while fathers are more likely to
rely on their spouses for help, the share of mothers relying on their children is higher
than that of fathers. In “two-partners households”, mothers are 8 pp more likely to
rely only on their children for help than fathers, while fathers are 8 pp more likely to
rely on their spouse only than mothers.
Because some of the activity limitations listed in Panel A are prone to be gender-
biased, Panel B displays information relating help received with functional limitations
(help with dressing, bathing, eating, getting in and out of bed, and using the toilet)
that are gender-neutral. In “two-partners households”, mothers are 3 pp more likely
to be experiencing a limitation that requires help and 11 pp less likely to receive
help than fathers in case of need. Similarly, as in Panel A, mothers with functional
limitations in “two-partners households” are 11 pp more likely to rely only on children
for help than fathers are, and 7 pp less likely to rely only on their spouse.
Although the table is very descriptive in nature, the information presented suggests
that part of the explanation of the larger effect of daughters’ education on maternal
health is the larger dependence mothers have on their children. In this scenario,
and to the extent that higher education makes children better able to support their
parents in later life, mothers would experience a more direct benefit from investing
35“Two-partners households” are defined as those households in which the respondent is married
and living with the spouse (82.4%), or in cohabitation (0.05%). The remaining respondents are
either widowed (11.5%) or married but not living with the spouse, separated, divorced or never
married (6%). Fathers are more likely to be living in a two-partners household than mothers (88.8%
versus 77.7%), while mothers are more likely to be living without a partner than fathers (22.3%
versus 12.2%).
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in the education of their children.
3.7 Conclusion
This study examines whether parents benefit from their children to better under-
stand fertility decisions and parental investments in children. Differently from previ-
ous studies, which use models of parental utility maximization, I estimate long-term
health returns to offspring quantity and quality. Learning about the returns to fer-
tility choices allows me to evaluate the extent to which poor families, especially in
the developing world, are affected by high fertility and low investments in children.
This differs from previous studies on the intergenerational transmission of poverty,
which do not take into account the extent to which parents are affected by the lower
human capital of their offspring.
Using the higher preference of Chinese households for sons and the quasi-random
assignment of the sex of the firstborn to instrument for sibship size, I find that higher
fertility does not have any direct causal effect on long-term parental health. This
result suggests that policies aiming to reduce fertility levels as a means to increase
investments in children would not harm parents’ health in the long run. On the other
hand, a reform-induced increase in the education level of daughters improved parental
cognitive attainment (especially among mothers), and maternal physical health in
later life. This result documents positive spillovers from increased investments in
girls to reduce gender inequalities, and provide further support towards policies that
target educational investments among girls (such as the “Keeping Girls in School
Act” of 2019, a bill approved by the US to reduce barriers that adolescents girls face
in accessing primary and secondary education in low and middle-income countries).
More generally, this study documents that parents, often a barrier for girls’ schooling
in many countries, could benefit from better-educated daughters.
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The research design of this study takes advantage of the null effect among sons from
the education reform to support the estimated causal effect of daughters’ schooling on
parental health. However, the obvious limitation is the inability to draw conclusions
with respect to the rate of return to investments made on sons versus investments
made on daughters.36 Testing whether aging parents obtain higher benefits from rais-
ing sons over daughters could help rationalize the gender investment gap in children
observed in many countries of the world (something that we still know very little
about) or document a self-fulfilling prophecy, by which parents gain more from sons
simply because they invest more on them (Mocan and Yu, 2017).37,38
On the other hand, daughters are a large source of informal care across the world.
To the extent that education improves caregiving (either through resources or in-
formation), there is scope for higher aging quality for parents with better-educated
daughters. Nevertheless, in this study, I am only able to say that the correlation be-
tween children’s education and parental health is larger for sons than for daughters
(Appendix Table D.3). If we believe that the bias in the estimated effect of children’s
education on long-term parental health outcomes in an OLS regression does not differ
by child’s gender, we would conclude that in China the return to investments made
on daughters is between 70% and 86% of the return to investments made on sons.
Anecdotally, this figure is similar to the estimated gender wage gap in the country
(Xiu and Gunderson, 2013).
36However, there are both economic and cultural returns to raising sons and raising daughters,
and these might be relevant to parents at different levels.
37At least Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) show that in districts of India where women’s expected
employment in the labor market is relatively high, daughters receive a larger share of the family
resources relative to sons.
38Mocan and Yu (2017) find that children born during the dragon year in China (a year though
to bring good fortune and greatness) obtain higher test scores in middle school and are more likely
to complete college education. However, these results are explained by the higher expectations and
investment levels these children receive from their parents. Moreover, they show that the gender
gap in children’s height more than halves for cohorts born during this particular year of the zodiac
calendar. In Table 3.2 of this study, it can also be observed that parents continue to transfer more
resources to their sons than to their daughters during adulthood, with 73% of daughters (versus
63% of sons) providing positive net monetary transfers to their parents in later life.
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To conclude, these results also support the hypothesis that parents obtain infor-
mation through their children, in line with Nakasone and Torero (2016), who show
that a school intervention in Peru providing knowledge on agricultural practices to
children triggered behavioral changes among their parents. The policy implication of
the findings is the potential scope to target difficult to reach individuals through their
children (either in school or in the labor market), and possibly through other easier
to find relatives that they might interact with. These include health information
campaigns, environmental sensitization programs, or the promotion of civic attitudes
and values.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: Aging and parental health outcomes
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Note: Relationship between parents’ age and indices of physical,
mental, and cognitive health using lowess smoothing. See Table
D.1 for a summary of the components integrating each of the
health indices.
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Note: Provincial-level introduction year of the extended mini-
mum compulsory schooling approved in 1986.
Source: Guo et al. (2017).
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Note: Scatterplot of the average years of completed education
among sons and daughters centered around the implementation
year of the extension in the minimum years of compulsory school-
ing (solid vertical red line). Time is expressed as lags and leads
from the implementation year and it is a function of children’s
birth cohort and province of residence. Period 0 reflects the aver-
age years of education of those children that missed by one year
being affected by the education reform.





































Note: Plot of average years of completed education among sons
and daughters netting out children birth cohort and province
fixed effects centered around the implementation year of the ex-
tension in the minimum years of compulsory schooling (solid ver-
tical red line). Time is expressed as lags and leads from the
implementation year and it is a function of children’s birth co-
hort and province of residence. Confidence intervals are set at
the 90% level.
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Daughters Sons
Note: Each of the coefficients shown in the figure is estimated in a separate OLS regression
of the effect of the extension in the minimum compulsory schooling on labor marker
indicators of children and on support given to their parents. Sample of respondents to the
fertility histories. The dependent variables (except for Functional Help) are measured at
the child level. Functional Help is measured at the sibhsip level. The regressions control
for the education (5 categories) and sex of the parent responding to the the fertility
questionnaire, a dummy variable for belonging to the Han ethnicity, a dummy variable
for living in a rural area, child and parent cohort fixed effects, and province fixed effects.
Regular contact is defined as seeing or having contact with the child at least once per
week. Tot. net transfers (SD) refer to the total standardized amount of net monetary
transfers received from the child, while Reg. net transfers (SD) refer to the fraction of the
total net transfers that have some level of periodicity. Standard errors are clustered at
the child cohort-province level in the children labor market participation and occupation
regressions, and at the parent cohort-province level in the regressions of support received
by parents. Confidence intervals are displayed at the 95% confidence level.
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Note: Each of the coefficients shown in the figure is estimated in a separate OLS regression
of the effect of having a female firstborn on labor marker indicators of children and on
support given to their parents. Sample of respondents to the fertility histories. The
dependent variables Ever Worked and Occupation type are measured at the child level.
The dependent variables of support to parents are measured at the sibhip level. The
regressions control for the education (5 categories) and sex of the parent responding to
the the fertility questionnaire, a dummy variable for belonging to Han ethnicity, a dummy
variable for living in a rural area, parent cohort fixed effects, and province fixed effects.
Regular contact is defined as seeing or having contact with at least one of their children
at least once per week. Tot. net transfers (SD) refer to the total standardized amount
of net monetary transfers received from children, while Reg. net transfers (SD) refer to
the fraction of the total net transfers that have some level of periodicity. Standard errors
are clustered at the child cohort-province level in the children labor market participation
and occupation regressions, and at the parent cohort-province level in the regressions of




Table 3.1: Summary statistics of parents
Fathers Mothers
Mean SD Mean SD
Years of education 6.06 4.63 3.38 4.44
Primary completed 0.70 0.46 0.40 0.49
Middle school completed 0.42 0.49 0.23 0.42
Age 62.07 9.12 61.48 10.02
Birth Year 1950.93 9.12 1951.52 10.02
Education (categorical)
No Education 0.12 0.33 0.42 0.49
Incomplete primary 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38
Primary school 0.27 0.45 0.17 0.38
Middle School 0.26 0.44 0.15 0.35
High School or more 0.17 0.38 0.08 0.28
Fertility
Sibship size 2.55 1.29 2.71 1.40
Single child 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39
Two children 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.47
Three children 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Four children 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34
Five or more children 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.32
Share of boys in sibship 0.56 0.33 0.56 0.33
Firstborn female 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50
Financial old-age support
Children 0.59 0.49 0.67 0.47
Savings 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18
Pension/Retirement Salary 0.33 0.47 0.26 0.44
Other 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19
Other support
Regular contact with children 0.78 0.41 0.80 0.40
Has functional limitation 0.25 0.43 0.37 0.48
- Received help 0.83 0.38 0.79 0.41
Expects care from children 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.46
Observations 5,756 6,465
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of children
Sons Daughters
Mean SD Mean SD
Years of education 9.21 3.77 8.05 4.50
Primary completed 0.89 0.31 0.78 0.41
Middle school completed 0.66 0.47 0.54 0.50
Ever worked 0.97 0.16 0.94 0.23
Age 38.13 9.66 38.62 9.48
Birht Year 1974.87 9.66 1974.38 9.49
Education (categorical)
No Education 0.11 0.31 0.22 0.41
Primary school 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.42
Middle school 0.37 0.48 0.30 0.46
High School 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.34
College 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31
Occupation
Managerial 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.22
Professional 0.21 0.41 0.10 0.31
Clerical 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25
Services 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47
Agriculture 0.36 0.48 0.45 0.50
Residency
Parental household 0.35 0.48 0.10 0.30
Parental village 0.29 0.46 0.18 0.39
Parental district 0.13 0.33 0.47 0.50
Other 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43
Support to parents
Financial (parent expectation) 0.62 0.49 0.39 0.49
Positive net transfers 0.63 0.48 0.73 0.44
Regular contact with parents 0.62 0.48 0.55 0.50
Observations 10,369 8,753
3.9. Tables 195
Table 3.3: Variation in parental health indicators
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incomplete primary 0.011 0.023 −0.051 −0.035 0.351*** 0.360***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Primary school 0.057** 0.079*** 0.061* 0.094*** 0.540*** 0.561***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Middle School 0.108*** 0.144*** 0.117*** 0.170*** 0.664*** 0.707***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
High School or more 0.175*** 0.230*** 0.179*** 0.261*** 0.816*** 0.880***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.042) (0.040) (0.036) (0.035)
Married 0.028 0.031 0.214*** 0.228*** 0.041 0.058*
(0.033) (0.032) (0.040) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034)
Female −0.208*** −0.198*** −0.230*** −0.213*** −0.188*** −0.172***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Han Ethnicity 0.012 0.014 −0.052 −0.049 0.037 0.036
(0.038) (0.038) (0.047) (0.048) (0.043) (0.044)
Rural −0.061*** −0.084*** −0.094*** −0.127*** −0.128*** −0.155***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
Children’s education (years) 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Number of children −0.019* −0.027*** −0.004 −0.016 −0.016 −0.029***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,164 27,678 26,152 26,636 23,895 24,367
R2 0.129 0.125 0.088 0.082 0.261 0.256
Note: The table shows results from OLS regressions of associations between indices of parental physical, men-
tal, and cognitive health, and characteristics of parents and their children. See Table D.1 for a summary of
the components integrating each of the health indices.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-province level in
parentheses.
196 Chapter 3. From Daughters to Mothers
Table 3.4: Effect of a firstborn girl on completed fertility
Total Fertility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FirstChildGirl 0.293*** 0.291*** 0.241*** 0.284***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.043) (0.029)
FirstChildGirl X LowEduc 0.004
(0.057)
FirstChildGirl X Rural 0.084
(0.056)
FirstChildGirl X OlderCohort 0.017
(0.059)
Incomplete primary −0.078 −0.078 −0.078 −0.078
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Primary school −0.116** −0.114** −0.116** −0.116**
(0.047) (0.053) (0.047) (0.047)
Middle School −0.185*** −0.183*** −0.185*** −0.185***
(0.047) (0.053) (0.047) (0.047)
High School or more −0.343*** −0.342*** −0.343*** −0.344***
(0.052) (0.058) (0.052) (0.052)
Han Ethnicity −0.238*** −0.238*** −0.236*** −0.238***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Rural 0.459*** 0.459*** 0.420*** 0.459***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.043) (0.034)
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,087 7,087 7,087 7,087
R2 0.445 0.445 0.445 0.445
Note: The table shows results from OLS regressions on the effect of a firsborn girl
on total fertility (dependent variable). FirstChildGirl is a binary variable that is
equal to 1 when the firstborn child is a girl. Low education is defined as having
no education or not having completed primary school. Older cohort is defined as
being older than the sample median (63 years old). There is one observation per
household and the regressions control for the sex of the respondent to the fertility
history module.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent
cohort-province level in parentheses.
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Table 3.5: Effect of extended compulsory schooling on years of education
All Sons Daughters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.289 0.343** −0.091 0.097 0.845*** 0.628**
(0.186) (0.173) (0.209) (0.196) (0.308) (0.284)
Daughter −1.029***−0.937***
(0.064) (0.059)
Incomplete primary 0.526*** 0.510*** 0.524***
(0.073) (0.092) (0.117)
Primary school 1.344*** 1.211*** 1.513***
(0.075) (0.092) (0.118)
Middle School 2.244*** 2.089*** 2.482***
(0.089) (0.111) (0.135)
High School or more 3.666*** 3.413*** 3.953***
(0.110) (0.146) (0.158)
Two children −0.612*** −0.776*** −0.543***
(0.100) (0.124) (0.164)
Three children −1.131*** −1.240*** −1.148***
(0.110) (0.141) (0.172)
Four children −1.577*** −1.449*** −1.839***
(0.120) (0.151) (0.184)
Five or more children −2.176*** −1.844*** −2.605***
(0.124) (0.158) (0.193)
Han Ethnicity 0.441*** 0.367** 0.471**
(0.140) (0.167) (0.208)
Rural −1.565*** −1.132*** −2.045***
(0.062) (0.077) (0.095)
Child Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,037 18,957 10,334 10,292 8,703 8,665
R2 0.176 0.322 0.124 0.251 0.217 0.396
Note: The table shows results from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable
is child’s education and the independent variable Treated is a binary variable equal
to 1 if the child was affected by the extension in the minimum compulsory schooling.
All regressions control for the sex of the respondent to the fertility histories.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the child
cohort-province level in parentheses.
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Table 3.6: Children’s education and parental outcomes
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Daughters
Treated 0.036 0.025 −0.010 −0.017 0.191*** 0.162**
(0.051) (0.050) (0.070) (0.069) (0.071) (0.063)
Observations 12,750 12,705 12,269 12,224 11,178 11,148
R2 0.078 0.111 0.036 0.075 0.110 0.250
Panel B: Sons
Treated 0.017 0.021 0.030 0.040 −0.069 −0.033
(0.048) (0.047) (0.070) (0.068) (0.055) (0.050)
Observations 15,018 14,970 14,446 14,408 13,238 13,215
R2 0.091 0.123 0.041 0.083 0.104 0.244
Panel C: All
Treated 0.012 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.057 0.056
(0.033) (0.032) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.042)
Observations 27,771 27,675 26,719 26,632 24,420 24,363
R2 0.092 0.124 0.042 0.082 0.116 0.255
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: OLS regression estimates where the dependent variables are indices of parental physical, mental,
and cognitive health. See Table D.1 for a summary of the components integrating each of the health
indices. The independent variable Treated is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the child was affected
by the extension in the minimum compulsory schooling. Controls include parent’s education (5 cate-
gories), marital status, parent’s gender, a dummy for Han ethnicity, and a dummy for rural area. Panel
A: Sample of all parents and daughters. Panel B: Sample of all parents and sons. Panel C: Sample of
all children and parents.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-province
level in parentheses.
Table 3.7: Children’s education and parental outcomes: Fathers vs Mothers
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fathers Mothers Fathers Mothers Fathers Mothers
Panel A: Daughters
Treated −0.109 0.144** 0.010 −0.047 0.118 0.210**
(0.083) (0.063) (0.103) (0.094) (0.076) (0.089)
Observations 5,941 6,764 5,770 6,454 5,559 5,589
R2 0.099 0.101 0.072 0.061 0.193 0.258
Panel B: Sons
Treated 0.086 −0.043 −0.008 0.088 −0.069 0.018
(0.072) (0.062) (0.084) (0.103) (0.069) (0.073)
Observations 6,932 8,038 6,767 7,641 6,487 6,728
R2 0.107 0.115 0.067 0.078 0.176 0.265
Panel C: All
Treated −0.012 0.027 −0.035 0.044 0.019 0.106*
(0.045) (0.043) (0.060) (0.072) (0.056) (0.055)
Observations 12,873 14,802 12,537 14,095 12,046 12,317
R2 0.107 0.119 0.073 0.076 0.195 0.276
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: OLS regression estimates where the dependent variables are indices of parental physical, mental,
and cognitive health. See Table D.1 for a summary of the components integrating each of the health
indices. The independent variable Treated is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the child was affected
by the extension in the minimum compulsory schooling. Controls include parent’s education (5 cate-
gories), marital status, a dummy for Han ethnicity, and a dummy for rural area. Panel A: Sample of
daughters and their respective parent as displayed in the column header. Panel B: Sample of sons and
their respective parent as displayed in the column header. Panel C: Sample of all children and their
respective parent as displayed in the column header.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-province
level in parentheses.
3.9. Tables 199
Table 3.8: Fertility and parental outcomes
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All
Firstborn female 0.009 0.013 −0.005 −0.001 0.000 0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 10,564 10,469 10,281 10,187 9,568 9,472
R2 0.117 0.121 0.076 0.084 0.250 0.258
Panel B: Fathers
Firstborn female 0.010 0.014 −0.006 −0.003 0.007 0.011
(0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 5,013 4,967 4,912 4,867 4,745 4,699
R2 0.097 0.101 0.061 0.069 0.186 0.202
Panel C: Mothers
Firstborn female −0.000 0.004 −0.007 −0.003 −0.011 −0.010
(0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.026)
Observations 5,551 5,502 5,369 5,320 4,823 4,773
R2 0.106 0.111 0.065 0.072 0.266 0.269
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Children’s education No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: The table shows OLS estimates of the effect of having a firstborn girl on indices of parental
physical, mental, and cognitive health. See Table D.1 for a summary of the components integrat-
ing each of the health indices. Controls include parent’s education (5 categories), marital status,
a dummy variable for belonging to Han ethnicity, and a dummy variable for living in a rural area.
Panel A: Sample of all parents (regressions control for the sex of the parent). Panel B: Sample of
fathers. Panel C: Sample of mothers.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-province
level in parentheses.
Table 3.9: Help and caring arrangements
All households Two-partners households
Fathers Mothers Difference Fathers Mothers Difference
Panel A: Activity Limitations
Has some limitation 0.19 0.29 0.11*** 0.18 0.25 0.07***
- Receives help 0.75 0.78 0.03 0.76 0.77 0.02
Helper/Carer Identity
Spouse only 0.67 0.47 −0.20*** 0.79 0.71 −0.08***
Child only 0.22 0.43 0.21*** 0.12 0.20 0.08***
Other relatives only 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00
Spouse and children 0.05 0.03 −0.01 0.05 0.05 −0.00
Other 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00
Observations 5,728 6,432 5,026 4,989
Panel B: Functional Limitations
Has some limitation 0.16 0.21 0.05*** 0.15 0.18 0.03***
- Receives help 0.37 0.31 −0.07** 0.39 0.28 −0.11***
Helper/Carer Identity
Spouse only 0.71 0.43 −0.28*** 0.80 0.73 −0.07
Child only 0.16 0.49 0.33*** 0.07 0.17 0.11***
Other relatives only 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01
Spouse and children 0.09 0.04 −0.06** 0.11 0.06 −0.04
Other 0.02 0.01 −0.00 0.02 0.01 −0.01
Observations 5,728 6,432 5,026 4,989
Note: The table displays information regarding parental limitations and intra-family help and caring ar-
rangements. In Panel A, Activity Limitations consist of limitations doing household chores, preparing
hot meals, shopping, making telephone calls, and taking medications. In Panel B, Functional Limita-
tions consist of limitations in dressing, bathing, eating, getting in and out of bed, and using the toilet.
Two-partners households are defined as those households in which the respondent is married and liv-
ing with the spouse, or in cohabitation; as opposed to being widowed, married but not living with the
spouse, separated, divorced, or never married.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Note: Evolution of completed fertility by mothers’ birth cohort.

















Note: Evolution in the probability of being an only child by
child’s birth cohort. Observations are weighted by the inverse of
the number of siblings in the family so that all siblings sum as
one observation. Solid red vertical lines marks the introduction
of the One Child Policy. Two vertical red lines are displayed to
account for the time lapse between time of conception and birth.
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Table D.1: Summary statistics of health components
Fathers Mothers
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Physical health
Functional limitations
Jogging 2.88 1.37 1 4 2.34 1.41 1 4
Walking 1km 3.73 0.78 1 4 3.53 0.99 1 4
Walking 100 meters 3.89 0.51 1 4 3.82 0.63 1 4
Standing up 3.73 0.56 1 4 3.60 0.62 1 4
Climbing stairs 3.42 0.96 1 4 3.11 1.10 1 4
Stooping/Kneeling/Crouching 3.55 0.84 1 4 3.35 0.98 1 4
Reaching above shoulder level 3.80 0.69 1 4 3.73 0.78 1 4
Lifting weight 3.80 0.70 1 4 3.55 1.00 1 4
Picking up small coin 3.92 0.44 1 4 3.90 0.49 1 4
Self-assessed health 2.72 1.01 1 5 2.58 1.00 1 5
Mental Health
CES-D-10
Bothered 3.41 0.93 1 4 3.13 1.08 1 4
Focused on task at hand 3.38 0.97 1 4 3.19 1.07 1 4
Depressed 3.41 0.90 1 4 3.15 1.06 1 4
Effortful 3.31 1.04 1 4 3.12 1.13 1 4
Fearful 3.84 0.56 1 4 3.66 0.79 1 4
Sleep restless 3.15 1.14 1 4 2.79 1.22 1 4
Lonely 3.67 0.77 1 4 3.51 0.93 1 4
Cannot get on 3.81 0.61 1 4 3.67 0.80 1 4
Happy 2.66 1.23 1 4 2.60 1.22 1 4
Hopeful 2.46 1.29 1 4 2.41 1.28 1 4
Life satisfaction 3.16 0.69 1 5 3.12 0.77 1 5
Cognitive Health
Mathematical operation 0.98 0.15 0 1 0.93 0.25 0 1
Drawing 0.75 0.43 0 1 0.53 0.50 0 1
Self-assessed memory 2.03 0.88 1 5 1.82 0.82 1 5
Total words recall 3.20 1.94 0 10 3.05 2.06 0 10
Observations 5,716 6,414
Note: All outcome values are adjusted so that a higher value represents a better score
in the health component evaluated. CES-D-10 stands for Center for Epidemiologic
Studies Depression Scale - 10 items Andresen et al. (1994).
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Table D.2: Quality-Quantity trade-off
Sibship education Sibship education Sibship education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Sibship size −0.706*** −0.538** −0.511*** −0.434* −0.442*** −0.543**
(0.028) (0.218) (0.032) (0.231) (0.032) (0.222)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Cohort FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
House Wealth No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 7,134 7,134 7,134 7,134 7,027 7,027
R2 0.415 0.412 0.433 0.432 0.458 0.457
F-stat 103.0 119.1 125.3
Note: Columns 1, 3, and 5: OLS regression estimates of the effect of sibship size on sibship average
education. Columns 2, 4, 6: 2SLS regression estimates of the effect of sibship size on sibship aver-
age education where sibship size is instrumented with the occurrence of a female firstborn. Sample
of respondents to the fertility histories. Controls: categorical variables of parent’s education (not
completed primary, primary education, middle school education, high school or higher education),
sex, dummy variable for belonging to Han ethnicity, and dummy variable for living in a rural area.
House Wealth: dummy variables of whether the building is made of concrete, whether there is
running water in the residence, the existence of in-house bath or shower facilities, of a telephone
connection, availability of coal gas or natural gas, and whether the main source of cooking fuel is
coal, crop residue, or wood. F-stat reports the F-statistic of the excluded instruments test in the
first-stage.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-province
level in parentheses.
Table D.3: Variation in parental health indicators: By children’s gender
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
Incomplete primary −0.005 −0.005 −0.057 −0.072* 0.360*** 0.321***
(0.030) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.040)
Primary school 0.056* 0.027 0.051 0.057 0.557*** 0.517***
(0.030) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033) (0.039)
Middle School 0.116*** 0.109*** 0.132*** 0.097** 0.669*** 0.631***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.035) (0.039)
High School or more 0.167*** 0.179*** 0.182*** 0.147*** 0.803*** 0.797***
(0.034) (0.039) (0.046) (0.049) (0.039) (0.043)
Married 0.012 −0.023 0.200*** 0.202*** 0.038 0.049
(0.035) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042) (0.035) (0.041)
Han Ethnicity 0.027 0.015 −0.046 −0.095* 0.050 0.016
(0.044) (0.046) (0.052) (0.057) (0.046) (0.050)
Rural −0.060*** −0.057** −0.104*** −0.082*** −0.116*** −0.120***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.022) (0.024)
Children’s education (years) 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of children −0.023** −0.028** −0.009 −0.007 −0.025** −0.015
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,679 12,482 14,136 12,012 12,956 10,935
R2 0.129 0.117 0.090 0.080 0.251 0.256
Note: The table shows results from OLS regressions of associations between indices of parental physical, men-
tal, and cognitive health, and characteristics of parents and their children (by childrens’ gender). See Table
D.1 for a summary of the components integrating each of the health indices.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-province level in
parentheses.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table D.5: Variation in parental health indicators: Categorical variables
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incomplete primary 0.012 0.024 −0.050 −0.034 0.357*** 0.360***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Primary school 0.051* 0.080*** 0.056* 0.095*** 0.542*** 0.562***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Middle School 0.100*** 0.146*** 0.111*** 0.171*** 0.663*** 0.707***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
High School or more 0.174*** 0.234*** 0.175*** 0.261*** 0.805*** 0.879***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.042) (0.040) (0.036) (0.036)
Married 0.024 0.032 0.212*** 0.228*** 0.044 0.058*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.034)
Female −0.210*** −0.199*** −0.233*** −0.214*** −0.189*** −0.172***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Han Ethnicity 0.006 0.016 −0.056 −0.048 0.041 0.036
(0.038) (0.038) (0.047) (0.048) (0.043) (0.044)
Rural −0.064*** −0.088*** −0.095*** −0.127*** −0.128*** −0.154***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020)
Children’s education
Primary school 0.122*** 0.133*** 0.066**
(0.029) (0.033) (0.031)
Middle school 0.161*** 0.205*** 0.107***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.032)
High School 0.224*** 0.285*** 0.162***
(0.033) (0.036) (0.034)
College 0.245*** 0.327*** 0.272***
(0.034) (0.038) (0.036)
Number of children
Two children −0.002 −0.011 −0.019 −0.031 −0.026 −0.044*
(0.023) (0.022) (0.031) (0.030) (0.024) (0.024)
Three children −0.015 −0.033 0.002 −0.021 −0.038 −0.069**
(0.029) (0.028) (0.038) (0.037) (0.030) (0.030)
Four children −0.011 −0.037 −0.030 −0.066 −0.062 −0.100**
(0.040) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047) (0.040) (0.041)
Five or more children −0.068 −0.105** −0.008 −0.058 −0.083 −0.132**
(0.047) (0.047) (0.054) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052)
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,413 27,678 26,373 26,636 24,109 24,367
R2 0.129 0.125 0.088 0.082 0.261 0.256
Note: The table shows results from OLS regressions of associations between indices of parental physi-
cal, mental, and cognitive health, and characteristics of parents and their children. See Table D.1 for
a summary of the components integrating each of the health indices.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-province
level in parentheses.
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Table D.6: Firstborn’s sex-selection
Dep var: Firstborn is a girl
(1) (2)
Incomplete primary −0.024 −0.018
(0.019) (0.019)
Primary school 0.027 0.032
(0.019) (0.020)
Middle School −0.010 −0.005
(0.022) (0.022)










Respondent is female −0.017 −0.016
(0.014) (0.014)
Province FE No Yes
Observations 7,087 7,087
R2 0.002 0.005
Note: OLS estimates of regressing the incidence of
a firstborn girl on parental characteristics.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust
standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-
province level in parentheses.
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Table D.7: Direct effect of sex of firstborn on parental health
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: All
Firstborn female 0.017 0.000 0.010
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018)
Number of children −0.027*** −0.015 −0.030***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 10,564 10,281 9,568
R2 0.118 0.076 0.251
Panel B: Fathers
Firstborn female 0.018 −0.001 0.021
(0.024) (0.028) (0.024)
Number of children −0.025* −0.016 −0.042***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 5,013 4,912 4,745
R2 0.098 0.061 0.189
Panel C: Mothers
Firstborn female 0.008 −0.002 −0.008
(0.026) (0.030) (0.026)
Number of children −0.030* −0.015 −0.010
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 5,551 5,369 4,823
R2 0.107 0.065 0.266
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows OLS estimates of the effect of having a firstborn girl conditional on
the number of children on indices of parental physical, mental, and cognitive health. See Ta-
ble D.1 for a summary of the components integrating each of the health indices. Controls
include parent’s education (5 categories), marital status, a dummy variable for belonging to
Han ethnicity, and a dummy variable for living in a rural area. Panel A: Sample of all par-
ents (regressions control for the sex of the parent). Panel B: Sample of fathers. Panel C:
Sample of mothers.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-
province level in parentheses.
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Table D.8: Daughters’ education and parental outcomes (2SLS)
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All
Schooling 0.028 0.024 −0.022 −0.036 0.157** 0.178*
(0.043) (0.054) (0.057) (0.074) (0.067) (0.092)
Observations 12,527 12,482 12,057 12,012 10,965 10,935
F-stat 14.3 11.1 14.5 11.0 15.0 9.4
Panel B: Fathers
Schooling −0.071 −0.112 0.010 0.011 0.107 0.116
(0.081) (0.114) (0.083) (0.106) (0.072) (0.088)
Observations 5,838 5,834 5,672 5,670 5,457 5,457
F-stat 6.8 4.9 7.7 6.3 7.1 6.0
Panel C: Mothers
Schooling 0.108* 0.134* −0.058 −0.088 0.204** 0.265
(0.059) (0.079) (0.081) (0.111) (0.102) (0.189)
Observations 6,689 6,648 6,385 6,342 5,508 5,478
F-stat 7.9 6.2 7.0 4.9 7.0 3.3
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Second stage estimates of two-stage least squares regressions in which the dependent variables
are indices of parental physical, mental, and cognitive health, and the endogenous variable Schooling
is instrumented with a dummy variable indicating whether the daughter was affected by the exten-
sion in the minimum schooling period. See Table D.1 for a summary of the components integrat-
ing each of the health indices. Controls include parent’s education (5 categories), marital status, a
dummy for Han ethnicity, and a dummy for rural area. F-stat reports the F-statistic of the excluded
instruments test. Panel A: Sample of all parents and daughters (regressions also control for the sex of
the parent). Panel B: Sample of fathers and daughters. Panel C: Sample of mothers and daughters.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-province
level in parentheses.
Table D.9: Fertility and parental outcomes (2SLS)
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All
Number of children 0.043 0.029 −0.004 −0.014 0.009 0.001
(0.060) (0.059) (0.068) (0.066) (0.056) (0.055)
Observations 10,469 10,564 10,187 10,281 9,472 9,568
F-stat 149.6 154.9 169.1 176.1 182.7 181.4
Panel B: Fathers
Number of children 0.047 0.033 −0.009 −0.019 0.034 0.022
(0.075) (0.073) (0.084) (0.083) (0.069) (0.069)
Observations 4,967 5,013 4,867 4,912 4,699 4,745
F-stat 103.1 105.4 118.7 119.2 117.2 114.5
Panel C: Mothers
Number of children 0.013 −0.001 −0.011 −0.022 −0.032 −0.036
(0.089) (0.086) (0.098) (0.096) (0.083) (0.082)
Observations 5,502 5,551 5,320 5,369 4,773 4,823
F-stat 79.5 82.6 90.1 94.2 103.3 103.5
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Children’s education Yes No Yes No Yes No
Note: Second stage estimates of two-stage least squares regressions in which the dependent variables
are indices of parental physical, mental, and cognitive health, and the endogenous variable “Number
of children” is instrumented with the occurrence of a firstborn girl. See Table D.1 for a summary of
the components integrating each of the health indices. Controls include parent’s education (5 cate-
gories), marital status, a dummy for Han ethnicity, and a dummy for rural area. F-stat reports the
F-statistic of the excluded instruments test. Panel A: Sample of all parents (regressions also control
for the sex of the parent). Panel B: Sample of fathers. Panel C: Sample of mothers.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table D.12: Children’s education and parental outcomes: Alternative index construc-
tion methods
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PCA SEM PCA SEM PCA SEM
Panel A: Daughters on fathers
Treated −0.074 −0.067 0.040 0.028 0.126 0.126
(0.085) (0.084) (0.099) (0.098) (0.078) (0.080)
Observations 5,941 5,941 5,770 5,770 5,559 5,559
Panel B: Daughters on mothers
Treated 0.136** 0.123* −0.016 −0.034 0.203** 0.193**
(0.064) (0.065) (0.097) (0.099) (0.082) (0.080)
Observations 6,764 6,764 6,454 6,454 5,589 5,589
Panel C: Sons on fathers
Treated 0.109 0.108 0.046 0.053 −0.062 −0.056
(0.072) (0.071) (0.084) (0.085) (0.070) (0.071)
Observations 6,932 6,932 6,767 6,767 6,487 6,487
Panel D: Sons on mothers
Treated 0.030 0.035 0.132 0.125 0.040 0.050
(0.064) (0.064) (0.097) (0.097) (0.072) (0.072)
Observations 8,038 8,038 7,641 7,641 6,728 6,728
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: OLS regression estimates where the dependent variables are indices of parental physical, mental, and
cognitive health. See Table D.1 for a summary of the components integrating each of the health indices. The
independent variable Treated is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the child was affected by the extension in the
minimum compulsory schooling. In columns “PCA” the health index is a principal component variable con-
structed using principal component analysis. In Columns “SEM” the health index is a latent variable indicator
constructed from structural equation modelling. Controls include parent’s education (5 categories), marital
status, a dummy for Han ethnicity, and a dummy for rural area. Panel A: Sample of fathers and daughters.
Panel B: Sample of mothers and daughters. Panel C: Sample of fathers and sons. Panel D: Sample of mothers
and sons.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-province level in
parentheses.
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Table D.13: Fertility and parental outcomes: Alternative index construction methods
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PCA SEM PCA SEM PCA SEM
Panel A: All
Firstborn female 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.003 0.005
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 10,564 10,564 10,281 10,281 9,568 9,568
Panel B: Fathers
Firstborn female 0.007 0.007 −0.001 −0.002 0.007 0.007
(0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 5,013 5,013 4,912 4,912 4,745 4,745
Panel C: Mothers
Firstborn female 0.004 0.006 0.019 0.026 −0.007 −0.004
(0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 5,551 5,551 5,369 5,369 4,823 4,823
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: OLS estimates of the effect of having a firstborn girl on indices of parental physical, mental, and
cognitive health. See Table D.1 for a detailed description of the components integrating each of the
health indices. In columns “PCA” the health index is a principal component variable constructed us-
ing principal component analysis. In Columns “SEM” the health index is a latent variable indicator
constructed from structural equation modelling. Controls include parent’s education (5 categories),
marital status, a dummy for Han ethnicity, and a dummy for rural area. Panel A: Sample of all
parents (regressions also control for the sex of the parent). Panel B: Sample of fathers. Panel C:
Sample of mothers.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-province
level in parentheses.







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Reform exposure
Treated 0.017 0.013 0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020)
Observations 32,097 31,953 32,097 31,953 32,097 31,953
Mean depvar 0.140 0.139 0.166 0.165 0.228 0.226
Panel B: Parental fertility
Firstborn female −0.009 −0.008 −0.010 −0.008 −0.000 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 12,085 12,034 12,085 12,034 12,085 12,034
Mean depvar 0.139 0.138 0.165 0.164 0.226 0.225
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: OLS regression estimates where the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the health
index of a parent cannot be computed due to missing observations in any of the health components. Panel A:
Treated is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the child was affected by the extension in the minimum compulsory
schooling. Estimation sample includes all parents and children. Regressions include parent and child birth
cohort fixed effects, and province fixed effects. Panel B: Firstborn female is a dummy variable equal to 1 when
the firstborn is a girl. Estimation sample includes all parents. Regressions include parent birth cohort fixed
effects, and province fixed effects. Controls: parent’s education (5 categories), marital status, parent’s gender,
a dummy for Han ethnicity, and a dummy for rural area.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-province level in
parentheses.
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Table D.15: Effect of the compulsory schooling reform: CFPS dataset
Schooling (years) Middle school completion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Treated 0.481*** 0.233 0.751*** 0.029 −0.008 0.069***
(0.179) (0.288) (0.239) (0.020) (0.031) (0.024)
Girl −1.585*** −0.129***
(0.069) (0.007)
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26,121 12,764 13,357 26,121 12,764 13,357
R2 0.411 0.328 0.474 0.298 0.232 0.357
Note: OLS regression estimates where the dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is child’s com-
pleted years of education, and in columns 4 to 6 is a dummy variable for having completed
middle school (9 years of schooling). The independent variable Treated is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the child was affected by the extension in the minimum compulsory schooling.
Controls include father’s and mother’s education level (5 categories), a dummy variable for
belonging to the Han ethnicity, and a dummy variable for living in a rural area. The dataset
used is the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the child cohort-
province level in parentheses.
Appendix E
Parental health: fertility vs children’s
education
To simultaneously estimate the causal effect of offspring quantity and children’s ed-
ucation on parental health I need to make some adjustments to the regression spec-
ification. The problem arising is that one needs to include both the sample of sons
and daughters in the regression for the instrument of “First child female” to work.
However, as discussed previously, the extension in the minimum compulsory school-
ing period only created an exogenous shift in the education level of daughters (the
school reform is a weak instrument if used for the whole sample of children). I follow
two approaches to overcome this limitation. First, I estimate reduced form effects
differentiating whether the child exposed to the school reform was the son, or the





Where yj represents the different indices of parental health (physical, mental, and
cognitive health) of parent j. TreatSonicp is a dummy variable equal to one if the
son was affected by the introduction of the schooling reform, TreatDaughtericp is a
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dummy variable equal to one if the daughter was affected by the reform, and Girlfbj
records whether the firstborn child of parent j is a girl. ϕa are parent cohort fixed
effects, θc are children cohort fixed effects, µp are province fixed effects, and εi are
error terms. Moreover, J is a vector of characteristics that include the parent’s
education level, marital status and ethnicity, and a dummy for rural area.
Results are displayed in Table E.1. When all parents are pooled together (Panel
A), the estimated effect of having a daughter treated by the school reform is an in-
crease of 0.16 standard deviations in parental cognitive health (significant at the 5%
level, Column 3). Again, this effect is larger among the sample of mothers (Col-
umn 3 of Panel C). The effect of daughters’ education on maternal physical health,
although positive, is lower in magnitude than previously estimated and no longer
statistically significant. Fertility does not have a statistically significant effect on
long-term parental health.
Second, to obtain instrumental variables estimates, and given the no effect of the
school reform on the education of sons, I instrument children’s education with a
variable that takes the value of 1 if the daughter was affected by the school reform,
and 0 otherwise. That is, the variable is always 0 for sons. The number of children
is instrumented with the occurrence of a female firstborn. I estimate the following
two-stage least squares regression with two instrumental variables:
Sj = ρ0 + ρ1Girl
fb
j + ρ2Treat(Daughter)icp + τ
′
1J + ϕa + θc + µp + ε1i (E.2)




2J + ϕa + θc + µp + ε2i (E.3)
yj = γ0 + βÊicp + γ1Ŝj + Ω
′J + ϕa + θc + µp + ui (E.4)
In equation E.2, Sj denotes the number of children of parent j, and Girlfbj de-
notes whether the firstborn child of parent j is a girl. In equation E.3, Eicp de-
notes the level of education attained by child i born in cohort c and province p,
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and Treat(Daughter)icp is a dummy variable equal to one when the daughter was
affected by the extension in the minimum compulsory schooling. Equations E.2 and
E.3 are the first-stage regressions. In equation E.4, yj represents the different indices
of parental health (physical, mental, and cognitive health) of parent j, Êicp are the
children’s education predicted values estimated from equation E.3, and Ŝj are the
number of children predicted value estimated from equation E.2. Similar to the no-
tation previously described, ϕa are parent cohort fixed effects, θc are children cohort
fixed effects, µp are province fixed effects, and ε1i, ε2i, and ui are the error terms.
Moreover, J is a vector of characteristics that include the parent’s education level,
marital status and ethnicity, and a dummy for rural area.
Consistent with previous results, Panel A in Table E.2 show no statistically signifi-
cant effects from the number of children on parental health in later life. On the other
hand, an additional year in the schooling of daughters increases parents’ cognition
by 0.14 standard deviations (significant at the 5% level, Column 3).
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Table E.1: Quantity vs Quality and parental outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
Panel A: All
Treated Son 0.012 0.016 −0.008
(0.044) (0.066) (0.050)
Treated Daughter −0.004 −0.006 0.160**
(0.050) (0.069) (0.065)
Firstborn female 0.019 0.007 0.005
(0.019) (0.022) (0.019)
Observations 27,675 26,632 24,363
Panel B: Fathers
Treated Son 0.042 −0.067 −0.053
(0.059) (0.074) (0.067)
Treated Daughter −0.101 0.004 0.140*
(0.072) (0.097) (0.082)
Firstborn female 0.021 0.015 0.010
(0.025) (0.029) (0.024)
Observations 12,873 12,537 12,046
Panel C: Mothers
Treated Son −0.021 0.095 0.049
(0.061) (0.098) (0.072)
Treated Daughter 0.086 −0.033 0.192**
(0.065) (0.096) (0.087)
Firstborn female 0.011 −0.002 −0.002
(0.026) (0.031) (0.027)
Observations 14,802 14,095 12,317
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Child Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: OLS regressions in which the dependent variables are indices of parental physical, men-
tal, and cognitive health; the independent variables “Treated Son” and “Treated Daughter”
are dummy variables that take the value of 1 when the son or the daughter, respectively,
were affected by the extension in the minimum compulsory schooling; and the independent
variable “First child female” takes the value of 1 in the event of a female firstborn. See Ta-
ble D.1 for a summary of the components integrating each of the health indices. Controls
include parent’s education (5 categories), marital status, a dummy for Han ethnicity, and a
dummy for rural area. Panel A: Sample of all parents and children (regressions also control
for the sex of the parent). Panel B: Sample of fathers and all children. Panel C: Sample of
mothers and all children.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-
province level in parentheses.
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Table E.2: Quantity vs Quality and parental outcomes: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Physical Health Index Mental Health Index Cognitive Health Index
Panel A: All
Schooling (daughters) −0.000 −0.014 0.142**
(0.044) (0.060) (0.065)
Number of children 0.075 0.028 −0.071
(0.080) (0.082) (0.080)
Observations 27,161 26,148 23,891
SW F-stat: Schooling 16.1 16.4 17.0
SW F-stat: Sibship size 22.4 29.5 26.1
Panel B: Fathers
Schooling (daughters) −0.074 0.010 0.122
(0.080) (0.082) (0.077)
Number of children 0.137 0.037 −0.048
(0.110) (0.103) (0.098)
Observations 12,634 12,314 11,826
SW F-stat: Schooling 7.9 10.1 8.9
SW F-stat: Sibship size 11.0 17.0 12.6
Panel C: Mothers
Schooling (daughters) 0.060 −0.049 0.167*
(0.054) (0.086) (0.095)
Number of children −0.004 0.016 −0.097
(0.108) (0.117) (0.111)
Observations 14,527 13,834 12,065
SW F-stat: Schooling 9.4 8.3 7.3
SW F-stat: Sibship size 14.8 18.0 17.3
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Parent Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Child Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Second stage estimates of two-stage least squares regressions in which the dependent vari-
ables are indices of parental physical, mental, and cognitive health. See Table D.1 for a summary
of the components integrating each of the health indices. The endogenous variable “Schooling
(daughters)” is instrumented with a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the daughter was
affected by the school reform and a value of 0 otherwise. The endogenous variable “Number of
children” is instrumented with the occurrence of a firstborn daughter. SW F-stat reports the
F-statistic of the Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) test of excluded instruments in IV models
with multiple endogenous variables. Controls include parent’s education (5 categories), marital
status, a dummy for Han ethnicity, and a dummy for rural area. Panel A: Sample of all parents
and children (regressions also control for the sex of the parent). Panel B: Sample of fathers and
all children. Panel C: Sample of mothers and all children.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent cohort-
province level in parentheses.
219
Conclusion
This thesis examines different dimensions of human capital: investment decisions,
resilience, and spillovers.
Chapter 1 investigates the origins of investment gaps in children by focusing on dif-
ferences in parental expectations about the rate of return to investments, preferences
for child developmental outcomes, and financial or psychic constraints. The chapter
shows that differences in maternal beliefs regarding the technology of skills formation,
and in the perceived cost associated with investments in children both contribute to
explaining the observed heterogeneity in maternal investments across families. On
the other hand, there seems to be no differences in preferences over child developmen-
tal outcomes in rural Pakistan. The study provides the first evidence for maternal
investments in newborns in a developing country using subjective expectations of the
returns, and the first estimates in any context of the link between perceived cost of
effort and investment constraints. Policy simulations suggest that increasing mothers’
beliefs about returns and alleviating the effort cost can substantially increase average
investments in children. However, future research should explore how women’s ex-
pectations on the productivity of investments can be changed, and identify the most
cost-effective approaches to reduce the effort cost among mothers.
Chapter 2 shows that universal healthcare protected the educational achievement
of primary school children in Mexico in the event of adverse shocks. The results doc-
ument synergies from public investments in education and health and suggest higher
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returns to educational investments when the ability of families to endure shocks is
increased. The expansion in health coverage mitigated the negative effect of rainfall
shocks on children’s health among program-eligible households, reduced the demand
for children’s time, and reduced fluctuations in household’s consumption. The find-
ing contributes to a new stream of research investigating the extent to which shocks
to human capital during childhood can be mitigated through different policies or in-
terventions. The result that universal healthcare builds resilience in cognitive devel-
opment among children exposed to environmental shocks is important, since climate
disturbances are increasing in frequency and intensity. Results are also significant
given the growing number of countries expanding healthcare coverage among the
disadvantaged population, and should be taken into consideration when carrying a
cost-benefit analysis of public investments in health.
The third chapter in this thesis inspects human capital spillovers. It examines
whether fertility decisions and parental investments in children affect parental health
outcomes in later life. This is different from previous studies on fertility choices
(which use models of parental utility maximization) and studies on the intergenera-
tional transmission of poverty (which do not consider the extent to which parents are
affected by the lower human capital of their offspring). Using the higher preference of
Chinese households for sons and the quasi-random assignment of sex of the firstborn
to instrument for sibship size, I find that higher fertility does not have any direct
effect on parental physical, mental, or cognitive health. On the other hand, increased
schooling among daughters stemming from an extension to the minimum compulsory
schooling period improved parental cognitive attainment (especially among mothers)
and maternal physical health in later life. The results document positive spillovers
from investing in girls’ education as a means to reduce gender inequalities, and sug-
gest underestimated impacts of educational programs targeting girls when failing to
account for the positive externalities accruing to their mothers.
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